All the fear­mon­ger­ing in Wash­ing­ton over the $1.5 tril­lion fed­eral bud­get def­i­cit hides a truth few pol­i­ti­cians would ad­mit — that hefty head­line num­ber you hear so much about is an un­re­li­able mea­sure of US fis­cal health.

Savvy econ­o­mists pre­fer what’s known as the “pri­mary def­i­cit,” which is the over­all short­fall mi­nus what the gov­ern­ment spends each year on in­ter­est pay­ments. At $637 bil­lion, this mea­sure is smaller, less fright­en­ing, in line with re­cent his­tory and — more im­por­tantly — shrink­ing, hav­ing nar­rowed from $1 tril­lion in 2023.

The pri­mary def­i­cit

Why does it make eco­nomic sense to fo­cus on the pri­mary def­i­cit, which ig­nores fed­eral in­ter­est pay­ments? The an­swer is be­cause tax rev­e­nue and in­ter­est rates can di­verge — of­ten with un­ex­pected re­sults. For ex­am­ple, a boom­ing econ­omy will in­crease tax rev­e­nue but also push up bor­row­ing costs; a slow­ing econ­omy would have the op­po­site ef­fect on rates.

Advertise with us

Think back to the early 1980s, when the bud­get and pri­mary def­i­cits were a sim­i­lar per­cent­age of gross do­mes­tic prod­uct as to­day and con­cern about the na­tion’s fis­cal sit­u­a­tion was also el­e­vated. In 1983, the pri­mary and head­line def­i­cits were 3.3% and 5.7% of GDP, com­pared with 3.8% and 5.4% cur­rently.

And like now, the US was also emerg­ing from a pain­ful re­ces­sion, dur­ing which GDP con­tracted faster and deeper than any time since the Great De­pres­sion only to be­gin a strong re­cov­ery that lasted six years, in­creas­ing gov­ern­ment rev­e­nue. As a re­sult, that pri­mary def­i­cit of 3.3% in 1983 be­came a pri­mary sur­plus of 0.3% by 1989.

Total debt as a per­cent­age of GDP was lit­tle changed, how­ever, go­ing from 38.9% of GDP to 38.5% as the rap­idly grow­ing econ­omy kept in­ter­est rates rel­a­tively high. Fed­eral in­ter­est pay­ments grew as a per­cent­age of the econ­omy from 2.5% of GDP in 1983 to 3% in 1989. As a re­sult, the head­line def­i­cit in 1989 was 2.7% of GDP, much higher than the post-war av­er­age of 1.2% of GDP at the time.

If you had judged the coun­try’s fis­cal health based on the head­line def­i­cit alone, you would have thought the US went from the worst shape since WWII in 1983 to merely bad shape in 1989. In fact, Amer­ica’s fis­cal health had sta­bi­lized, debt was no lon­ger grow­ing as a per­cent­age of GDP and the stage had been set for the mas­sive sur­pluses of the 1990s.

A more ac­cu­rate mea­sure

Advertise with us

Just as the pri­mary def­i­cit — or more ac­cu­rately sur­plus — would have been a much more ac­cu­rate in­di­ca­tor of Amer­ica’s fis­cal health in 1989, so too is it likely a more ac­cu­rate mea­sure of US fis­cal health to­day.

The bi­par­ti­san Con­gres­sio­nal Bud­get Of­fice proj­ects that the pri­mary def­i­cit will come in at 2.3% of GDP this year and shrink to 2.1% by 2034 — which is a very man­age­able fig­ure from a debt man­age­ment per­spec­tive. As for the head­line def­i­cit, the CBO proj­ects that to be 5.3% of GDP this year, ex­pand­ing to 6.2% by 2034.

Just like in the 1980s, the head­line def­i­cit may prove to be an un­re­li­able in­di­ca­tor. The econ­omy has re­bounded strongly fol­low­ing the early days of the pan­demic, driv­ing up bor­row­ing costs and fed­eral in­ter­est pay­ments. Ris­ing in­ter­est ex­penses rather than in­creases in gov­ern­ment spend­ing are mostly why the head­line def­i­cit is wider to­day than in 2019.

This is not to say that ris­ing fed­eral in­ter­est pay­ments aren’t a bur­den on gov­ern­ment fi­nances, and at 2.8% of GDP they are clos­ing in on their peak of 3% in 1995. The up­side is that in­di­ca­tors of the US’s abil­ity to pay its $34 tril­lion of debt debts, such as ro­bust de­mand for Trea­sury se­cu­ri­ties by for­eign in­ves­tors and a strong and sta­ble dol­lar, sug­gest that Amer­ica’s cred­i­tors are not wor­ried.

More­over, the CBO is bad at fore­cast­ing in­ter­est rates. Over the last 40 years, in­ter­est pay­ments have been half of what it fore­casted on av­er­age. That sug­gests their cur­rent pro­jec­tion of in­ter­est pay­ments is likely overly pes­si­mis­tic.

Advertise with us

It’s a shame that law­mak­ers don’t use that mea­sure to help bridge the po­lit­i­cal di­vide and forge bi­par­ti­san solu­tions that will put the gov­ern­ment on a fis­cally sound and sus­tain­able path.

In­stead, they bicker over less-than-mean­ing­ful num­bers that threaten the US’s “ex­or­bi­tant priv­i­lege” in the global fi­nan­cial sys­tem by way of gov­ern­ment shut­downs and reck­less talk of not rais­ing Amer­ica’s bor­row­ing ca­pac­ity — a move that would risk a cat­a­strophic de­fault.

Bet­ter health

Law­mak­ers should look to the pri­mary def­i­cit to gauge the na­tion’s fis­cal health. This mea­sure in­di­cates that while not per­fect, the US’s fis­cal health is bet­ter than be­fore the pan­demic.

What’s more, the econ­omy has grown faster than most fore­casts. If the trend con­tin­ues, then even the mod­est pri­mary def­i­cits the CBO is fore­cast­ing may be an over­state­ment. The US could be on the cusp of a re­peat of the 1980s when rap­idly grow­ing rev­e­nues brought the pri­mary def­i­cit swiftly into bal­ance.

Karl W. Smith is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. His previous article was “Child tax credit good for families, good for the economy.”