The country owes a debt of gratitude to Justice Amy Coney Barrett and Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson. Their opposing opinions in Trump v. CASA, Inc. — the nationwide injunctions case — not only illustrate competing visions of judicial review in our constitutional republic but also the roots of the judicial tyranny that had threatened to engulf us.
For the first two centuries of our national existence, we saw no injunctions except as applied to the parties in the dispute before a court. The twist with nationwide injunctions is that they allow forum-shopped judges to use that dispute to frustrate national policies set by democratically elected branches.
Humbling the courts
They are largely a product of the 21st Century. Six such injunctions were entered against the George W. Bush administration. Twelve such injunctions were entered against the Obama administration. Sixty-four were entered against the first Trump administration, 22 against the Biden administration, and — in its first six months in office — 40 against the second Trump administration.
Judges appointed by Democrats enjoined Republican presidents. Judges appointed by Republicans enjoined Democrat presidents. The Democrats were obviously better at it than the Republicans, but neither party has clean hands.
Against this alarming usurpation of power by the federal judiciary, we see Justice Barrett’s majority opinion honoring Alexander Hamilton’s admonition in Federalist 78 that the federal judiciary should be “the least dangerous branch.” She traces the authority of federal courts to the Constitution and to the statutory foundation for federal judicial power.
She concludes that federal district courts have not been vested with the power to enter injunctions that extend beyond the case before them. In effect, She takes a vow of humility on behalf of the federal judiciary, as the Founders envisaged.
Justice Jackson will have none of this. She refers to Justice Barrett’s analysis as mind numbing “legalese.” She accuses the Court’s majority of “enabling our collective demise.”
As for Justice Barrett’s careful examination of the sources of judicial power, she thinks the majority is swimming in “minutiae.” She doesn’t much care whether federal judges have been lawfully vested with power.
Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion has been heavily criticized for its histrionics. To many commentators, her denigration of Justice Barrett’s constitutional analysis as mere “legalese” was a disparagement of the very institution in which the justices serve.
Courts acting as legislatures
The rule of law depends upon such analysis to keep us tethered to our founding ideas and structure and to laws subsequently enacted by the democratically-elected branches of government. Otherwise, unelected judges with life tenure would rule our country.
But there is context to Justice Jackson’s dissent. One can understand her outrage without agreeing that she should be allowed to act as a free-range dispenser of justice.
When Earl Warren became Chief Justice of the United States in 1953, America embarked on a new era of constitutional jurisprudence. The Warren Court and the Court of Chief Justice Warren Burger often viewed the Court as a super legislature that could enact its preferences without regard to the underlying law.
In 1954, the Warren Court in Brown v. Board of Education ruled that racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional — a happy and necessary result.
But instead of straightforwardly saying that public money used to discriminate on the basis of race violates the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, it unnecessarily relied on social science research arguing that racial discrimination is a bad thing. It thus acted as a legislature would and opened the Court up to criticism that it was exceeding its constitutional authority.
In 1965, the Warren Court in Griswold v. Connecticut found a right for married couples to use contraceptives in a “penumbra,” or shadow, cast by the explicit constitutional provisions. The penumbra was a mere contrivance for the Court to enact its view of public policy when there was no constitutional warrant in the text of the Constitution.
In 1973, the Burger Court in Roe v. Wade invented a right to abortion without a constitutional foundation. Again invoking penumbras, it accentuated its policymaking with an elaborate structure based on the trimesters of a pregnancy. Seven old men (the majority in Roe) opined on the particulars of pregnancy. Need I say more?
The Warren and Burger Courts’ dissenters did not disparage the majority for practicing “legalese” or swimming in “minutiae.” This was because the leftist majorities did not meaningfully bother with constitutional or other legal analysis. They simply asserted their views of the right policy, as the democratically-elected branches would.
The justice’s real problem
Justice Jackson’s real problem with Justice Barrett’s approach is that the Court’s majority has flipped. It’s best to leave that legal analysis stuff to conservative dissenters, she might have said, as the Warren and Burger Courts did.
Justice Barrett summed up the source of Justice Jackson’s frustration: “Justice Jackson decries an imperial Executive while embracing an imperial Judiciary.”
Justice Barrett might well have added: Not on my watch.
Peter Kalis was, before his retirement, chairman and global managing partner of K&L Gates. He writes every other Wednesday. His previous article was “The Steelers halfback who defended the Constitution against the Supreme Court.”




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