Abor­tion is back at the Supreme Court. The case con­tests de­ci­sions by the Food and Drug Ad­min­is­tra­tion to make the drug mife­pri­s­tone avail­able by mail and via tele­med­i­cine. But at oral ar­gu­ment on Mon­day, the court that over­turned Roe v. Wade seemed poised to re­ject the ar­gu­ments of the pro-life Al­liance for Hip­po­cratic Med­i­cine.

No, the con­ser­va­tive justices ha­ven’t sud­denly dis­cov­ered a new sym­pa­thy for the right to choose. Sev­eral of the con­ser­va­tives, along­side the court’s three lib­er­als, ap­peared to be­lieve that the doc­tors rep­re­sented by the Al­liance lacked le­gal stand­ing to chal­lenge the FDA’s de­ci­sions be­cause they aren’t con­cretely harmed by the avail­abil­ity of mife­pri­s­tone.

Only real cases

The ba­sic idea is that the court shouldn’t de­cide hy­po­thet­i­cal is­sues, but only real cases where real peo­ple can show that they are re­ally harmed.

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For a fed­eral court to weigh in, there must be an ac­tual “case or con­tro­versy,” in the lan­guage of Ar­ti­cle III of the Con­sti­tu­tion. Over the years, the Supreme Court has elab­o­rated stand­ing doc­trine to re­quire that an in­jury be con­crete, fac­tual and not ex­ces­sively specu­la­tive.

An im­por­tant case about what counts as con­crete and fac­tual is Clap­per v. Am­nesty In­ter­na­tional. In the Clap­per de­ci­sion, the court re­jected a chal­lenge to the For­eign In­tel­li­gence Sur­veil­lance Act brought by ad­vo­cates and at­tor­neys who ar­gued the gov­ern­ment was likely to in­ter­cept their over­seas com­mu­ni­ca­tions.

In the rul­ing, the court held that the chain of causation as­serted by the plain­tiffs was too specu­la­tive. It de­pended on the as­sump­tion that the gov­ern­ment would tar­get peo­ple with whom the plain­tiffs com­mu­ni­cated; that the gov­ern­ment would seek and re­ceive a sur­veil­lance war­rant; that the gov­ern­ment would ac­tu­ally suc­ceed in in­ter­cept­ing the com­mu­ni­ca­tions; and that the plain­tiffs would be part of those com­mu­ni­ca­tions.

That might sound plausible in 2024, but the ruling was issued in 2013, months before Edward Snowden revealed the existence of government programs collecting massive amounts of metadata on U.S. citizens.

The chain of causation in the mife­pri­s­tone case is far more specu­la­tive and at­ten­u­ated. Ac­cord­ing to the doc­tors, their con­crete in­jury is that some­one might take mife­pri­s­tone, might ex­pe­ri­ence med­i­cal com­pli­ca­tions, might go to the hos­pi­tal for care, and then the phy­si­cians in ques­tion might have to com­plete the abor­tion de­spite their moral ob­jec­tions to do­ing so.

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The odds that this chain of causes and ef­fects might ac­tu­ally come to pass — and af­fect the spe­cific phy­si­cians in the case — bog­gles the mind. To start with, med­i­ca­tion abor­tion us­ing mife­pri­s­tone is suc­cess­ful 99.6% of the time; just 0.4% of pa­tients face a sig­nifi­cant com­pli­ca­tion. If the Clap­per in­jury was too specu­la­tive, the mife­pri­s­tone “in­jury” cer­tainly doesn’t sat­isfy con­sti­tu­tional stand­ing.

What’s more, as So­lic­i­tor Gen­eral Eliz­a­beth Prelogar pointed out, fed­eral law al­ready says that no phy­si­cian can be com­pelled to per­form an abor­tion — or any other pro­ce­dure — against their con­science. Hence, the doc­tors’ hy­po­thet­i­cal sup­po­si­tion lit­er­ally can­not oc­cur un­der ex­ist­ing law. That’s a fur­ther rea­son for the court to re­ject stand­ing.

Alito searches for a way

Iron­i­cally, it was Justice Samuel Alito, who wrote the Clap­per de­ci­sion, who was most con­cerned dur­ing oral ar­gu­ment to de­vise some way to find a con­crete in­jury to the doc­tors in this case.

He re­peat­edly asked the so­lic­i­tor gen­eral if any­one would have the au­thor­ity to chal­lenge the FDA’s de­ci­sion to make mife­pri­s­tone more eas­ily avail­able. His strong im­pli­ca­tion was that some­one must have stand­ing to do so.

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But it’s the FDA’s job to de­cide whether drugs are safe and how they can be ad­min­is­tered. If it ap­proves a drug for use as safe, no one is re­quired to pre­scribe it or take it, and so no one has stand­ing to chal­lenge the FDA’s judg­ment. (Of course, if the drug harms peo­ple, they can then sue the man­u­fac­turer for prod­uct li­a­bil­ity.)

Justice Elena Kagan em­pha­sized how un­usual this case is by point­ing out that when the US Court of Ap­peals for the Fifth Cir­cuit over­turned part of the FDA’s rules, it was the first time in his­tory that “any court has re­stricted ac­cess to an FDA-ap­proved drug by sec­ond-guess­ing FDA’s ex­pert judg­ment about the con­di­tions re­quired to as­sure that drug’s safe use.”

All the court’s non-Alito con­ser­va­tive justices ap­peared open to the con­clu­sion that the plain­tiffs lacked stand­ing. Even Justice Clar­ence Tho­mas, who of­ten votes with Alito, seemed un­sym­pa­thetic to a sep­a­rate stand­ing ar­gu­ment, namely that the or­ga­ni­za­tion that brought the case on be­half of the doc­tors in­curred con­crete in­jury be­cause of the cost of bring­ing the lit­i­ga­tion.

A weak protection

If the flow of the oral ar­gu­ment is re­flected in the fi­nal de­ci­sion, the justices are go­ing to duck the mer­its of the case and al­low the FDA’s rules to stay in place. That’s a far cry from re­pair­ing the dam­age done by over­turn­ing Roe.

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And it still leaves open the com­plex le­gal ques­tion of what hap­pens when a state bans the sale or im­por­ta­tion of mife­pri­s­tone de­spite the FDA’s au­tho­ri­za­tion. But at least in this in­stance, the justices would be al­low­ing the con­tin­u­ing use of mife­pri­s­tone by tele­health and mail — a pro­tec­tion, how­ever weak, of abor­tion rights.

Noah Feldman, a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, is a professor of law at Harvard University, His previous article was “Will bankruptcy protect the Sacklers?.”