I’m try­ing to fig­ure out why I’m so deeply trou­bled by the re­sult in Murthy v. Mis­souri, where the Supreme Court dis­missed a law­suit that chal­lenged the Biden ad­min­is­tra­tion’s “jaw­bon­ing” of so­cial me­dia com­pa­nies to re­move cer­tain posts about COVID-19 and the 2020 elec­tion.

In an opin­ion writ­ten by Justice Amy Coney Bar­rett for a 6-3 ma­jor­ity, the justices de­ter­mined that the plain­tiffs lack stand­ing, a pre­req­ui­site for a law­suit. Maybe they do. Yet I keep com­ing back to hy­po­thet­i­cals that be­gin: “Let’s imag­ine it’s still the McCarthy era” or “Sup­pose for the sake of ar­gu­ment that Don­ald Trump wins the pres­i­den­tial elec­tion.”

Keep gov­ern­ment far away

Per­haps the rea­son I’m trou­bled is that I deeply, sin­cerely and pas­sion­ately be­lieve that the free­dom of speech is cen­tral to de­moc­racy. The gov­ern­ment should be forced to keep its fin­gers far away from the le­vers of speech reg­u­la­tion for the same rea­son that a bank shouldn’t hire a con­victed em­bez­zler: temp­ta­tion, temp­ta­tion, temp­ta­tion.

The Murthy case arose as a chal­lenge by three in­di­vid­u­als and two states to con­tent mod­er­a­tion de­ci­sions by so­cial me­dia com­pa­nies. As pri­vate com­pa­nies plainly have the power to do ex­actly that, or­di­nar­ily an un­happy user could at best sue for breach of con­tract. (And quickly lose.)

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Here, how­ever, the plain­tiffs ar­gued that the mod­er­a­tion de­ci­sions re­sulted from pres­sure by Biden ad­min­is­tra­tion of­fi­cials, giv­ing their case First Amend­ment im­pli­ca­tions. It’s a well-es­tab­lished prin­ci­ple that if the gov­ern­ment can’t cen­sor, it can’t co­erce pri­vate ac­tors to cen­sor ei­ther.

Whether a gov­ern­ment cam­paign to get so­cial me­dia com­pa­nies to re­strict “mis­in­for­ma­tion” con­sti­tutes un­con­sti­tu­tional co­er­cion is an im­por­tant ques­tion. But the justices kicked the can down the road.

As Bar­rett ex­plained, the plain­tiffs were for the most part un­able to point to spe­cific harms that they had suf­fered; and, to the ex­tent that they did claim harms, they had not al­leged facts suf­fi­cient to show that those harms stemmed from the ad­min­is­tra­tion’s ac­tions.

For ex­am­ple, one plain­tiff al­leged the fol­low­ing se­quence of events: The gov­ern­ment asked Face­book to take down cer­tain anti-vac­cine posts. Face­book emailed back that it had done so.

After that, the plain­tiff’s anti-vac­cine sen­ti­ments were re­moved. Given the time­line, writes the ma­jor­ity, it’s hard to see how that gov­ern­ment re­quest could have led to the re­moval of her posts, spe­cif­i­cally.

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The ma­jor­ity’s mis­take

I share the view that stand­ing is of bed­rock im­por­tance. But here, with re­spect, the ma­jor­ity’s anal­y­sis seems not quite right.

In 1954, Har­vard cash­iered a pro­fes­sor at the med­i­cal school af­ter con­gres­sio­nal Red-bait­ers called for her dis­missal af­ter she re­fused to tes­tify at a hear­ing about Com­mu­nism. Later, the uni­ver­sity dumped a psy­chol­ogy pro­fes­sor who did the same.

Even if the McCarthy­ites com­plained only about the first pro­fes­sor, we surely wouldn’t say that there was no con­nec­tion be­tween the two cases.

This con­nec­tion mat­ters. The rea­son gov­ern­ments pun­ish speech is rarely to “get” one par­tic­u­lar speaker — it’s to make sure that all the other po­ten­tial speak­ers get the mes­sage, and learn what not to say.

Sim­i­larly, the rea­son gov­ern­ments pres­sure so­cial me­dia com­pa­nies is rarely to “get” a par­tic­u­lar user. It’s to make sure that all the other us­ers get the mes­sage, and learn what not to say.

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There are plenty of sim­i­lar ex­am­ples, many col­lected in the trial court’s 155-page opin­ion grant­ing a pre­lim­i­nary in­junc­tion. Quite pos­si­bly many of the claims would be dis­proved at trial. And a trial would be a use­ful way to find out ex­actly what oc­curred. Per­haps the ad­min­is­tra­tion’s cam­paign wasn’t as bad as it might ap­pear. Per­haps it was worse. Alas, no stand­ing means no trial, so we won’t find out.

My con­cern isn’t to de­fend false in­for­ma­tion about COVID-19 or elec­tions or any­thing else. My con­cern, rather, is that if we fol­low the ma­jor­ity’s logic, we might con­clude that even if gov­ern­ment pres­sure on tech com­pa­nies is wrong, few plain­tiffs will ever have stand­ing to chal­lenge it.

That’s why Justice Samuel Alito’s dis­sent, if in places a bit over the top, seems cor­rect in its worry that the ad­min­is­tra­tion’s cam­paign might “stand as an at­trac­tive model for fu­ture of­fi­cials who want to con­trol what the peo­ple say, hear, and think.”

The dan­ger to free speech

One an­swer to all this is that it’s im­por­tant that the pub­lic be pro­tected from mis­in­for­ma­tion about, say, the COVID vac­cines. Fair enough.

But im­por­tance is not enough. To be­lieve in free speech is to refuse to draw the dis­tinc­tion be­tween those we agree with and those we don’t.

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If it’s re­ally this hard to find stand­ing to chal­lenge the Biden White House’s ef­forts to per­suade so­cial me­dia com­pa­nies to de­lete or limit the range of cer­tain posts, it will be just as hard to find stand­ing, if, say, a Don­ald Trump-run White House does the same.

So I guess now I know why I’m trou­bled.

Stephen L. Carter, a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, is a professor of law at Yale University and author of “Invisible: The Story of the Black Woman Lawyer Who Took Down America’s Most Powerful Mobster.” His previous article was “The Supreme protected free speech when it protected the NRA.”