It’s usually liberals warning that populism or Trumpism is steering the United States toward civil war. But in France and Britain, it’s usually conservatives who are preoccupied with looming civil war.
For years, figures associated with the French right and French military have warned of an impending civil conflict driven by the country’s failure to assimilate immigrants from the Muslim world. (The great reactionary novelist Michel Houellebecq’s “Submission” famously imagines this war being averted by the sudden conversion of French elites to Islam.)
In Britain conservative writers have touched off a similar discussion, arguing that multicultural Britain is in danger of tearing itself apart, and warning that British elites are increasingly fearful of organized violence from nativists and radicalized immigrants alike.
More separatism and discontent
When I’ve written skeptically about scenarios for an U.S. civil war, I’ve tended to stress several realities: the absence of a clear geographical division between our contending factions; the diminishment, not exacerbation, of racial and ethnic polarization in the Trump era; the fact that we’re rich and aging and comfortable, not poor and young and desperate, giving even groups that hate each other a stake in the system and elites strong reasons to sustain it; the absence of enthusiasm for organized communal violence as opposed to lone-wolf forays.
Tensions between natives and new arrivals are common on both sides of the Atlantic, but ethnic and religious differences arguably loom larger in Europe than they do in the United States.
There is more intense cultural separatism in immigrant communities in suburban Paris or Marseilles than in Los Angeles or Chicago, more simmering discontent that easily turns to riots.
At the same time, British and French elites have been more successful than American elites at keeping populist forces out of power. But their tools — excluding populists from government and an increasingly authoritarian throttling of free speech — have markedly diminished their own legitimacy among discontented natives.
This means that neither under-assimilated immigrants nor working-class whites feel especially invested in the system. That makes multiple forms of political violence more plausible: pitting immigrant or native rebels against the government, or pitting immigrants against natives with the government trying to suppress the conflict, or, finally, pitting different immigrant groups against one another. (English cities have already seen bursts of Muslim-Hindu violence.)
Then, too, Western Europe’s economies have grown more sluggishly than America’s for the last decade, reducing ordinary people’s stake in the current order and encouraging alienation and resistance.
Finally there are arguably geographic concentrations of discontent — in the north of England, or in immigrant-dominated cities that could become ungovernable — that don’t exist in quite the same way in the United States.
A progressive correction
All of this adds up, I would say, to a useful corrective to the progressive tendency to regard America in the Trump era as a great outlier, uniquely divided and deranged and threatened by factional strife, while liberal politics continues more or less as usual among our respectable and stable European allies.
Not so: There are clearly ways in which Europe’s problems and divides are deeper than our own, with economic and demographic trends that portend darker possibilities, and the establishment attempt to keep populist forces at bay may end up remembered as accelerating liberal Europe’s downfall.
Yet many of the reasons to doubt the imminence of civil war in America still apply to Western Europe.
The continent is more stagnant than the United States, but still rich and comfortable and aged and there’s enthusiasm for rioting but rather less for organized violence. For all the palpable disillusionment, it is hard to glimpse any elite faction emerging — right or left, nativist or “Islamo-Gauchiste” — that would see violent revolution as an obvious means to its ambitions.
Meanwhile, distinctive European conditions make civil war less likely there than in the United States. Smaller nations with more centralized political systems generally find it easier to police dissent, and there’s no Second Amendment or American-style gun culture to challenge the European state’s monopoly on force.
Ultimately I agree with British writer Aris Roussinos, a pessimist but not a catastrophist. He writes that the most likely near-future scenarios involve increasing “outbursts of violent disorder,” but not the kind of collapse of central government authority, complete with ethnic cleansing and refugee flows, that the language of “civil war” implies.
And that difference matters.
Chaos, not civil war
If you use a civil-war framing to describe a world where rioting is more commonplace and assassination attempts and random forms of terrorism make a comeback, you’re using terms that misleadingly or hysterically evoke Antietam or Guernica to describe realities that big diverse societies often have to live with.
I don’t think America in the 1960s and 1970s experienced a civil war, even though those were certainly chaotic decades. I don’t think modern France, with its long tradition of student protests and urban riots, has existed in a perpetual state of civil war.
As we face a future that’s clearly more destabilized than the post-Cold War era, we must be realistic: We are still far more likely to be navigating a more chaotic landscape together, as fellow citizens, than shooting at one another across a sectional divide.
Ross Douthat is a columnist for The New York Times, where this article first appeared. His previous article was “Donald Trump's 'Taco' presidency is the reason he survives.”




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