This week the House Foreign Affairs Committee began its investigation into the disastrous American withdrawal from Kabul, a prelude to the broader-mandated Afghanistan War Commission established by Congress which will meet in the coming months to examine the whole twenty years of fighting.
How could the worst attack on the United States since Pearl Harbor have ended in such defeat? American administrations all framed the issue too narrowly. They focused on “chasing terrorists at the beginning rather than focusing on the environment that created them,” wrote one of the conflict’s definitive chroniclers. Veteran British foreign correspondent David Loyn in his comprehensive book “The Long War.” They all repeated “the mantra that this was not a nation-building project.”
The successive administrations didn’t learn. No administration made any major policy shift or course correction, despite the fact that it was evident within the first five years that things were going very badly, and that fresh thinking was urgently required.
After the initial defeat of the Taliban, Bush moved swiftly to focus on his war of choice in Iraq; Obama showed a cool distaste for both conflicts as he prioritized his domestic agenda; Trump was always vehement about his desire to exit Afghanistan and concluded a severely disadvantageous deal with the militants in order to effect that.
Biden had been outspoken about his opposition to nation-building there since he was a senator and was the strongest voice against it when he was vice president, and quickly decided to honor the deal after he became president, even though the enemy did not.
However, on a deeper level the narrow frame of mind that cast the Afghan war as primarily a counter-terror mission proceeded from a denial about the broader origins of the 9/11 attacks. Modern Afghan history has been so seismic because its mountains were the intersecting fault lines of not only the Cold War, but also of the India-Pakistan rivalry and the modernist-vs-fundamentalist struggle across the Muslim world.
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An earlier narrow framing by Washington had created much of the problem. America framed the Soviet-Afghan War and its support of the mujahideen resistance in the 1980s as solely an effort to inflict pain on Moscow.
That allowed America’s partners in the project, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, to distort it into a radical jihad, eventually placing the Taliban in power and enabling al Qaeda to find refuge there. America’s failure to foresee that there would be aftershocks from such enormous tectonic shifts was a tragic, myopic flaw that should not have been repeated once they had shaken the homeland.
It was precisely this state of shock and the intensely emotional desire to re-affirm American righteousness to an absolute degree that kept American leadership from coming to a painful recognition: that these purported allies had created the ideological environment that had created jihadist terrorists, that they needed to be dropped in favor of new relationships more soundly grounded in shared values.
Secular, democratic India, which had been the chief backer of the anti-Taliban opposition in the run-up to 9/11, needed to be brought in as a partner in Afghanistan. Not, as America did, Islamist, militaristic Pakistan, which used the renewed assistance it received from us to continue backing the militants.
Instead of fighting for two decades within such desperately illogical parameters, a diplomatic and economic containment regime directed against Islamabad would have degraded its ability to pursue aggression against its neighbors, enabled the building of a moderate Afghan nation, and strengthened anti-extremists in Pakistan itself, which was ultimately the only way of eradicating terrorism at its roots.
But, in the absence of such a sea-change, “Hunt then down and kill them,” the motto forged for the so-called “war on terror” by Soldier of Fortune magazine in its first issue after the attacks, remained Washington’s basic strategy down to the end of the war.
As the congressional investigations grapple with this legacy, they must also address the consequences of a restored terrorist-creating environment. Writing in The Spectator in December, David Loyn spoke to Ahmad Massoud, the son of legendary Afghan resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, who fought the Soviets and the Taliban, warned the West of an imminent major terrorist attack by al Qaeda, and was assassinated two days before 9/11 for his pains.
The young Massoud painted a picture of his fallen country as a wasteland of repression, violence, and deprivation, where countless young boys are raised to hate in radical religious schools. “If this goes on it will produce a brainwashed generation,” he told Loyn. “Today Afghanistan is a training center for terrorists and a prison for the people.”
President Biden will have it that the long war is a thing of the past, due to his responsible termination of it. Yet a world thrust back into a new Cold War of great power rivalry compounded by the agony of Ukraine must also face the fact that Afghanistan is once again a source of jihadist terror.
Vanni Cappelli, a freelance journalist, is the president of the Afghanistan Foreign Press Association. His previous article was “Saudi Arabia is our enemy. Bought golfers doesn't change that.”




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