This Supreme Court term prom­ises to be im­por­tant for the First Amend­ment. Ma­jor de­ci­sions are ex­pected soon on the rights of so­cial me­dia plat­forms and their us­ers. But the free-speech fun has al­ready be­gun.

In an oth­er­wise un­re­mark­able trade­mark case, a ma­jor de­bate about how to de­cide First Amend­ment is­sues broke out.

On one side was Justice Clar­ence Tho­mas, joined fully by Justices Samuel Alito and Neil Gor­such, push­ing the hard-line con­ser­va­tives’ new “his­tory and tra­di­tion” ap­proach to in­ter­pret­ing laws. On the other was Justice Amy Coney Bar­rett, joined fully by Justice Elena Kagan and partly by Justices So­nia So­to­mayor and Ketanji Brown Jack­son, call­ing for a sim­ple rule drawn from anal­o­gous free-speech prece­dent.

There are a num­ber of im­por­tant take­aways, but the most rel­e­vant right now is that nei­ther orig­i­nal­ism nor the more mal­lea­ble “his­tory and tra­di­tion” can help solve new prob­lems in free-speech law.

Advertise with us

Justice Tho­mas’s ap­peal

The trade­mark case, Vidal v. El­ster, was ini­ti­ated by one Steve El­ster, who tried to trade­mark the phrase “Trump too small.” The Patent and Trade­mark Of­fice re­jected the trade­mark be­cause the Lan­ham Act says you can’t trade­mark the name of a liv­ing in­di­vid­ual with­out his or her con­sent.

In court, El­ster ar­gued that the liv­ing per­son rule should be held un­con­sti­tu­tional be­cause ap­ply­ing it re­quires read­ing the trade­mark to as­cer­tain if it con­tains the name of a liv­ing per­son. Ac­cord­ing to a for­mal­is­tic rule first for­mu­lated by Tho­mas in a 2015 case, if a law re­quires you to look at the con­tent of an ut­ter­ance to ap­ply the law, it pre­sump­tively vi­o­lates free speech.

Ap­ply­ing Tho­mas’s ab­so­lut­ist free-speech rule to the liv­ing per­sons law would pro­duce the ab­surd re­sult that the liv­ing per­sons rule should be struck down: The only way you can tell if a trade­mark in­cludes the name of a liv­ing per­son is by read­ing what the trade­mark says.

So Tho­mas broke out the con­ser­va­tives’ fa­vor­ite new con­sti­tu­tional toy, the idea that the Con­sti­tu­tion should be in­ter­preted ac­cord­ing to “his­tory and tra­di­tion.” This ap­proach has been used by the con­ser­va­tive court in the last cou­ple of years to re­verse Roe v. Wade, vastly ex­pand gun rights, and over­turn 50-plus years of ex­ist­ing doc­trine on the sep­a­ra­tion of church and state.

Tho­mas based his ma­jor­ity opin­ion on the idea that trade­mark law has been around for a long time and no one has ever se­ri­ously thought the liv­ing per­sons rule vi­o­lated the First Amend­ment. On the sur­face this may sound like a rea­son­able ap­proach.

Advertise with us

The prob­lem with Tho­mas’s ap­proach

The prob­lem is that, if you re­ally take his­tory and tra­di­tion back to 1791 and ear­lier in the free-speech con­text, you would have to trash nearly the en­tirety of free-speech doc­trine, which was cre­ated by judges in the 20th and 21st cen­tu­ries.

The First Amend­ment as rat­i­fied and un­der­stood in 1791 didn’t re­ceive any mean­ing­ful doc­tri­nal de­vel­op­ment by the Supreme Court un­til 1919, when Justice Oliver Wendell Hol­mes ini­ti­ated mod­ern free-speech doc­trine. At the time, Hol­mes him­self ac­knowl­edged that it wasn’t clear if the fram­ers had in­tended the First Amend­ment to do any­thing more than pro­hibit pre-emp­tive cen­sor­ship. In other words, when it comes to free speech, orig­i­nal­ism is use­less. His­tory and tra­di­tion is lit­tle bet­ter.

Bar­rett un­der­stands all this very clearly. She wrote a con­cur­rence ex­plain­ing that Tho­mas’s his­tor­i­cal anal­y­sis was un­con­vinc­ing and that his­tory and tra­di­tion would be a bad way to de­cide free-speech cases.

In­stead, she pro­posed a sim­ple, clear rule: There is noth­ing wrong with con­tent-based trade­mark rules as long as they are rea­son­ably re­lated to the two pur­poses of trade­mark law, pro­tect­ing the trade­mark owner and en­abling con­sum­ers to tell prod­ucts from each other.

To be sure, Bar­rett’s opin­ion isn’t some foray into lib­er­al­ism. It’s just a demon­stra­tion of doc­tri­nal in­tel­li­gence and hon­esty in the face of the mumbo-jumbo of his­tory and tra­di­tion.

Advertise with us

Skep­ti­cal Bar­rett

Indeed, as is fre­quently the case for Bar­rett, the guid­ing spirit be­hind her po­si­tion is that of the late Justice An­to­nin Sca­lia, for whom she clerked. Bar­rett ex­plained neatly that Tho­mas had failed to “adopt a gen­er­ally ap­pli­ca­ble prin­ci­ple” in his opin­ion — the car­di­nal sin for Sca­lia, who be­lieved that, as he once put it, the rule of law should be a law of rules.

The up­shot is that Bar­rett is reg­is­ter­ing skep­ti­cism about his­tory and tra­di­tion in gen­eral — and of­fer­ing a par­tic­u­larly ap­pro­pri­ate and dev­as­tat­ing ri­poste to its use in free-speech cases.

What­ever the court de­cides about so­cial me­dia, it would do bet­ter to ap­ply First Amend­ment doc­trine in the light of the pur­poses of free ex­pres­sion, not based on vague his­tory and tra­di­tion that long pre­ceded so­cial me­dia’s in­ven­tion.

Noah Feldman, a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, is a professor of law at Harvard University and author of “To Be a Jew Today." His previous article was “The Supreme Court may support abortion — but only for technical reasons.”