When the Supreme Court handed down Roe v. Wade in 1973, I was a first year student at Yale Law School. For the ensuing 49 years, I watched with great interest the swirling cauldron of emotions surrounding Roe, though I never offered a public opinion on the saga until now. It’s time.

The curious birth, life and death of Roe teach a lesson for the ages: We simply cannot maintain our Constitutional Republic when powerful factions, of any political persuasion, are willing to distort and fictionalize our Constitution — and then cry foul when the Supreme Court does its job and calls a halt to the dangerous charade. With no constitutional foundation, the Court in Roe, and later in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, extricated from democratic processes an issue of unsurpassed moral consequence on which the people of America have deeply conflicting views. If the last 49 years have taught us anything, it is that this approach to the law is futile.

But this isn’t just my view. It’s a view shared by the late Ruth Bader Ginsberg, who argued in 1992 that in Roe, “doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped...may prove unstable.” She agreed with the Court’s conclusion, but thought its reasoning left that conclusion vulnerable. She has been proven right.

More important still, the view that Roe was flawed from the start was held by many of the leading constitutional scholars and practitioners — liberal and conservative — of the last century. They shared the view that constitutional adjudication unhinged from the Constitution itself would destroy the values that undergird our republic. In effect, Supreme Court decisions would be less about law than about its own policy choices. In our system of government, this is simply not the role of unelected judges with lifetime appointments.

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The weakness of Roe was apparent from the start. Justice Byron White, for whom I later clerked, was at the time perhaps the greatest living Rhodes Scholar. He had been a football star, a highly decorated World War II veteran, a law clerk for the Chief Justice of the United States and Robert F. Kennedy’s Deputy Attorney General charged with protecting the Freedom Marchers in Selma. In his dissent he described Roe as “an exercise of raw judicial power” and concluded that “nothing in the language or history of the Constitution [supports] the Court’s judgment. The Court simply fashions and announces a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers.”

This wasn’t a regular dissent. It was an extraordinary rebuke from a humble man whose intellect and fairness were unquestioned. I took a deep breath and awaited the verdict of the constitutional experts whose work I most admired.

The greatest constitutional scholar of that generation was Alexander Bickel, who taught my constitutional law course in the fall of 1972 and had earlier clerked for Justice Felix Frankfurter. He authored the Supreme Court classic The Least Dangerous Branch and represented The New York Times in the Pentagon Papers case before the Supreme Court. In The Morality of Consent Professor Bickel rendered his judgment on Roe: “The Court … refused the discipline to which its function is properly subject. It simply asserted the result it reached.”

The legal giant of the Watergate Era was Professor Archibald Cox of Harvard Law School, who had served as President Kennedy’s Solicitor General. He wrote in The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government that Roe was not founded on constitutional principles, and with its famous “trimester approach” read “like a set of hospital rules and regulations.” “The Court,” he concluded, “failed to establish the legitimacy of the decision.”

In late 1973, the Yale Law Journal published John Hart Ely’s devastating critique entitled “The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade.” Ely, one of the most cited constitutional scholars of all time, taught at Harvard Law and Yale Law and served as Dean of the Stanford Law School. He found the decision “frightening.” He concluded that the new “super-protected right is not inferable from the language of the Constitution, the framers’ thinking respecting the specific problem in issue, any general value derivable from the provisions they included, or the nation’s governmental structure.”

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The wellspring of Roe was the “right to privacy” fashioned in Griswold v. Connecticut, which affirmed a right of married couples to buy and use contraception. This right is not found in the Constitution itself but, as Justice William O. Douglas’ majority opinion in Griswold maintains, in the “penumbras formed by emanations” from various Constitutional provisions. Penumbra? My dictionary defines it as “the partially shaded outer region of the shadow cast by an opaque object.” This is an unfortunately imprecise metaphor for a crucial and defensible holding in Griswold. This was also the view of Professor Ely who had clerked for Chief Justice Warren when Griswold was decided. Ely defended Griswold in the pages of the Yale Law Journal, but also meticulously reasoned that Roe was an illegitimate extension of that precedent.

Only 19 years after Roe, the Supreme Court revisited the issue in Casey. I revere the Court, but the outcome in Casey can only be described as a dog’s breakfast. The Court spoke through a plurality opinion of only three Justices while six other Justices concurred in part and dissented in part, and not the same parts. The Court affirmed the central holding of Roe that there was a constitutional right to abortion but abandoned Roe’s reliance on privacy and instead turned to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. It tossed out the trimester approach and substituted something called an “undue burden” test. In affirming that there was indeed a Constitutional right to abortion, the Court relied on the doctrine of stare decisis, which presumes (though not dispositively) the correctness of a prior decision — in this instance a prior decision whose reasoning Casey itself had thoroughly gutted.

Roe’s “hospital rules and regulations” failed to last two decades — a nanosecond in Constitutional jurisprudence. All that mattered was its unadorned holding that — somehow, somewhere, anywhere — there must be a Constitutional right to abortion. It didn’t much matter how we arrived at that conclusion. Just hold that beachhead by any means necessary.

And now we come to Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, in which the Supreme Court, speaking through five Justices, overturned both Roe and Casey and returned the resolution of the abortion issue to the states, where it had resided prior to Roe. The Court unsurprisingly could locate no right to abortion in the Constitution and easily rebutted the presumption of stare decisis by applying the settled five-part test for evaluating those claims. The quality of Roe and Casey as precedent, the majority concluded, was comparable to that of the 1896 “separate but equal” case Plessy v. Ferguson, which Brown v. Board of Education thankfully overruled in 1954.

What comes next? Citizens of different views will petition their state legislatures, litigate in the courts, publish tracts and march in the streets — and politicians will bloviate ad nauseum. Messy? You bet. Democracies are messy. But we are Americans, and we should know how to move important issues through democratic processes to resolution. We certainly don’t need nine unelected people operating beyond Constitutional authority telling us that democracy doesn’t matter.

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One final thought: Have you noticed that I did not declare my position on abortion? Frankly, it’s none of your business until I choose to make it your business. What is indeed your business, however, and mine as well, is the integrity of our constitutional republic. Don’t take it for granted.

Peter Kalis served as the editor-in-chief of the Yale Law Journal, completed a Doctor of Philosophy degree at the University of Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar and clerked at both the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States. Prior to his retirement from the practice of law, he served for 20 years as Chairman and Global Managing Partner of K&L Gates LLP.