The most recent poll of the electorate in the United Kingdom shows Reform UK with a commanding lead at 33%, and the Greens in second at 17%, in a system dominated for a century by the Conservative (Tory) and Labour parties, representing the center-right and the center-left.

But now, British voters are grasping for alternatives.

Reform is the political project of populist-nationalist (some would say “far-right”) provocateur Nigel Farage. The Greens, meanwhile, had been a boutique left-wing party focused on the environment. One, disgusted with the feckless Tories, wants to replace them; the other, fed up with the ineffective government of Sir Keir Starmer, wants to replace Labour.

Barring a return to the center that no Western nation has seen in recent years, his majesty’s next prime minister will be a person of the (capital-letter) Right or the Left.

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The United States is undergoing the same process, but through insurgencies within the major parties rather than the emergence of new ones. The old wisdom about the magnetism of the political center no longer applies. And neither does the language we’re accustomed to using to describe the fundamental conflict in American politics.

The Right

Political conservatism always exists uneasily in a revolutionary nation. Still, American-style conservatism has a rich and variegated legacy, from Federalists like John Adams to the communitarian, anti-nativist, anti-capitalist writer Orestes Brownson, to anti-Wilson isolationists and anti-Roosevelt free-marketers.

Modern American conservatism — as most readers would understand the term today — under the influence of William F. Buckley, Irving Kristol and others settled into an attempt to conserve the classic principles of American liberalism: individualism, family-based social values, free markets in goods and ideas, all sustained by a sharply limited view of the power and legitimate authority of the central government.

The obvious tension here is that American conservatism saw itself as defending liberalism.

I use the past tense because we are undergoing one of history’s periodic transitions in political alliances, understandings and definitions — and “conservatism” no longer describes (or will soon no longer describe) the dominant force on the American Right.

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Young right-wingers, in particular, view conservatism as conservation-of-liberalism to be beneath contempt. A regular taunt deployed on social media against defenders of conservative-liberalism is: “What have you conserved?”

It is extremely effective. Young people drawn to the right — and many from older generations, as well — look around at a society where fertility and family formation have tanked, where once-fringe academic notions of sex and gender became dominant, where social trust has collapsed (and, in its darker formulations, where white Americans may soon become a minority), and they conclude that conservatism has not just failed, but been humiliated.

This movement is not united — some are motivated by nostalgia for a mythical past they never experienced, others by enthusiasm for the transformative power of high technology — but they agree that political power must be deployed aggressively to reshape society.

Neither can meaningfully be called “conservatives,” because they seek to destroy the status quo. They are the Right.

The Left

American liberalism is in some ways harder to define, because it’s like asking a fish to describe water. It is, simply, the American political tradition, and conservatism has always defined itself by reference to it.

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But “liberal” as a partisan descriptor is relatively modern, and has meant many things over the generations. Roughly since the 1960s, it has referred to the left-wing tendency within American liberalism, which sees social values as mutable and typically improving over time while approving of a stronger role for the government in directing both the economy and the acceleration of social progress.

Still, for a few generations the dominant strains of American conservatism and liberalism broadly shared a vocabulary and at least some core principles, specifically regarding tolerance of difference in the realm of ideas and beliefs.

But sometime in the heady days of the Obama administration, the idea that toleration of perceived intolerance was, well, intolerable came to dominate what we call “liberalism.” This supercharged the existing censorious tendency among those drawn to the left, and catalyzed its transformation into a far more aggressively ideological movement — especially, again, among younger people. While traditional liberals, in the mode of the 1990s, have mounted a rear-guard action, it will fail.

What remains unclear to me is whether the more identity-focused strain (progressivism or woke-ism) or the more economics-focused strain (democratic socialism) will become dominant. Regardless, this movement can no longer meaningfully be described as “liberal.” It is the Left.

The end

We typically call the process I’ve described here, and which is demonstrated by the situation in the U.K., “polarization.” This isn’t inaccurate: Both Left and Right tendencies are diverging from the traditions of American liberalism.

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But it’s also very incomplete. American politics is transforming as wide and deep dissatisfaction with civic institutions has eroded the shared, broadly liberal assumptions those institutions represent. Instead of sharing core values, these movements share core resentments — and may, in the darkest future, share perceived internal enemies.

People accurately described as “liberals” and “conservatives” will continue to exist, and may even remain a majority. The future, however, belongs to the Right and the Left.

Brandon McGinley’s previous column was “Don't look now, but Pittsburgh has really young political leaders.”