Last week, a se­nior U.S. na­tional se­cu­rity of­fi­cial left the door open to the first ex­pan­sion of the U.S. nu­clear war­head ar­se­nal since the 1980s. Pranay Vaddi, a se­nior di­rec­tor of the Na­tional Se­cu­rity Coun­cil, out­lined the Biden ad­min­is­tra­tion’s nu­clear strat­egy dur­ing a speech at the Arms Con­trol As­so­ci­a­tion in Wash­ing­ton.

Most of the speech re­it­er­ated U.S. pol­icy goals: get­ting more coun­tries to de­crease their nu­clear ar­se­nals, even as the U.S. up­dates its own nu­clear de­ter­rent. But the warn­ing was as clear as day. “Ab­sent a change in the tra­jec­tory of ad­ver­sary ar­se­nals,” Vaddi said, “we may reach a point in the com­ing years where an in­crease from cur­rent de­ployed num­bers is re­quired.”

A more dan­ger­ous world

Since the mid-1980s, U.S. of­fi­cials have sought to dis­cour­age ad­ver­sar­ies from at­tack­ing the U.S. and its treaty al­lies in Europe and Asia even as it grad­u­ally as­pires to­ward a world in which nu­clear weap­ons no lon­ger ex­ist. The proof is in the num­bers: Since 1967, the U.S. nu­clear weap­ons stock­pile has de­creased by 88%, from 31,255 war­heads to 3,750.

Yet in the eyes of U.S. of­fi­cials in Wash­ing­ton, the state of af­fairs in the world is get­ting in­creas­ingly hairy. The kinds of arms con­trol ne­go­ti­a­tions that were so prev­a­lent since the lat­ter years of the Cold War are all but dead.

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The war in Ukraine has only el­e­vated the im­por­tance and value of nu­clear weap­ons for Putin. With Rus­sia’s con­ven­tional mil­i­tary bat­tered and bruised, its stra­te­gic weap­ons sys­tems are be­com­ing much more im­por­tant in Rus­sian de­fense strat­egy. Mos­cow has not only moved tac­ti­cal nu­clear war­heads to Be­la­rus, next door to Ukraine, but also is pour­ing re­sources into di­ver­si­fy­ing its nu­clear arms by add­ing more de­liv­ery sys­tems.

The Po­sei­don, a nu­clear-armed in­ter­con­ti­nen­tal tor­pedo, is now one of Putin’s most cher­ished weap­ons sys­tems. (Whether it ac­tu­ally works is an­other story.) Ac­cord­ing to the U.S. in­tel­li­gence com­mu­nity, Rus­sia is also test­ing com­po­nents for a space-based nu­clear anti-sat­el­lite weapon, which if used could wipe out hun­dreds of low-or­bited sat­el­lites.

Rus­sia is hardly the only coun­try the U.S. is con­cerned about. China is dou­bling its nu­clear ar­se­nal to strengthen its own de­ter­rent power. The Pen­ta­gon’s most re­cent re­port an­a­lyz­ing Chi­nese mil­i­tary ca­pa­bil­i­ties finds that “over the next de­cade, the PRC (China) will con­tinue to rap­idly mod­ern­ize, di­ver­sify, and ex­pand its nu­clear forces.” China will have more than 1,000 op­er­a­tional nu­clear war­heads by 2030 — dou­ble its cur­rent ar­se­nal.

Chi­nese build-up

Although Bei­jing con­tin­ues to claim a “no first use” pol­icy, pol­i­cies can change de­pend­ing on the en­vi­ron­ment. Indeed, Chi­nese mil­i­tary doc­u­ments leave open the pros­pect of junk­ing this dec­la­ra­tion in the event the Chi­nese People’s Lib­er­a­tion Army is at risk of los­ing a con­ven­tional war.

This is all quite con­cern­ing to U.S. of­fi­cials, am­pli­fied by the fact that the United States has so many al­lies it has sworn to de­fend. Our ex­tended de­ter­rence com­mit­ments, in which Wash­ing­ton would the­o­ret­i­cally es­ca­late to the nu­clear level to fight off an ad­ver­sary who has at­tacked a U.S. ally, in­clude most of Europe, Japan, South Korea and Aus­tra­lia.

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Ex­tended de­ter­rence, how­ever, is a dif­fi­cult prom­ise to make cred­i­ble: Would any U.S. pres­i­dent use nu­clear weap­ons against Rus­sia, China or even North Korea to de­fend an ally, know­ing that do­ing so would put Amer­i­can cit­ies at risk of nu­clear an­ni­hi­la­tion? Would the U.S. even fight a nu­clear-armed coun­try in these cir­cum­stances, know­ing full well that a strictly con­ven­tional con­flict could es­ca­late to nu­clear war?

Pres­i­dent Joe Biden’s ad­min­is­tra­tion has ap­par­ently cal­cu­lated that a larger U.S. nu­clear ar­se­nal is the cure-all to these prob­lems. The un­der­ly­ing logic is straight­for­ward: nu­clear ad­ver­sar­ies such as China and Rus­sia will even­tu­ally come to the con­clu­sion that they sim­ply can’t out­com­pete the U.S. in this area and that throw­ing more money into a costly arms race is fu­tile.

If this sounds fa­mil­iar, that’s be­cause it is; part of the ra­tio­nale be­hind the mil­i­tary buildup in the 1980s by Ron­ald Rea­gan’s ad­min­is­tra­tion was to bleed the So­viet Union fi­nan­cially.

A less risky way

There’s a cheaper and less risky way of ac­com­plish­ing what the Biden ad­min­is­tra­tion wants to ac­com­plish. But this would re­quire U.S. of­fi­cials to be self-re­flec­tive and rec­og­nize that ad­ver­sary per­cep­tions of U.S. mo­ti­va­tions are driv­ing much of Rus­sia and China’s nu­clear mod­ern­i­za­tion.

Rus­sia, for in­stance, is com­pen­sat­ing for its con­ven­tional strug­gles in Ukraine and views nu­clear weap­ons as ab­so­lutely es­sen­tial to com­bat­ing what it sees (rightly or wrongly) as U.S. at­tempts to weaken it over the long term. China, in part, is em­brac­ing nu­clear ex­pan­sion to scare the U.S. away from de­fend­ing Tai­wan if Bei­jing de­cides to sub­ju­gate the is­land mil­i­tar­ily.

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A larger U.S. nu­clear weap­ons ar­se­nal is likely to heighten those threat per­cep­tions, not elim­i­nate them.

Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune. His previous article was “Even Europe disagrees about Ukraine.”