The Trump administration has not called for regime change in the conflict with Iran, though many analysts and others have. But over 70 years ago, the United States played a key role in ousting Tehran’s government.
Against the backdrop of the Cold War and Britain’s frustration over its lost access to oil, the CIA coordinated a clandestine operation in 1953 with the British that toppled the country’s democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh.
In his place, Washington helped to reinstall exiled Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, an autocrat who was sympathetic to Western interests and virulently anti-communist. His rule lasted until the 1979 Iranian revolution, but the coup remains a “touchstone” of modern Iranian nationalism, said Roham Alvandi, a historian at the London School of Economics. “It looms in the background of Iranian politics,” he said.
Washington’s dilemma
When Mossadegh was elected to power on a nationalist platform of taking control of the country’s oil assets in 1951, Washington was confronted by a dilemma. The U.S. could support his new government’s aspirations or side with the British, who had requested help in overthrowing him. They were dismayed by the threat Iran’s new leader posed to the lucrative Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (later known as BP).
At the time, Washington was deeply unsettled by the spread of communism after World War II. The British — whose influence in the region was waning along with its dying empire — argued that Mossadegh’s rise was a prelude to even greater Soviet influence in Iran.
The prospect of communism in Iran was anathema to Washington — and in particular to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who took office in 1953. The U.S. sided with Britain, “because they were afraid that if the oil crisis in Iran wasn’t resolved, then either the Iranian communists or the Soviet Union might seize power,” Alvandi said.
Kermit Roosevelt Jr., the CIA’s top agent charged with orchestrating the coup, was given permission to proceed by his superiors on June 25, months after he was initially approached by British diplomats about the prospect. On July 19 he arrived in Iran through Iraq, where he met with Iranian operatives, communicated with Iran’s exiled shah, and organized support among army officers and street demonstrators.
“America didn’t bomb anything; it was a protracted intelligence operation by the CIA,” said University of St Andrews historian Siavush Randjbar-Daemi, who has researched the 1953 coup extensively. According to Randjbar-Daemi, the coup capped covert CIA influence operations that included the printing of fake Communist propaganda to make the Communist party appear more virulently anti-Islamic than it was.
The consequences
On Aug. 19, rebels took over Radio Tehran and declared on the radio that the Mossadegh’s government had collapsed that afternoon — when it hadn’t. “After that radio broadcast, it was over,” Randjbar-Daemi said. “It was one of the most effective pieces of fake news in recent history in the world.”
When the coup had succeeded, Roosevelt wrote to his superiors in a telegram that the shah “will be returning to Tehran in triumph shortly. Love and kisses from all the team.”
In 2013, a declassified CIA internal document publicly confirmed the U.S. involvement: The military coup “that overthrew [Mossadegh] and his National Front cabinet was carried out under CIA direction as an act of U.S. foreign policy, conceived and approved at the highest levels of government,” it read.
What were the consequences? Pahlavi returned to power in 1953 as Iran’s monarch, ruling for over two decades as a Western-friendly autocrat. The period coincided with rapid economic growth and urban development for many in Iran, but was also marked by fierce political repression by the shah’s feared intelligence agency, SAVAK.
The Shah’s collaboration with the British and Americans to oust a popular nationalist government “fatally wounded” the legitimacy of his monarchy, Alvandi said. “The shah tried very hard for the next 20 years to embody Iranian nationalism, to project an image of himself as a champion of Iran, but he could never get out of the memory of Mossadegh and 1953,” Alvandi said.
His arch domestic rival, the influential religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, portrayed him as a Western puppet.
The Iranian memory of 1953
Iran’s oil-based industrialization caused the economy to boom, but it also led to rampant corruption. When the economy began to sour in 1977, the cracks in his authority only grew. After months of revolutionary unrest, Pahlavi left Iran in January 1979. Soon after, it became the Islamic Republic of Iran, led by Khomeini.
According to Alvandi, the memory of 1953 — and the shah’s dismal image — cast a long shadow and serves as a tale of caution for any domestic opponents who might contemplate supporting Iran’s foreign adversaries.
“Iranians have a long memory, and as much as they detest the Islamic Republic, they will have a visceral dislike of anyone who is seen to collaborate with a foreign power to hurt Iran and Iranians,” he said.
Leo Sands is a breaking-news reporter and editor in The Washington Post’s London Hub. His previous article was “From one president to the next.”





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