White evangelical Protestants’ enthusiasm for Donald Trump, a person they would have traditionally dismissed as an obvious “reprobate,” in evangelicalism’s biblical terminology, is startling. How could they support someone who openly mocked repentance, one of the crucial aspects of their faith, as appropriate only for “losers”?
These evangelicals had traditionally been disconnected from movement politics and parts had been a Democratic constituency. Their fundamentalist ancestors had often practiced an apolitical isolationism.
They’ve been a key part of the American conservative movement since at least the 1970s. That movement has recently grown more radical — more alienated, aggrieved and disruptive — as Donald Trump has taken it over the movement and remade the Republican party in his image.
Now, most of those who self-identify as evangelicals have doubled-down on their commitment to MAGA. Indeed, in the 2016 and 2024 Republican primaries, evangelical voters preferred Trump over candidates with strong evangelical bona fides, including Ted Cruz, Mike Pence, and Tim Scott, and Catholics like Marco Rubio.
Why? It’s complicated, but at least three reasons come to mind, two reflecting the movement’s susceptibility to “Americanism” and the third its culture.
Americanist religion
First, from its eighteenth-century origins, American evangelicals have allowed their national loyalties to shape or even overshadow their Christian commitment. Evangelical historian Mark A. Noll aptly describes American evangelicalism as “a form of culturally adaptive biblical experientialism.”
This cultural adaptation to what we can call “Americanism” helps them attract new adherents, but it can also twist their message and compromise the Christian faith. For instance, despite strong New Testament injunctions to “obey the emperor,” many colonial evangelicals supported a violent uprising against King George III in 1776. Rather than join the ranks of the loyalist Tories, most evangelicals allowed their American creed more than the Apostles’ teaching to shape their political thinking.
In the decades prior to the Civil War, white Southern evangelicals devised a biblical defense for chattel slavery. Though it involved essentially gutting the Golden Rule, they managed to justify the buying and selling of human beings as mere property, among other abominations.
Second, again influenced by Americanism, evangelicalism has rarely been narrowly confessional or rigorously doctrinal but instead freewheeling, emotional, and personality driven. Rather than attempting the difficult, demanding task of constructing an integrated political theology, many of the faithful have adopted a single-issue approach to voting that reduces political engagement to a simplistic binary choice.
To quote Noll again, “the evangelical ethos is activistic, populist, pragmatic, and utilitarian. It allows little space for broader or deeper intellectual effort because it is dominated by the urgencies of the moment.”
When the modern conservative movement emerged following World War II, its intellectual leaders included few evangelicals, but its anticommunism and libertarian economics attracted many evangelicals. By the 1960s, most evangelicals were biblicists, the idea that the “Christian view” was obvious from the Bible. They also practiced an unreflective activism on the causes they believed in, like prayer in the public schools.
Evangelicals responded to the fallout from the cultural upheavals of the late 1960s, supporting the Vietnam war and opposing the counterculture, and becoming more strongly identified with movement conservatism. As they did this, they evolved on other issues.
After the Supreme Court’s landmark 1973 Roe v. Wade decision, evangelicals viewed the abortion issue as almost exclusively a personal rather than a societal question and, revealingly, framed the debate as chiefly about individual rights. They slowly became the pro-life voting bloc they are now. Their earlier biblicism and unreflective activism persisted, but covered new issues.
Traditional authoritarianism
Third, some evangelicals have historically favored an authoritarian model of leadership. Not all, of course. During the 18th and 19th centuries, Congregationalists, Methodists, and Baptists often manifested an egalitarian and democratic institutional culture. Yet charismatic preachers have regularly — especially in today’s non-denominational mega churches — exercised unchecked power with little accountability.
Evangelicals tend to value obedience to authority more than other groups do. Revering a celebrity candidate with a highly rated television show and an autocratic style, along with manifold personal flaws (including marital infidelity), was not unusual for evangelicals who followed TV preachers Jim Bakker and Jimmy Swaggart.
In short, white evangelicals’ preference for Trump had significant historical roots. Recall that Ronald Reagan’s divorce and remarriage and his spotty church attendance appeared less important to his evangelical supporters than his amiable film persona, sentimental invocations of rugged individualism, and hearty endorsement of American exceptionalism.
Evangelicals’ utilitarian penchant to set aside considerations of character and personal morality has become far more pronounced in the case of Trump. In 2011, a sizable majority of evangelicals still affirmed that the personal ethics of candidates mattered, but in 2016, a staggering 72% of evangelicals endorsed a tidy separation between candidates’ public and private lives.
With a candidate’s piety and character no longer a consideration, other concerns moved to the foreground. Robert P. Jones concludes that Trump’s “make America great again” campaign “converted” what used to be called “values voters” into “nostalgia voters.”
The movement’s new politics
Whether Trump caused this shift is unclear, but his campaign certainly played to a nostalgic yearning for an idealized American past when evangelical Protestants had enjoyed greater cultural influence. As candidate Trump declared to a meeting of church leaders in New York, “you have such power, such influence. Unfortunately the government has weeded it away from you pretty strongly. But you are going to get it back.”
Thus, the mainstream evangelical movement adopted an identity-driven and resentful ideology over the traditional religious concerns that had often guided their political involvement in the past. Psychologist John Ehrenreich notes how Trump made religious identity “the test of national belonging,” but stripped it almost entirely of its theological meaning.
None of this was inevitable. The MAGA movement successfully tapped into some deeply rooted features of American evangelicalism, and the movement did not resist.
Gillis Harp is professor of history at Grove City College and author of “Protestants and American Conservatism: A Short History.” His previous article was “Donald Trump is no George Washington.”






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