If Don­ald Trump ends up serv­ing a term in prison, I’d rel­ish the chance to re­fer to him as an ex-con. The brute force of the term would be ex­tremely sat­is­fy­ing.

But the very power of that la­bel has made it prac­ti­cally ta­boo. In its place, even fed­eral pros­e­cu­tors have adopted phrases like “justice in­volved” or “justice im­pacted” to de­scribe those con­victed of crimes — as if we could re­form the en­tire crim­i­nal justice sys­tem sim­ply by us­ing new words.

Euphe­mism in­fla­tion

Much ado has been made of eu­phe­mism in­fla­tion, part of the cease­less ef­forts to re­form the English lan­guage to­ward de­sired so­cial or po­lit­i­cal ends. While it’s easy to make fun of the changes, it’s worth dig­ging deeper to ex­am­ine the un­der­ly­ing logic of what can feel like — but rarely is — ar­bi­trary new ter­mi­nol­ogy.

One ma­jor goal of lex­i­cal re­form is to hu­man­ize and dig­nify the per­son be­hind a sim­ple la­bel. This is ex­em­pli­fied by what The As­so­ci­ated Press calls “per­son-first” lan­guage, rec­om­mended in its lat­est guide­book, is­sued in May, when re­fer­ring to any­one im­pli­cated in the crim­i­nal justice sys­tem, avoid­ing terms like “in­mate” and “ju­ve­nile.”

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Another ex­am­ple is the word “slave,” which sug­gests a to­tal­iz­ing con­di­tion, while the in­creas­ingly pre­ferred “en­slaved per­son” em­pha­sizes that the per­son is some­one upon whom slav­ery (or “en­slave­ment”) has been im­posed.

Pas­sive de­scrip­tors can be turned into ac­tive ones, and thus more pow­er­ful. To call some­one a “slave­holder” or “slave owner” im­plies that a per­son just hap­pens to have an­other hu­man be­ing in his pos­ses­sion. Whereas to call that per­son an “en­slaver” makes clear that one hu­man be­ing has ac­tively sub­ju­gated and de­hu­man­ized an­other.

Not all these re­phras­ings are nec­es­sar­ily down­grades, or even wrong. There is in­ar­gu­ably a power, some­times a nec­es­sary one, in re­con­sti­tut­ing terms, es­pe­cially when they re­fer to hu­man be­ings. As Toni Mor­ri­son once ex­plained, “The de­fin­ers want the power to name. And the de­fined are now tak­ing that power away from them.”

The right eu­phe­mism not only re­moves blame, it also re­as­signs it. Thus, “pris­ons” be­come the “car­ceral sys­tem” or part of the “car­ceral state,” which sug­gests that the act of im­pris­on­ing peo­ple may it­self be the crime. The im­plied ques­tion is: What gives the state a right to put peo­ple away?

Robbed words

But eu­phe­misms can in­ad­ver­tently rob words of their moral force. Let’s re­turn to the old “ex-con.” Even “for­mer pris­oner” and “for­merly in­car­cer­ated per­son” have grown passé.

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But “justice in­volved” and “justice im­pacted” go fur­ther yet. They not only avoid stigma, they also re­move the im­pli­ca­tion of re­spon­si­bil­ity al­to­gether, as if the crime were some­thing that hap­pened to the crim­i­nal rather than an act he com­mit­ted him­self.

“Enslaved per­son” hu­man­izes the vic­tim, but it also soft­ens the in­dig­nity of what is a fun­da­men­tally de­hu­man­iz­ing con­di­tion. When, for ex­am­ple, Ian Urbina writes about con­tem­po­rary “sea slaves” in the South China Sea, the ab­ject state of the world’s vic­tims is de­liv­ered in a ver­bal gut punch in a way “en­slaved peo­ple at sea” would not.

Ac­tive de­scrip­tors can be sub­sti­tuted with pas­sive ones in ways that rob peo­ple of power or agency, de­lib­er­ately so: Obese peo­ple be­come “peo­ple with obe­sity” — those with a con­di­tion ir­re­spec­tive of ac­tion. Like­wise, an “al­co­holic,” which it­self re­placed the de­ri­sive “drunk,” is now a per­son suf­fer­ing from an “al­co­hol abuse dis­or­der.”

In these cases, the ob­vi­ous goal is to neu­tral­ize terms that have come to be seen as loaded. “Over­weight” be­comes ver­bo­ten be­cause it as­sumes a cer­tain body size to be nor­mal. Along the same lines, skin care com­pa­nies like Uni­le­ver got rid of the word “nor­mal” to de­scribe skin that was nei­ther es­pe­cially oily nor dry.

Many of these changes seem neu­tral on the face of it. The re­place­ment of “home­less” with “un­housed” at first glance seems like a su­per­flu­ous switch­eroo. But key to the change is the im­pli­ca­tion that the gov­ern­ment has failed to pro­vide a home, not that some­one has lost one.

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Sim­i­larly, “poor” neigh­bor­hoods be­come “un­der-re­sourced com­mu­ni­ties.” And tru­ancy, which feels like an ac­cu­sa­tion of ju­ve­nile de­lin­quency, in­stead be­comes “ab­sen­tee­ism,” which hum­bly sug­gests a box left un­ticked on the at­ten­dance list, more the fault of the school than the stu­dent.

Wish­cast­ing lan­guage

Lan­guage has al­ways driven and re­flected so­ci­e­tal change. In Or­well’s time, vague lan­guage was used by the pow­er­ful to de­fend or ob­scure bru­tal­ity (e.g., Brit­ish rule in In­dia, Sta­lin’s purges, So­viet de­por­ta­tions).

This ten­dency still ex­ists in po­lit­i­cal lan­guage (see “en­hanced in­ter­ro­ga­tion”). But to­day’s vague lan­guage is more of­ten used as a means to ward off bad things so we don’t have to deal with harsh re­al­ity. Euphe­mis­tic lan­guage be­comes a kind of wish­cast­ing, and per­haps even a way of avoid­ing — or cov­er­ing up a lack of — more sub­stan­tive re­form.

For lan­guage to re­main an ef­fec­tive way to com­mu­ni­cate in­tent and mean­ing, we should con­sider the rea­sons — be­yond kind­ness or sen­si­tiv­ity — be­hind our eu­phe­misms. Some words are bru­tal for a rea­son, and some­times we need to de­liver a pure blunt force.

Pamela Paul, former editor of the The New York Times Book Review, is a columnist for The New York Times, where this article first appeared. Her previous article was “They’re not reading like we did.”