I strongly support abortion rights, but am dismayed by the way that we who defend that position do not even listen to arguments based on a fetus’s right to life. As long as Roe v. Wade was the law of the land, that didn’t much matter. Supporters of abortion rights could afford to ignore or dismiss those who oppose abortion as sexists or religious fanatics without bothering to engage with what they had to say.

Now that needs to change. If abortion-rights supporters are going to win public arguments anywhere in purple or red states, they need to find arguments that address abortion opponents, rather than dismiss them. The way forward is not to double down on the now-overruled, and always constitutionally suspect, language of “due process” or “liberty interests,” but rather to recognize that the right to an abortion is part of the American tradition of religious freedom. Only this style of argument allows abortion-rights supporters to respect their opponents as having a true moral case on their side — and therefore to appeal to them with any hope of success.

Imagine a young, vulnerable single mother, unable to put her week-old baby up for adoption or unaware of how to do so, who disposes of the child in a dumpster. Even the most ardently pro-choice people I know would condemn that as murder. We might be sympathetic to the woman, and think the courts should go easy on her, but we would still condemn her choice as the taking of a human life. Yet a week-old baby is not very different, developmentally, from a late-term fetus. And it remains highly dependent on its mother. So surely the difference between this case and an abortion has to do with the fact that we are confident that the baby counts as a full human life, and we are unsure of whether a fetus does.

Which is to say: we cannot talk about abortion without talking about the moral status of the fetus.

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Supporters of abortion rights have fudged this issue for so long, I suspect, because they are afraid they will lose the argument once it moves to this ground. After all, science would seem to tell us that a fetus is a human life. It has human DNA, after all. And it is alive. So it is human and alive — a human life.

But science cannot tell us when, why or even that human life is morally important. Indeed, science cannot tell us whether anything is morally important. Science does not deal in value judgments.

For the most part, people agree widely about who counts as being a “human life” in the morally significant sense. But that consensus breaks down at both the beginning and the end of life. When human life begins, and when it definitively ends, are very difficult questions, which depend hugely on what views we hold about what matters in human life: why we value it so highly, and what it needs to become, or remain, that sort of tremendously significant life.

These are issues for which people generally bring in a religious view, or a secular ethical view that functions like a religion. Practically all Americans are, moreover, content to allow individuals to settle questions about the end of life — when to withdraw a respirator, say — on the basis of their religious or personal ethical views. It should therefore make equal sense to let people make decisions about the beginning of life this way.

One advantage of construing the right to an abortion in this way is that it recognizes the fact that different religions have different views of abortion. Orthodox Jews for instance see abortion as not just permissible but mandatory in many circumstances in which it is ruled out by Catholics and fundamentalist Protestants. Muslims also have religious laws about abortion that differ from Christian ones.

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Another advantage is that construing the right to abortion under the heading of the freedom of religion shows true respect for the views of those who are strongly opposed to abortion, even while calling on them to acknowledge that those views should not be enshrined in law. It is therefore a more democratic basis for a legal framework about abortion than one that emphasizes the mother’s right to choose alone.

The liberal constitutional theorist Ronald Dworkin proposed years ago that the freedom of religion protected by the 1st amendment provides a much better “textual home” for the right to abortion than anything in the 14th amendment. He was right. Returning to that idea is pragmatically wise, if we want to reach any sort of compromise over this issue. It is also morally wise: only then can people on all sides of the issue respect one another, and come together as citizens with an equal voice in our democracy.

Sam Fleischacker is an LAS Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois-Chicago.