The big cinematic moment in Christopher Nolan’s “Oppenheimer,” teased from the very beginning, comes when the Trinity test is represented on screen. It is one of relatively few scenes not focused entirely on the film’s titular scientist, played by remarkable lookalike Cillian Murphy.
Everything is fire and flame, otherworldly colors and massive, alien shapes. These cues communicate a clear message: The atom bomb is not like anything else. It is a hole in our everyday world through which the incomprehensible force of the primal universe thunders in. It is awful and terrible in the original sense of these words: It inspires awe and terror. The most striking real-life account of Trinity came from Brigadier General Thomas Farrell, not depicted in the film, who called the test “magnificent,” “beautiful” and “terrifying.”
As the film recounts, Trinity witnesses reported total silence immediately after seeing the blast. This moment of awe could be what philosophers call “the sublime:” a mix of beauty and horror, fear and attraction, grandeur so overwhelming that we feel like we don’t exist. The rational order that we create to understand and master the world seems to fail. “There are no words” is a common sentiment.
But then words came rushing in to fill the gap. Many were religious, since no other frame seemed adequate. Farrell wrote that the roar of the test “warned of doomsday and made us feel that we puny things were blasphemous to dare tamper with the forces heretofore reserved to the Almighty.” Oppenheimer’s famous Bhagavad Gita (mis-)quote “I am become death, the destroyer of worlds” is another example. Nuclear weapons themselves took on their own godlike persona: instead of many bombs, we had The Bomb.

Conceiving of the bomb
Two atom bombs were dropped on Japan and many more detonated around the world, primarily on the lands of indigenous and marginalized peoples, where their raw materials also originated. The full-scale nuclear exchange of Cold War fantasy, however, exists only in imagination. Faced with something so wildly beyond the scale of our daily realities, we seek out ways to make it fit into our preexisting views of the world.
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This is arguably the most important problem of nuclear war: There is no point of reference our minds can grasp. It is just too big for us to understand, and our efforts to do so suggest disturbing conclusions about our rational abilities. Our fantasies never exist in a vacuum. Even nuclear science fiction influences them — and if the story about Truman reviewing a poem about aerial superweapons before deciding to bomb Hiroshima is true, it always has.
One path for coping with the sublime terror of nuclear war is apocalypticism, either religious or secular. The end-of-the-world discourse of nuclear war fits into many narratives about destruction and renewal. For the world to be regenerated, it must first be destroyed. Maybe we should “force the end,” as many religious extremists seem to think, to speed up the process of salvation.
The rationality of deterrence assumes that everyone wants to avoid such a war, but apocalyptic thinking presents an entirely different set of values. Religious belief undeniably affects policymaking, but so do other convictions. It has been argued that Vladimir Putin subscribes to a secular version of this belief in purifying cataclysm, with a salvific role for Russia bringing purity to a fallen world.
Another avenue for nuclear mastery is to reassert reason. If the (imagined) reality of the Bomb is too big, we can get a handle on it not by surrendering to religious frames but by creating the language to make nuclear war manageable and thinkable again. This is a classic rhetorical response: Anything that can be named can be controlled.
Defense intellectuals are notoriously fond of acronyms: ICBM, SLBM, CEP, TEL, ALCM, TNW, BNW. Euphemisms are popular, too. Anodyne phrases in the mold of other bureaucratic language makes the nuclear threat easier to swallow. Collateral damage, not incinerated children. Nuclear exchange, not mutual genocide. Countervalue targeting, not aiming to kill civilians. Nukes, almost cute, instead of nuclear weapons.
“Nukespeak” may make nuclear war easier to grasp, but when nuclear war becomes more thinkable, it may also become more likely. Pioneering researcher Carol Cohn listened to the ways nuclear intellectuals actually talked about their weapons and noticed an undercurrent of masculine sexuality that can’t easily be explained away. Stanley Kubrick’s classic “Dr. Strangelove” parodies this attitude with the opening scenes of aerial refueling and General Turgidson’s childish enthusiasm about the capabilities of bomber aircraft.
Cohn found that supposedly hyper-rational lab personnel would seek out the thrill of contact with these terrible weapons, a phenomenon called “patting the bomb.” This mix of sex and death is even present in the film as Oppenheimer’s infamous “I am become death” line is delivered (quite ahistorically, I suspect) at the behest of his mistress during sex.

