One an­ti­dote to our poi­son­ous, nasty po­lit­i­cal at­mo­sphere is to con­sider es­pe­cially sig­nifi­cant pos­i­tive lead­ers of our past. George C. Mar­shall, one of the great­est sol­diers pro­duced by our or any other na­tion, is what we used to re­fer to as a ded­i­cated pub­lic ser­vant.

As chief of staff of the U.S. Army, he did es­sen­tial work to get a dan­ger­ously un­pre­pared Amer­ica at least par­tially ready for World War II, and then led the mam­moth or­ga­ni­za­tional ef­fort re­quired for vic­tory. He later served as sec­re­tary of state and sec­re­tary of de­fense dur­ing the try­ing post-war years, when the Cold War and Korean War both be­gan.

Ever the good sol­dier

Mar­shall wanted very much to lead the Nor­mandy in­va­sion, but that mis­sion went to his protégé Dwight Ei­sen­hower. FDR con­sid­ered Mar­shall in­dis­pens­able in his war­time role, and stated he would not be able to sleep at night if the gen­eral were out of the coun­try.

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Ever the good sol­dier, Mar­shall ap­par­ently never di­rectly dis­cussed his very in­tense per­sonal de­sire with the pres­i­dent. He did his duty with ded­i­ca­tion, con­sis­tently put­ting the na­tional in­ter­est above his own.

Along with re­mark­able ad­min­is­tra­tive abil­ity, Mar­shall demon­strated ex­cep­tional dip­lo­matic and po­lit­i­cal skills. Fol­low­ing Pearl Har­bor, the Jap­a­nese Im­pe­rial Army sur­rounded Amer­i­can forces in the Phil­ip­pines un­der the com­mand of Gen. Douglas MacArthur,

He was a man widely dis­liked and mis­trusted among fel­low of­fi­cers and more gen­er­ally in Wash­ing­ton. Pres­i­dent Roosevelt nev­er­the­less did not want the Amer­i­can com­mander to be­come a Jap­a­nese pris­oner, and or­dered an evac­u­a­tion to Aus­tra­lia.

Mar­shall fol­lowed up thor­oughly to en­sure that the me­dia and pub­lic, at home and abroad, knew that this was not MacArthur’s de­ci­sion, and that the gov­ern­ment of Aus­tra­lia pro­vided a pos­i­tive and sup­port­ive wel­come.

The ul­ti­mate pro­fes­sional

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The ul­ti­mate pro­fes­sional, he never let per­sonal opin­ion of MacArthur in­ter­fere. The ul­ti­mate staffer, he de­voted the time nec­es­sary for op­er­a­tional suc­cess.

Jo­siah Bunt­ing III’s new bi­og­ra­phy of Mar­shall, “George C. Mar­shall: The mak­ing of a leader,” has done just that. His book fo­cuses pri­mar­ily on Mar­shall’s ear­lier years, be­fore his cen­tral and in­stru­men­tal roles in plan­ning and com­mand dur­ing World War II.

As a boy, he was ex­tremely shy and ret­i­cent, ap­par­ently very much in the shadow of an ac­com­plished busi­ness­man father and an older brother al­ready headed to mil­i­tary ed­u­ca­tion and train­ing at Vir­ginia Mil­i­tary In­sti­tute.

Mar­shall fol­lowed in his brother’s foot­steps by go­ing to VMI, a re­spected ed­u­ca­tional in­sti­tu­tion but not the U.S. Mil­i­tary Acad­emy at West Point. Then, as be­fore and since, West Point was the pro­fes­sional train­ing ground for fu­ture top lead­ers of the Army.

World War I con­firmed Mar­shall’s grow­ing rep­u­ta­tion. Bunt­ing em­pha­sizes this was the re­sult not of ge­nius, but ex­tra­or­di­nary fo­cus, dis­ci­pline and sheer hard work.

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No one talks about him now

Mar­shall is rarely dis­cussed to­day. He put lit­tle per­sonal in­for­ma­tion in the pub­lic record, and never wrote mem­oirs, likely in part be­cause he feared in­ad­ver­tently re­veal­ing de­tails about the war and af­ter­math that were best kept pri­vate.

Also, at least in part — in­cred­i­bly from a con­tem­po­rary per­spec­tive — he felt strongly that pa­tri­otic cit­i­zens should not ben­e­fit fi­nan­cially from gov­ern­ment of­fice. For him, pub­lic ser­vice was lit­er­ally just that, a priv­i­lege.

Arthur J. Cyr is the di­rec­tor or the In­ter­na­tional Po­lit­i­cal Econ­omy Pro­gram at Car­thage Col­lege and the au­thor of “After the Cold War: Amer­i­can For­eign Pol­icy, Europe and Asia.”