In the wake of the utter failure of the American anti-extremism and nation-building project in Afghanistan, the fate of a world-known Kabul bookseller may be taken as symbolic. Shah Mohammad Rais is a cultural icon of modern Afghanistan. Much more than a bookseller, he is an intellectual and author at home in the thought-worlds of East and West who risked his life to defend his country’s traditions of tolerance against extremisms of left and right.

After being imprisoned by the Soviets and watching his books burned by the Taliban, the American-led intervention of 2001 gave him every reason to believe that the Afghans’ hour of deliverance had come. His bookstore in Kabul became a mine of knowledge and a social center for the international community, where he presided as a personable and quotable sage. He expanded his business into a vital conduit for schoolbooks as attendance, literacy and professional skills soared at all levels of education, for both girls and boys.

Yet Mr. Rais only became known to the world via Norwegian writer Asne Seierstad’s 2002 bestseller, “The Bookseller of Kabul,” which claimed to be based on observations made during a months-long stay in his home and depicted him as a cruel domestic tyrant and a misogynist.

It’s a picture totally at odds with my own experiences as his close personal friend, and as an intimate of his family over a period of twenty years.

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The bookseller’s antagonist clearly sought to convince her readers that Afghanistan is a backwards society inherently resistant to transformation. This parallels the reductionist narrative by which America justified its actions in Afghanistan as its effort there stumbled from one crisis and contradiction to another before crashing in final defeat. Both narratives only offered such evidence as would serve their conclusions, and even twisted the facts.

Speaking to National Public Radio in May upon her retirement as Afghanistan and Pakistan bureau chief for the Associated Press, a position she had held since the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, Kathy Gannon summed up the American and Western mindset in the immediate aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001:

“(T)he actual narrative of the Afghans somehow got lost to the narrative of the U.S.-led coalition,” she lamented, “and it was very much focused on the horrors of what had happened, and . . . al Qaeda.”

Such a visceral and simplistic reaction was perhaps to be expected in an hour of primal shock, but it was never going to lead to an understanding of why the horrors had happened, and of how to ensure they would not happen again. And this stunted narrative was never allowed to deepen, broaden and grow over the course of a twenty-year war, America’s longest, with terrible results for that vital preventive mission.

“Remember why we went to Afghanistan in the first place?” President Joseph Biden rhetorically asked the nation at the end of August 2021, amidst the fiasco of America’s withdrawal from the country. “Because we were attacked by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, and they were based in Afghanistan.”

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That was the equivalent of saying that the Civil War happened because the Confederates fired on Fort Sumter. It was also simply not true that America “went to Afghanistan in the first place” only after 9/​11.

The American presence in Afghanistan in fact goes back to the 1950s, when Washington and Moscow played the standard Cold War game of development aid and espionage in unaligned Third World countries. Yet America’s engagement was always hampered by its strong preference for Afghanistan’s rival Pakistan, despite the latter’s increasingly alarming pursuit of Islamic extremist policies, culminating in the genocide its army perpetrated against the people of Bangladesh in 1971. This ideology was considered either irrelevant to, or even useful in, the struggle against communism.

So when Afghanistan succumbed to Soviet subversion in 1978, Washington acceded to the demand made by Pakistan and its close ally Saudi Arabia that they be the ones to dictate the ideological cast of the Afghan resistance. The most hardline groups received the heaviest weapons provided by the United States, such as Katyusha rockets funneled from Egypt, and after the Russians withdrew they were used by a succession of Pakistani proxies to further devastate the country without interference from Washington — until Islamabad managed to put the Taliban in power in 1996. Under their rule the country became a safe haven for a variety of transnational terrorist groups. That is why Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were based in Afghanistan on September 11, 2001.

In light of this tragic history, during which the United States had clearly enabled the forces that attacked it, it was evident that soul-searching and fresh creative thinking were needed to address the underlying problem of Islamic extremism. Those who, like Mr. Biden, argued for a narrow counter-terror mission lacked the vision to see that the goals of rooting out terrorism and advancing women’s rights both depended on building a modern, development-focused nation in Afghanistan — in short, a country so transformed that terrorism could not take root there. And the success of that project would have been a model and an inspiration for the Muslim world as a whole.

Instead, a combination of blind rage, rationalizations and the influence of special interests such as the oil lobby yielded a self-defeating strategy. The U.S. doubled down on Cold War alliances with regimes antithetical to Western liberal values — and which had created the radical milieu that led to 9/​11. Ties with Saudi Arabia, whose official Wahhabi creed is the font of modern Sunni extremism, were strengthened, and Pakistan, the chief backer of the Taliban, was given tens of billions of dollars in military assistance. And in the end, the yield of these stunted narratives, and the denial that produced them, was broadcast to the world from Kabul airport in August of last year.

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As we mark the anniversary of that tragedy, reports from the Department of Defense and to the United Nations Security Council have detailed how an Afghanistan run by Taliban again has a “permissive environment” for terrorists to operate in — an assessment that was spectacularly confirmed when an America drone killed bin Laden’s successor, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, in the heart of Kabul at the end of July.

Though Mr. Biden predictably hailed it as a justification of his policies, the event only proved the opposite: The Taliban are more hardline than ever; all their promises regarding sheltering terrorists were lies; and a variety of militants with potentially global ambitions and reach have again taken root there. And the most dangerous of them will not be notorious and old high-value targets who have grown complacent, but relatively unknown and younger ones who will re-enforce the relative security they enjoy with discretion.

The country they operate in is on the verge of total economic collapse, with severe poverty pervasive and mass starvation looming, which will be leveraged by terrorists to recruit the desperate. Impressive religious centers of learning which were built in Kabul specifically to promote moderate Islam have been repurposed to promote the Taliban ideology. Women have been barred from most work and girls from school, and some have even been reportedly sold for food.

And Shah Mohammad Rais is in a hotel run by the Home Office in London, anxiously awaiting word on his request for asylum in the United Kingdom, resigned to the likelihood that the Taliban will destroy his bookstore.

Vanni Cappelli, a freelance journalist, is the president of the Afghanistan Foreign Press Association.