Up until recently, countries like Finland, Sweden and Norway had notably higher fertility rates than many countries in southern Europe. The Nordic socioeconomic model, with its mixture of gender egalitarianism and strong welfare-state supports for child rearing, was often held up as proof that progressive policies could prop up birthrates, even that feminism is the new natalism.

That hope seems to be dissolving. As Darel Paul wrote in an essay for Compact magazine last week, Europe has suffered a “stunning fertility collapse” in the past decade, much of it concentrated in countries where the feminist egalitarian model was strongest.

In Finland, for example, the country’s birthrate has dropped by almost a third since 2010. Its birthrate is now almost as low as Italy’s.

Cultural and cognitive

America can learn from the European experience that policy can shape fertility decisions and work against anti-natal trends. But it’s always been clear that pro-natalist legislation is expensive and works primarily on the margins. The right policy might get you from 1.5 children per couple up to 1.7, or from 1.1 to 1.3, an outcome that’s both very much worth aiming for, but also potentially swamped by larger trends.

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Whatever is going on in countries like Finland, says Finnish demographer Anna Rotkirch, “it’s not primarily driven by economics or family policies. It’s something cultural, psychological, biological, cognitive.” Let’s talk for a moment about the cultural and psychological aspect, the role of people’s thinking about the world in their fertility decisions.

Consider, first, the case that contemporary attitudes are explicitly anti-natal and the too-many-humans worldview infuse modern society in a profound and under-indexed way. In this theory, people aren’t having kids because (in the words of one critic) they think too many people are “wrecking the planet,” encouraging young people to “believe having children is bad.”

I’m a little doubtful. It’s notable that the critic’s evidence starts with online reader comments in major newspapers. That tracks with my sense that once Paul Ehrlich’s “The Population Bomb” 1968 prophecies of doom failed to materialize, his worldview became a kind of submerged ideology — present below the surface of liberal society, influential with many older liberals who imbibed it in the 1970s, but a bit too embarrassingly out of date and even racist-seeming to be a full part of official progressive ideology.

It can still be a meaningful force, and to some extent the specter of climate change has given Ehrlichism new life. But the no-kids-because-of-global-warming narrative seems less about overpopulation per se and instead about a pessimism about one’s children’s prospects in a warming world.

But before giving pride of place to that kind of pessimism in our explanations, it’s worth looking at a different ideological force: not the anti-natalism of despair but the anti-natalism of bourgeois propriety.

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This kind of anti-natalism isn’t anti-human, it doesn’t panic about teeming masses and polluted cities, it’s fine with people who want kids having kids. But it encourages a belief in family formation as a kind of consumer preference, one option among many, that deprioritizes its pursuit in the crucial decades when having kids is possible or easy.

And it sets social expectations in such a way that most people’s understandings of respectability and propriety and good sense end up delaying reproduction, shrinking family size and leaving too many people with unfulfilled fertility desires.

The Atlantic’s Derek Thompson defines this as “workism” — the prioritization of professional success to a degree that inevitably crowds out the space for family life, even when there’s some intention to have kids. Or a prioritization that crowds out the possibility of having more kids, if you have to help your first child thrive in a hypercompetitive workist environment.

Bourgeois instincts

This, more than Ehrlichian anti-natalism, is what I see when l look around my own social ecosystem — though it takes different forms for different social classes. Rotkirch emphasizes the professional-managerial script in which having kids is a kind of a capstone achievement, something you only do after you’re completely set, which means after you’ve spent years climbing the ladder of graduate programs and professional advancement that leaves you with a relatively narrow family-formation window.

Women’s fertility drops in their late 30s and 40s, Rotkirch notes. Society has to adapt. “If you do everything that typical ministers of finance tell you to do, you are 45 — you have a house and a doctorate and it’s too late. The idealized life course is really at odds with female reproductive biology.”

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But I also see another version of bourgeois anti-natalism, less upper-class professional and more middle class, where people get married relatively early, have a kid or two and then just assume that a larger family would be impossibly burdensome and therefore fundamentally irresponsible.

These are people who like children, who like being parents, who inhabit the middle class of the richest country in the history of the world, but for whom current norms and expectations and even regulations (those hulking car seats!) around parenting militate strongly against having three kids instead of two, four instead of three, two instead of one.

It’s especially worth emphasizing these bourgeois problems because they transcend ideology and partisanship. If you meet someone who’s convinced that overpopulation is about to overwhelm the Earth or that climate change will visit apocalyptic horror upon future generations, you’re probably talking to a convinced progressive.

But the impulse to delay fertility until some perfect moment of being “settled,” to recoil from the mess of an unplanned pregnancy, to restrict child rearing to the narrowest possible window, to get a responsible vasectomy after your second child is born — these are often conservative impulses, woven into the fabric of the American heartland as much as the liberal coasts.

Inadequate Republican policies

As is the policy corollary, the deep-seated instinct among some Republicans that pro-natal policy is a bad idea because everyone should be exclusively responsible for their own kids; that you shouldn’t even have children if you can’t afford to support them at a certain baseline level of middle-class comfort, that needing a tax credit or family leave is itself a form of irresponsibility, that the government shouldn’t be in the business of social engineering when it comes to favoring an extra kid over an extra car or a kitchen renovation.

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In the increasingly desperate demographic straits of much of the developed world, a reliance on this kind of bourgeois normalcy is not going to be enough.

Ross Douthat is a columnist for The New York Times.