Some wars last a lot lon­ger than oth­ers, even when one has lost, or at any rate can’t win. Why do some lead­ers take de­cades to ne­go­ti­ate peace? Do some con­flicts con­tinue end­lessly, with all the suf­fer­ing and de­struc­tion they cause, merely be­cause the lead­ers are numb­skulls?

In some cases — es­pe­cially in dic­ta­tor­ships where de­ci­sions re­ally can come down to one per­son — block­headed lead­ers are to blame. Dic­ta­tors fre­quently don’t care if peo­ple die, so long as they can pre­tend they are not los­ers.

But in other con­flicts — I think of my own area of ex­per­tise, Europe in the 16th and 17th cen­tu­ries — there are struc­tural rea­sons that make it hard for lead­ers to rec­og­nize that they have in fact lost.

The big na­tion couldn’t win

The Thirty Years War (1618-1648), for ex­am­ple, lasted so long be­cause (among other rea­sons) the Hab­s­burgs were the might­i­est power in Europe. They were Emper­ors of Ger­many and kings of Spain, Por­tu­gal, Na­ples and Sic­ily, Hun­gary, and rul­ers of Aus­tria and what is now the Czech Re­pub­lic.

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They were fight­ing against their Czech sub­jects, and then against the Elec­tor Pal­a­tine, whom they de­feated, and then the King of Den­mark, whom again they de­feated. They couldn’t be­lieve that they could not win a com­plete vic­tory — even though a ma­jor power, France, was fund­ing their op­po­nents be­hind the scenes. Even­tu­ally, France just de­clared war di­rectly.

Sim­i­larly, the Hab­s­burgs had lost the Eighty Years War (1566-1648) against the Dutch, their for­mer sub­jects, who had re­belled against them. The Dutch prov­inces were so small — but they were wealthy, their cit­ies were heav­ily for­ti­fied, and they could stop the Hab­s­burgs’ army any­time it be­came nec­es­sary by breach­ing their dikes. It is par­tic­u­larly hard for a large power to rec­og­nize that it has been de­feated by a small one.

A sim­i­lar dy­namic seems to be at work in the con­tem­po­rary world. If you want to ne­go­ti­ate suc­cess­fully, you can’t use the oc­ca­sion to feel bet­ter by scream­ing out your an­ger. You have to com­pro­mise, and that means you have to have a calm, re­al­is­tic as­sess­ment of what’s pos­si­ble.

When na­tions get stuck in end­less war, their par­ti­sans get ever more emo­tional, shriek­ing about how just their cause is and how de­monic their op­po­nents are. Even if it is true that your op­po­nents are bru­tal and com­mit war crimes ... you still have to deal with them. They are not go­ing away.

The Pal­es­tin­ians can’t ei­ther

This brings me to the lon­gest last­ing, per­haps most in­trac­ta­ble con­flict to­day, that in the Mid­dle East. I fear that the Pal­es­tin­ian lead­er­ship has the same dif­fi­cul­ties that the Hab­s­burgs had in the sev­en­teenth cen­tury.

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Be­cause of the pe­cu­liar cir­cum­stances of the con­flict, they can see them­selves as the top dogs, com­pared to the em­bat­tled Is­rae­lis, since there are a lot more Arab Muslims than Jews, and we know who sur­rounds who and which side has the oil. They be­lieve that even­tu­ally they must win, and there­fore they’re un­will­ing to com­pro­mise.

But they see them­selves as the un­der­dogs, com­pared to the suc­cess­ful Is­rae­lis. They feel op­pressed while be­liev­ing that even­tu­ally they must win, and there­fore they’re even more un­will­ing to com­pro­mise.

The con­flict should have ended back when Bill Clin­ton was Pres­i­dent, over 20 years ago. Clin­ton later wrote of those ne­go­ti­a­tions, “It was his­toric: an Is­raeli gov­ern­ment had said that to get peace, there would be a Pal­es­tin­ian state in roughly 97 per­cent of the West Bank, count­ing the [land] swap, and all of Gaza, where Is­rael also had set­tle­ments. The ball was in Ara­fat’s court.”

But Ara­fat never re­sponded to the pro­posal. In 2007, Pal­es­tin­ian ne­go­ti­a­tors treated a sim­i­lar (even slightly bet­ter) pro­posal from Is­raeli Prime Min­is­ter Ehud Olm­ert the same way. Ap­par­ently, they hope that if they wait for­ever, they will get ev­ery­thing they be­lieve they are en­ti­tled to — that is, to­tal vic­tory.

Pal­es­tin­ian lead­ers need to rec­og­nize that Is­rae­lis aren’t go­ing away. They have no­where to go, and know no other home — and just in case any­one has for­got­ten, they have nu­clear weap­ons. Pal­es­tin­ian sup­port­ers must rec­og­nize that Is­rael ex­ists.

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Pal­es­tin­ian lead­ers have de­manded a re­turn to the pre-1967 sta­tus quo for 50 years. This isn’t se­ri­ous ne­go­ti­at­ing. If your de­mands never change, you don’t re­ally want a deal. But the sta­tus quo fa­vors Is­rael.

Nor can the Is­rae­lis

In the cur­rent cli­mate, Is­rael’s Prime Min­is­ter Ben­ja­min Netan­yahu is also an ob­sta­cle to peace. Some­time, per­haps shortly be­fore he comes up for re-elec­tion, the Arab world needs to pro­pose a cred­i­ble peace pro­posal, so that Is­raeli vot­ers have a good rea­son to vote Netan­yahu out of of­fice.

Un­til then, while Pal­es­tin­ian lead­ers keep de­ny­ing re­al­ity and the ac­tiv­ists keep scream­ing “No justice, no peace,” peo­ple keep kill­ing each other end­lessly. The worst peo­ple con­trol events. And there’s noth­ing just about that.

Al­lan Tulchin is pro­fes­sor of his­tory at Ship­pens­burg Univer­sity.