“These are days of shaking,” declared an English preacher in 1643, “and this shaking is universal.” The English cut the head off the king, Charles I, abolished the House of Lords and disestablished the court, establishing a Puritan Republic under Oliver Cromwell.
The comparison of the present with the spate of civil wars in the mid-17th century is strikingly accurate. The mighty Spanish Empire was convulsed by regional disturbances. The largest state in Europe, the Polish-Lithuanian Republic, temporarily disappeared.
While the political world was convulsed, the world was seized by an overwhelming sense of doom — the Antichrist was surely on the march again! — and weird sects such as the British Diggers demanded that society should be turned upside down.
Court and country
Most historians explained these developments in national terms. The only people to find links between these national revolts were the Marxists, who trotted out their all-purpose explanation of the clash of capitalism with feudalism.
But then the Oxford historian Trevor-Roper came along with his 1959 essay, “The general crisis of the 17th century.” It provided a much more compelling explanation: the clash between the “Court” and the “Country.”
The Court became increasingly bloated and self-indulgent in the 16th and the early half of the 17th century. Monarchs sold offices to support their extravagant lifestyles. Courts adopted foreign values and looked down on the people who paid their salaries as bigots and backwoodsmen.
The corruption of the court spread to the wider society: The universities were turned into hatcheries of courtiers, or at least public servants, companies were offered monopolies so long as they became servants of the crown, and lawyers became agents of the state. Ambitious young men aimed for a career in the court, or at least the government, but there were more candidates than offices available.
The result was an explosion of anger across society. The Country got sick of paying for the lifestyles of people who contributed nothing to the Commonweal but nevertheless looked down on the more productive organs of society. Frustrated office-seekers turned against a system that had condemned them to years of pointless study.
Trevor-Roper explained both the social composition of the rebels and their ideological fervor. Far from being “capitalists,” they were either “backwoodsmen” who lived in the provinces or over-educated young men who had not found a role in life.
The English Puritans differed from the French Jansenists and the Spanish Catholic reformers on points of theology, but they all agreed on hating the magic roundabout of Court life and calling for a return to an earlier age when the Court lived within its means and people lived a more restrained life.
Today like then
The similarities with our own time are remarkable. Once again, we are confronted with a “general crisis” rather than a series of local ones. And once again, we have a disparate movement united by its hatred of the corrupt elite and its conviction that society is headed in the wrong direction.
The geography of today’s populist revolts mirrors the revolts of the mid-17th century. Brexit Britain, for example, was an almost exact reproduction of Oliver Cromwell’s Roundhead Britain: the small towns and the countryside.
Even more striking is the similarity of grievances. Populists rail against elite organizations (big companies, universities, professional service firms) for the same reason that Cromwell and company railed against the Court: because they are bloated and self-satisfied, using their political connections to extract wealth from the rest of society, and because they espouse globalist rather than national values.
Wokery plays the same role as High Church Anglicanism did in the 17th century as a symbol of sophistication, and university degrees play the same role as Court connections. Populists also argue that the only solution is to abandon the politics of compromise and tear the Court apart: Replace the “Uniparty” with a people’s party, unravel the knot of corrupt institutions and return power to the provinces.
The Puritan revolutionary Oliver Cromwell despised gaudy displays and demanded that his portrait should display him “warts and all,” yet I suspect that Trump’s monarchical tendencies may well prove to be his downfall, just as Cromwell’s downfall was sealed when he tried to make his son his successor.
What unites populists across the world is not Trump’s idiosyncrasies but an inchoate anger against the Uniparty Court.
A way out
European Courts responded to the general crisis in two ways: either by carrying on as if nothing had happened or else by reforming. The members of the first group stagnated like Spain, with the courts leaching the life out of the country, or else headed toward a bloody revolution, like France.
The members of the second group, most notably Britain and the Netherlands, created a sustainable compromise between court and country that guaranteed social peace and economic prosperity: cut the court down to size, stop lavishing rewards on a narrow section of society, curb the hatcheries that produce too many would-be courtiers and clergy and treat the nation-state with respect rather than aristocratic disdain.
The lesson of history is surprisingly clear: shrink “the Court” and create a healthier long-term relationship between the center and the periphery. The great question is whether we possess the political will to do it.
Adrian Wooldridge is the global business columnist for Bloomberg Opinion and author of “The Aristocracy of Talent: How Meritocracy Made the Modern World.” His previous article was “The three dangerous minds behind MAGA.”





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