In the early morning hours of September 12th 2001, the day after terrorists brought down the World Trade Center, I was assigned to the makeshift Emergency Operations Center a few blocks from the evacuated part of the city — the so-called “Red Zone.”

We focused on the hazards faced by the first responders fighting fires and digging for survivors in the rubble. We needed lots of data fast and I was hopeful when I was introduced to an on-scene coordinator from the Environmental Protection Agency’s environmental response team.

“What do you guys have?” I said. “Have you characterized the site?” But instead of data, he gave me a puzzled look. “That’s not the way this works,” he said. “We don’t characterize your site. We are here to support the city. Let’s start with what the city is requesting that we do.”

As a professional environmental engineer, I was mystified, assuming that the mighty United States Environmental Protection Agency, architect of the Clean Air Act that literally wrote the book on air sampling, would call all the shots. This was the first of many lessons about the nature of our nation’s disaster response system I would learn over the coming days and weeks.

Advertise with us

We should all be learning these lessons now, with the chaos in eastern Ohio another reminder. Why does the richest and most powerful nation on earth treat its disaster victims this way? Why do these types of disasters, from Exxon Valdez in 1989 to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 to Deepwater Horizon in 2010 to East Palestine, seem to descend into chaos?

The answer is that our fractured national disaster system is not built for these sorts of incidents. The scary reality is that we have no plan or program or ability to bring the nation together in the aftermath of a no-notice and high impact catastrophe like East Palestine, particularly ones that involve environmental contamination.

It isn’t that our system doesn’t work, because it does, most of the time. It was founded on the principle of home rule: that all disasters are local, meaning that municipal and township governments — nearly 36,000 of them at last count — bear the primary responsibility for disasters. As we say in the business, they own the job.

The problem is those rare occasions when the job gets too big, too fast, as it did on the night of Friday, February 3rd, when an eastbound Norfolk Southern freight train jumped the tracks in the tiny town of East Palestine, Ohio, smashing 50 cars, 11 of which contained hazardous materials, and triggering an intense fire. (Had the derailment occurred just 40 miles southeast, it would have been burning in downtown Pittsburgh, with more than 175,000 Pittsburghers in the evacuation zone.)

At that moment of truth there was an urgent need to organize and activate a multitude of complex field operations: firefighting, hazardous materials containment, site security, environmental sampling, evacuation decision-making and evacuation support and public communications.

Advertise with us

And since tiny East Palestine owned the job, it was responsible to do all of these things.

Experts will argue that East Palestine had a lot of help, as emergency agencies from Ohio, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania poured into the area, more than 70 in all. These assets, although important, also added enormous complexity to one of the most complex situations imaginable, as East Palestine sought to understand what was happening, what needed to be done and how it was going to do it.

Those East Palestinians faced the hardest job in the world. As late Friday night quickly turned into Saturday morning and then Sunday and Monday, it was not enough for them to do a lot of things very quickly, they were forced to try and do everything all at once. — including, as I discovered in the New York City EOC after 9/11, briefing, outfitting, organizing and directing the dozens of agencies that showed up to help.

The weaknesses of our current system are thus laid bare, as are the results: widespread chaos, fear and confusion; people getting hurt, either through exposure to contaminants from under evacuations or disruptions caused by over evacuation (we do not yet know). To fix them, we must rethink and retool our approach to these kinds of disasters.

The chaos we are seeing in East Palestine is less a failure of execution than of coordination, not a plan gone wrong but the absence of a plan.

Advertise with us

Let’s address the second problem first. There are a multitude of haz mat response plans, but too many plans can be infinitely worse than no plan at all.

We just need one, a national spill response plan. That one should names names, including key players from local, state and federal government and the responsible party (in this case Norfolk Southern), with clearly defined roles and responsibilities and activation triggers that compel their immediate engagement and effective action.

First on the list is the EPA. Its environmental response team deploys to oil spills, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents and large-scale national emergencies, but only provides “support” when requested, with unique approaches and outcomes for every incident. Yet EPA is essential.

No other entity, government or otherwise, has remotely the expertise and capability that EPA brings. Despite its reluctance to own the job, it must take a lead role for field investigation and risk communication (in partnership with states and locals)

This leads to the second problem: the critical issue of coordination. Most people think that coordination is something that just happens, organically, and that governments have some innate ability to self-organize in the aftermath of disasters. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Advertise with us

Governments are slow-moving creatures of habit, ill-suited to the demands of a fast-moving crisis. The emergency manager is the antidote. She creates an instant bureaucracy that supercharges the government-led response. But big jobs overwhelm local officials. We need to build their bandwidth so they can get a good picture of what is happening across their devastated regions while simultaneously managing a massive influx of aid.

At every national-level disaster, presidents and governors tell us that the local governments “own the job” and that they are leaning forward to “support” them with anything they might need. The reality is that nobody at the local level can come close to doing what is needed. We will never see the kind of organized, compassionate outcomes disaster victims deserve until we invest in that robust coordination element, the point of the spear, the local emergency manager.

The aftermath of any catastrophe brings a period of opportunity — a brief window of time for us to diagnose the problems and fix them. That window of opportunity is now.

East Palestine is a wake-up call and we need to listen to its lessons, one of which is that our nation is at risk from these environmental catastrophes and we must seal the cracks in our fractured system to prevent our disaster victims from falling through.

Kelly McKinney, former deputy commissioner at the New York City Office of Emergency Management and chief disaster officer at the American Red Cross in Greater New York, is assistant vice president of emergency management at NYU Langone Health.