Irrational choices
Since the first Soviet nuclear test in 1949, the world’s greatest powers have lived under the dubious shield of nuclear deterrence. Deterrence doctrine is based on rational choice theory, the notion that each actor will make choices to maximize self-interest, which is also the basis for much contemporary thinking in economics.
The outcome of a nuclear war would be catastrophic. During the Cold War, when both the warheads and the arsenals were much larger, humanity faced the real prospect of extinction if these weapons were ever used. States developed war plans to make their threats credible in the hope that they would never be carried out because enemies would calculate that the costs outweighed the benefits.
Any speculation about the causes and prevention of nuclear war is already theoretical since there is no empirical data about how a full-scale superpower nuclear conflict would start. Indeed, as two academics observed decades ago, if nuclear war is so bad that it would never happen on purpose, then any cause we could predict would be avoided, meaning that if a nuclear war ever happens it will be for reasons that we don’t foresee.
The threat of retaliation was the ultimate guarantee of security: If you attack me, I will attack you, killing perhaps tens of millions of your people, which outweighs any gains you might hope to achieve by striking first. Nuclear weapons are a kind of communication technology: To be deterred, everyone has to know that you have these weapons and believe that your threats to use them are credible, at least in response to an attack. Conventional wars may rage with proxies or non-nuclear states, but the forces of nuclear powers will never engage in direct combat with each other. As long as leaders keep a cool head and act rationally, everybody lives.
Herein lies a paradox: it is rational to threaten retaliation, but it is not rational to actually do it. If Joe Biden was informed tomorrow that the North American Aerospace Defense Command picked up hundreds of incoming Russian missiles, he would have no way of stopping the warheads. Tens of millions of Americans would die. Choosing to retaliate would just add tens of millions of dead Russians, the vast majority innocent and unaware that the “war” had even started. This would amount to an act of vengeful genocide for no strategic gain.
This is a contradiction identified long ago by Gregory Kavka in his “Toxin Puzzle:” to be rational, we must intend to do something irrational, but simultaneously not intend to do it. Our enemies must believe that we are rational for deterrence to work, but must believe at the same time that we would make irrational choices, or the whole thing falls apart.
Even if this particular paradox can be resolved, for nuclear deterrence theory to work, it is not enough for leaders to be rational even 99% of the time. One misstep could end the world. We know, however, that people are not always rational. Even government figures often make decisions against their own interests out of bigotry, ignorance or just plain stupidity. Maybe, as Biden said of Putin, leaders are usually rational but sometimes miscalculate. The most irrational thing we could believe about our leaders is that they, unlike us, make perfectly rational decisions every time.
Social science research reveals that we are actually pretty bad at making good decisions as individuals — what we’re really good at is convincing other people, and ourselves, that we know what we’re doing even when we don’t. Given the very short warning times between detection of a launch and decision to retaliate, leaders will have to make almost impossible choices with limited input under the most stressful circumstances imaginable. They will almost certainly have incomplete or even totally inaccurate information. Even rational leaders might get it wrong if they mistakenly believe that they are under attack.

Only human
In one sense, “Oppenheimer” is a story about the triumph of rationality. Brilliant scientists work with hard-headed military men like General Groves, combining genius and organizational efficiency. The number of equations hastily drawn on chalkboards is this film is astounding. Yes, there are important moral questions about the Trinity test and subsequent bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but at some fundamental level this is a parable of pure reason.
“Oppenheimer” has plenty of talk about neutron bombardments, U235 and quantum mechanics. But perhaps the most revealing part of the film is about human frailty, not science. Much of the story is about Oppenheimer’s romantic affairs, hubris, and sloppy relationships. He struggles with and against the stubbornness and ambition of fellow physicist Edward Teller (Benny Safdie) and is partially undone by the spite and jealousy of Lewis Strauss (Robert Downey Jr.). The film even portrays Oppenheimer’s alleged (but contested) attempt to poison his tutor after a classroom slight.
The film’s characters are not disembodied minds. They are human beings mired in webs of pathos, making decisions that are impulsive, self-defeating and often petty — and making them about “the most important thing to ever happen in the history of the world.” This conflict between the pure rationality of theory and the messy truth that fleshy apes do stupid things even when they might kill everyone cuts to the core of the nuclear threat. Seen this way, the film hints at the ways that nuclear weapons, the greatest scientific achievement of the twentieth century, undo the rationality upon which science itself is supposed to be built.
“Oppenheimer” is a story of scientific achievement mixed with intrigue, deception, and dishonesty. Ultimately, the film, like the book, mirrors the story of Prometheus, who discovered great technical achievement but along the way introduced new, almost incomprehensible, danger. It is a story about how a litany of human traits, from zealotry to ambition to lust, grip even those who see the nuances in reality to which most of us are blind.
Though it is not primarily a commentary on nuclear policy, “Oppenheimer’s” story of quantum physics reveals more than the probabilistic universe underneath our shared perceptions. It reveals the fragility of the human beings who make our most consequential choices. It offers no solutions but should encourage us to think about how much faith we put in reason when the stakes are so high. There may come a time when we all share the apple, realizing only too late that we chose to poison it ourselves.
Calum Matheson is Chair of the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh and author of “Desiring the Bomb: Communication, Psychoanalysis, and the Atomic Age.”




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