In a final report on the Fern Hollow Bridge collapse released Friday, the National Transportation Safety Board blamed a poor inspection regime, “insufficient oversight” by federal and state officials and repeated failures by the City of Pittsburgh to address known dangers and make critical repairs before the span collapsed.
The inspections used for the investigation — from 2005 to 2021 — showed the city almost never cleaned the drainage system of the 49-year-old bridge, leading to heavy deterioration in the bridge’s legs, which gave way in the early morning hours of Jan. 28, 2022.
That morning, the 447-foot bridge over Frick Park tumbled into the ravine below, stranding five vehicles and nine people. Four passengers were injured, the NTSB report said.
At a board hearing last month, the agency voted on the cause of the collapse after a two-year investigation, finding that the city ignored more than a decade of warnings about the bridge’s deteriorating condition and failed to implement a routine maintenance program to service Fern Hollow and other bridges throughout Pittsburgh.
“Although maintenance and repair recommendations were repeatedly made in the bridge inspection reports, the city failed to act on several of these recommendations, which led to progressive deterioration and the collapse of the bridge,” the report said.
Specifically, Friday’s report found the collapse originated from the failure of the transverse tie plate on the bridge’s southwest leg that suffered widespread corrosion over the years — damage that was caused by clogged drains that allowed water to run down the bridge legs and seep into the structure.
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“It was failure after failure after failure,” NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy said at the meeting last month.
Shortly after the span’s spectacular collapse on a snowy winter morning, the Post-Gazette detailed the decades of neglect that preceded the disaster, including inspection reports as old as 25 years that were never acted upon.
In the report released Friday, federal investigators said that one of the most serious problems was that local inspectors miscalculated the load rating — the amount of weight the bridge could safely carry. When the bridge collapsed, its posted weight limit was 26 tons. But on that day the bridge could safely carry little more than a pickup truck, investigators found.
The rating was miscalculated because inspectors did not identify the extent of the deterioration in the bridge’s legs in the bridge and the asphalt surface was twice as thick as inspections reports said, prompting the NTSB to recommend the city keep more detailed paving records.
Oversight of the city's inspection and maintenance program by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation was also insufficient, investigators found, but the agency has since revised some of its procedures that will allow it to more easily identify at-risk bridges. The NTSB also recommended the state publish annual data on bridge maintenance and repair recommendations.





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