We are at a dan­ger­ous preci­pice in the Mid­dle East. After Is­rael’s cam­paign against Hez­bol­lah and Iran’s vast bal­lis­tic-mis­sile re­tal­i­a­tion, the po­ten­tial for a wider re­gional con­flict hasn’t been greater in de­cades.

In the year since the hor­rific Ha­mas ter­ror­ist at­tacks on Is­rael, we have been in an in­trac­ta­ble cy­cle of vi­o­lence and mil­i­tary es­ca­la­tion be­tween Is­rael and Iran (and its prox­ies). Despite the lack of mass ca­su­al­ties from Iran’s missile at­tack, many se­nior Is­raeli lead­ers are vow­ing — in the words of Prime Min­is­ter Ben­ja­min Netan­yahu — to make Iran “pay for it.”

What Is­rael might do

This could in­clude long-range air strikes, over roughly 1,000 miles of con­tested air space, against the most vul­ner­a­ble el­e­ments of Iran’s nu­clear pro­gram, which is de­lib­er­ately scat­tered across that vast na­tion.

Do­ing so would re­quire a com­plex bal­let of load­ing GBU-57 “bun­ker buster” bombs on adapted F-15 Strike Eagle air­craft, and tricky in-flight re­fu­el­ing. The Is­rae­lis would have to hit many sites; 21 have been dis­closed to the In­ter­na­tional Atomic Energy Agency. And there are cer­tainly un­dis­closed lo­ca­tions.

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Such an ae­rial as­sault would re­quire doz­ens, if not a cou­ple of hun­dred, air­craft. Some of the nu­clear fa­cil­i­ties are more than 300 feet un­der­ground.

The air ar­mada would also need ded­i­cated fighter air­craft like the F-35, and elec­tronic-war­fare jets as well. Per­mis­sion to over­fly re­gional coun­tries would not be forth­com­ing, mean­ing the Is­raeli De­fense Forces might have to deal with third-party in­ter­fer­ence from Syria, Tur­key, Iraq or Azer­bai­jan. Iran’s Rus­sian-sup­plied S-300 air de­fenses, and its Cold War-era MiG-29 and F-14 fight­ers, are not for­mi­da­ble, but would com­pli­cate any strikes.

If Is­rael pro­ceeds with air at­tacks, the Ira­nian re­sponse would be sig­nifi­cant. Hez­bol­lah would un­doubt­edly be or­dered to launch as many sur­face-to-sur­face mis­siles as pos­si­ble. Per­haps a third of the pre-con­flict ar­se­nal of 130,000 had have been fired or de­stroyed by Is­rael in re­cent weeks.

But if just half the re­main­ing rock­ets were sent in waves to­ward Tel Aviv, Haifa, mil­i­tary in­stal­la­tions, Mos­sad fa­cil­i­ties and po­lit­i­cal cen­ters in Jeru­sa­lem, the dam­age and ci­vil­ian ca­su­al­ties would be sub­stan­tial — even given Is­rael’s strong air de­fenses.

In ad­di­tion, an Is­raeli at­tack on Iran might cause Ha­mas to ex­e­cute the re­main­ing hos­tages it holds from the Oct. 7 as­sault. Ter­ror­ists could also at­tempt many iso­lated at­tacks in­side Is­rael, like the kill­ing of seven and wound­ing more than a dozen Is­raeli ci­vil­ians early this week in Jaffa. The Houthis in Yemen could also step up their long-range mis­sile at­tacks.

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Threat­en­ing Iran

But the main threat is a re­cip­ro­cal Ira­nian bal­lis­tic-mis­sile strike on Is­rael far more force­ful than Tues­day’s. An at­tack with a ma­jor­ity of the 3,000 bal­lis­tic mis­siles in the Ira­nian in­ven­tory would over­whelm Is­raeli air de­fenses; the coun­try’s hos­pi­tals would be flooded with the wounded. While the qual­ity of Ira­nian main­te­nance and tar­get­ing is ques­tion­able, quan­tity can make up for a lot of mis­fires and de­fects.

Si­mul­ta­ne­ously, Iran would likely launch drone strikes — staged by Ira­nian Shi­ite mi­li­tias in Syria or west­ern Iraq — at co­vert Is­raeli nu­clear fa­cil­i­ties and at the IDF’s air force. These would be likely cou­pled with sig­nifi­cant cy­ber­at­tacks.

The Ira­nian Navy, while hardly a pow­er­house, could at­tack Western ship­ping and, above all, seek to close the Strait of Hor­muz. This would re­quire the use of mines, small speed­boats and sub­ma­rines: Iran has that equip­ment and rou­tinely trains for this mis­sion. The re­sult­ing dis­rup­tions in the flow of oil and gas could dev­as­tate the global econ­omy.

Sig­nifi­cant ground op­er­a­tions are un­likely — at least ini­tially. Iran has one mil­lion troops un­der arms, about two-thirds on ac­tive duty. It has a young pop­u­la­tion of nearly 90 mil­lion from which to draw more forces, and can count on a num­ber of mi­li­tia al­lies in Syria and Leb­a­non.

Could they mount a ground at­tack on Is­rael, likely through south­ern Iraq and Syria? Hard to pull off, but not im­pos­sible.

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The U.S. would al­most cer­tainly be pulled into a full-on war be­tween Is­rael and Iran. The Is­rae­lis would want sig­nifi­cant com­bat sup­port: the high­est-grade in­tel­li­gence from sur­veil­lance air­craft and sat­el­lites; cy­ber­war as­sis­tance; ad­vanced mu­ni­tions; ae­rial re­fu­el­ing.

The Arab states would try to main­tain neu­tral­ity — al­though they would of course wel­come a deg­ra­da­tion of Ira­nian prox­ies and mil­i­tary ca­pa­bil­ity. Tur­key would be a wild card, but prob­a­bly would not al­low ei­ther side tran­sit or ac­cess to Turk­ish bases.

What war would do

In sum, a true re­gional war be­tween Is­rael and Iran could crack the global econ­omy, kill tens of thou­sands of sol­diers and ci­vil­ians, wreak dip­lo­matic chaos, and draw Wash­ing­ton into some­thing it very much wants to avoid.

Is­rael is fully jus­ti­fied in want­ing to hit back at Iran. Yet hat­ing your en­e­mies too much can cloud your judg­ment. In­stead of seek­ing a re­gional war, Is­rael should fo­cus on de­stroy­ing all that it can of Hez­bol­lah; work to es­tab­lish a peace­keep­ing force, a cease-fire and a hos­tage re­lease in Gaza; and con­tinue the show of strength that can de­ter Iran from fur­ther es­ca­la­tion. Code Red in the Mid­dle East, in­deed.

James Stavridis, a retired U.S. Navy admiral and former supreme allied commander of NATO, is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. His previous article was “The sea floor is our future, and it's not secure.”