Does Donald Trump embody the conservative movement, or is he an aberration? And if he’s a conservative, is conservatism conservative? The Trump presidency and the hearings of the House Jan. 6 Committee inspired me to take a hard second look at the history of movement conservatism.

As a longtime student of the postwar Right, I had previously accepted much of the conventional, in-house interpretation of conservatism. It concentrated on the movement’s key thinkers and understood them as principled men and women who usually shunned radicalism. It acknowledged radical elements, but saw them as more of a marginal bug than a central feature.

Mr. Trump, of course, did not fit this genteel narrative. The four years of his presidency and the bizarre spectacle of the weeks following the 2020 election cast a revealing spotlight on the postwar conservative movement.

I used to think the conservative movement helped make the Republican party a principled “party of ideas.” That was true at certain times and in certain places. But far from being authentically conservative, the movement that took shape during the 1950s with William F. Buckley’s founding of National Review magazine had within it extremist and radical elements from its inception. Some of my fellow historians recognized this fact well before I did (Rick Perlstein among them).

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Some celebrate Buckley’s attempts to exclude from the movement extremist figures such as atheist libertarian Ayn Rand and the leadership of the John Birch Society. Many forget that his second book, “McCarthy and His Enemies” (1954), was a strenuous defense of Sen. Joe McCarthy’s anti-communist witch hunt. They also forget the magazine’s decades-long opposition to civil rights on the grounds that Black Americans were incapable of governing themselves.

Little was genuinely conservative about movement icon Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign. In it, the Republican standard-bearer not only commended dismantling Social Security to seniors but also toyed with employing nuclear weapons in Vietnam. As the conservative movement slowly began to reshape the Republican party after Goldwater’s lopsided defeat, positions previously viewed as extreme became more widely accepted and party moderates became increasingly isolated.

Although Richard Nixon had run as a centrist in 1968, once in office, his running mate, Spiro Agnew denounced anti-war protestors as traitors and celebrated what his speechwriter Pat Buchanan termed a “positive polarization” that neatly divided America into patriots and subversives. (The similarity with Trump’s polarizing rhetoric here is striking.) Meanwhile, George Wallace’s independent run in 1968 convinced Republicans that they could win the votes of the former Alabama governor’s segregationist base. This led to the Republican party’s “southern strategy,” its successful attempt to move southern (and other) conservative Democrats to vote Republican by appealing to racial antagonism.

Although genial in style, Ronald Reagan repudiated the centrism of Gerald Ford, who narrowly defeated him for the nomination in 1976 and then lost to Jimmy Carter. Among Reagan’s fringe ideas were unorthodox economic theories that claimed lowering taxes would reduce the deficit. His centrist opponent, George H.W. Bush, dismissed that as “voodoo economics” before throwing in his lot with Reagan on the 1980 ticket.

About that same time, one of the organizational wizards of the political Right, Paul Weyrich, candidly acknowledged the anti-democratic views among some within the movement. Weyrich (who had organized highly successful conservative direct mail campaigns) explained that he didn’t want all eligible voters to turn up at the polls: “Many of our Christians,” he told a large religious gathering in 1980, “have what I call the goo-goo syndrome — good government. They want everybody to vote. I don't want everybody to vote. … As a matter of fact, our leverage in the elections quite candidly goes up as the voting populace goes down.”

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Not all of those in the conservative movement embraced this anti-majoritarian approach or espoused extremism. But Weyrich’s comments represented a red flag and a portent of the future.

All it took was President Trump’s demagoguery to bring some of these extreme elements into the foreground, even into the mainstream. Notably, Trump first made his political reputation by championing fringe conspiracy theories such as birtherism. What had been hinted at by dog-whistles became increasingly explicit, including defenses of the Confederacy and blatant statements of anti-immigrant xenophobia.

The culmination was the decision of key Congressional conservatives (radicals would be a better name for them) to challenge the authoritative results of the Electoral College vote. Originally designed by the founders to restrain a simple majoritarianism, apparently the Electoral College is now insufficient for Trumpian radicals.

This cynical decision by so-called conservatives to appeal shamelessly to their extremist base, coupled with their radical challenge to constitutional norms, does not represent a recent aberration. Its roots in the postwar conservative movement are much deeper than I had once imagined.

Gillis Harp is professor of history at Grove City College and author of “Protestants and American Conservatism: A Short History.”