Washington’s “giving a vast amount of military assistance to Pakistan” was “awfully hard to defend,” Sen. Albert Gore Sr. of Tennessee (Al Gore’s father) told Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May of 1959.

The aid wasn’t to be used against India, McElroy answered, but for defense against Russia and China. Gore countered that the American official in Pakistan said the Pakistanis wanted weapons to use against India. McElroy disagreed. “They are the ones who will use it, not you,” Gore retorted.

More than sixty years after this sharp exchange, American-provided weapons are still being used by Pakistan to attack India — the current crisis having been sparked by a brutal jihadist massacre of dozens of Hindu tourists in the disputed Muslim-majority Indian province of Kashmir.

To understand why, it is necessary to understand how the politics of decolonization in British India interacted with American Cold War policy to fuel this enduring rivalry. And how an American decision in the 1950s led to 9/​11 and produced the current wave of global Islamist terrorism.

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The origins of the animosity

The animosity has its origins in a rift in the Indian independence movement. Fearing that Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru’s progressive program of poverty eradication and land reform would damage the economic interests of powerful feudal landlords, Muslim leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah declared “Islam in danger” and demanded a separate state where his people could live free from Hindu domination.

The British acquiesced in the hope of avoiding bloodshed, yet were unable to prevent the vast sectarian massacres that broke out during the 1947 partition or a war over Kashmir, which saw the first deployment of jihadist militants there and ended with each side controlling a part of the area, and claiming all of it.

While the ensuing three-quarter century of violence is often depicted as a simple Hindu-Muslim conflict, it is really one between two irreconcilable models of society: India’s dedication to democracy, secularism and development versus Pakistan’s authoritarian religious militarism, whose rationale is to block socio-economic change.

Unfortunately, this contrast did not concern Washington’s early Cold War planners as they eagerly sought allies against communism. With India staunchly neutralist, Pakistan received massive military assistance.

The Pakistan’s misuse of these weapons has never stopped. Having overthrown the civilian government in 1958, the generals fostered Islamic extremist parties and launched a full-scale invasion of Kashmir in 1965 and in 1970 a genocide in Bangladesh (then a part of Pakistan) that killed a million people. Yet it was not until 1979 that the Pakistani military abused American aid in a way that changed world history.

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As the price for serving as the staging ground for the CIA’s support of the Afghan resistance to the Soviets, Pakistan and its ally Saudi Arabia demanded full control of the endeavor. The most extreme fighters received the lion’s share of weapons, moderates were marginalized, and Afghan refugees were intensely indoctrinated in radical Islamic ideology.

Washington’s military assistance to Pakistan was finally being used for defense against Russia — but in a way that was to do enormous harm to the United States.

Pakistan’s new aggression

After the Soviets were forced to withdraw in 1989 and America lost interest in the region, Pakistan swiftly moved to enact a new paradigm of aggression: Use Islamist militants to crush domestic dissent and as proxies against its neighbors. Seeking “strategic depth” against India, Pakistani intelligence simultaneously fomented a civil war in Afghanistan and an insurgency in Kashmir.

Weapons that had been provided by Washington to be used against the Russians were used to level half of Kabul and kill thousands of Hindu civilians in Kashmir. By the time the dust cleared in 1996, the Taliban were in power, and Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda had a safe haven.

When all of this culminated on 9/​11, it should have been brutally clear that the American military assistance program for Pakistan had been a tragic blunder of colossal proportions. Al Qaeda and the Taliban were only the fin of the shark. What needed to be defeated was the Pakistani-created Islamic extremist milieu in the region.

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For this endeavor, there was a logical ally: democratic India, which had been the victim of jihadist violence for longer than any other nation.

Instead, the Bush administration, operating from a mindset of triumphalism and denial, opted to threaten Pakistan with dire consequences if it did not stop supporting terrorists and actively join its “global war on terror” — and upped military aid to the highest levels ever when the generals predictably, and deceptively, agreed. After Bush went off to invade Iraq, they quietly went back to supporting the Taliban.

In my 2007 essay “Containing Pakistan,” published in the foreign policy journal Orbis, I argued that a tripartite American-Indian-Afghan alliance aimed at containing Pakistan via a cessation of military aid, economic sanctions, and counterterrorism cooperation would accomplish what just fighting in Afghanistan could never do: breaking the capacity of the generals to support jihad and creating the conditions for democracy in Pakistan.

I sent it to all of the principals involved in a review of the Afghan war in the incoming Obama administration in 2009, and received the following reply from then-Vice President Joseph Biden: “For too long al Qaeda and the Taliban have found safe haven in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and America must acknowledge these deteriorating situations and fundamentally alter our course of action in the region. This Administration plans to do just that — disrupt, dismantle, and defeat these terrorist networks while also preventing their return in the future.”

Every post-9/​11 administration made this vow, and all failed to deliver on it — because none of them pursued a realistic strategy that would have delivered such a result.

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Not equivalents

It is therefore no surprise that at the present hour the Taliban are back in power in Afghanistan, al Qaeda has a restored safe haven there, and many of the weapons America left behind have found their way into Kashmir and are being used by Islamist terrorists to kill Hindu civilians — in short, full circle back to 2001.

What is unfathomable is how the international community can approach India and Pakistan with equivalence. Pakistan initiated this crisis, as it has every outbreak of violence since 1947, and Kashmir is not just an obscure territorial dispute but the birthplace of modern jihad and the fight against it.

Instead of yet another round of calling on both sides to exercise restraint, worrying about escalation, and acting to defuse the crisis, the international community needs to accurately perceive and address the fundamental problem: that Pakistan is a major recidivist state sponsor of terror that needs to be contained.

Vanni Cappelli, a freelance journalist, is the president of the Afghanistan Foreign Press Association and a frequent contributor to the Post-Gazette. His previous article was “What America can learn from Greek tragedy.”