BERLIN -- A few years before Apple introduced the iPhone in early 2007, the prototype of an Internet-ready, touch-screen handset with a large display made the rounds among upper management at Nokia.

The prototype developed by Nokia's research centers in Finland was seen as a potential breakthrough by its engineers that would have given the world's biggest maker of mobile phones a powerful advantage in the fast-growing smartphone market.

"It was very early days, and no one really knew anything about the touch screen's potential," said Ari Hakkarainen, a former manager on Nokia's Symbian Series 60 marketing team, who handled and demonstrated the prototype to business customers at Nokia's headquarters in Espoo, Finland, in 2004.

"And it was an expensive device to produce so there was more risk involved for Nokia," he said. "So management did the usual. They killed it."

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The decision, which has not been previously reported, allowed Apple; Research In Motion of Canada, the maker of BlackBerry phones; Samsung and LG of South Korea; and others to steal a beat in a main battle for the industry's future.

As Nokia -- which has just hired its first non-Finnish chief executive -- attempts to turn its troubled high-end lineup around, the company faces an obstacle almost as formidable, according to three former executives, as its rivals: its stifling bureaucracy.

In interviews, the now-departed veterans portrayed an organization so swollen by its early success that it grew complacent and slow moving and removed from customers. As a result, it lost the lead in several vital areas by failing to put its designs for touch screens, software applications and 3-D interfaces on a fast track.

The task of remaking Nokia, which has fallen far behind in the United States and has so far failed to develop a convincing response to the iPhone, has been given to Stephen Elop, a 46-year-old Canadian who ran Microsoft's business software division.

Mr. Elop began work last Tuesday. He is spending his first weeks meeting with Nokia employees, suppliers, phone operators and software developers. He has decided not to give interviews during his transition, which is expected to take several weeks, said a spokeswoman, Arja Suominen.

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But from the picture painted by the former Nokia executives, it is clear that Mr. Elop faces a major challenge restructuring Nokia's 129,000-employee work force to become more fleet-footed, less bureaucratic and more willing to take risks.

For example, Juhani Risku, a manager who worked on user interface designs for Nokia's Symbian operating system from 2001 to 2009, said his team had offered 500 proposals during his tenure to improve Symbian's performance but could not get even one adopted.

Many analysts say Symbian's shortcomings have hobbled Nokia's smartphone offering, as developers are unwilling to write applications for the clunky system.

Many ideas fell victim to infighting among managers with competing agendas or were rejected as too costly, risky or insignificant for a global market leader, Mr. Risku said.

In 2002, for example, Mr. Risku said he proposed a 3-D user interface for Symbian handsets, which at the time would have been unique to Nokia. He said his proposal had been rejected because the needed software would have added $2.05 to the cost of producing a telephone.

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Samsung and LG introduced the first phones with 3-D user interfaces in 2009. Nokia sold the N95 handset with 3-D graphics in 2006 and has said it may present a full 3-D interface for the year-end holiday season.

Mr. Risku, who now designs environmentally sound buildings 300 kilometers, or 185 miles, above the Arctic Circle in Ivalo, Finland, compared Nokia's design approval processes to a "Soviet-style" bureaucracy.

"It was management by committee," Mr. Risku said. "You know what comes out of committees."

In 2004, managers on Nokia's Series 60 smartphone development team came up with an early design for a Nokia online applications store -- an innovation that both Apple, Nokia and other handset makers would eventually adopt three years later in 2007.

Mr. Hakkarainen, a manager on a Nokia Series 60 smartphone development team, said that in 2004, his team came up with the early design for a Nokia online applications store.

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"We created a prototype that included a piece of software on the phone and a piece of software on the server, which made the applications store possible," said Mr. Hakkarainen, who worked at Nokia from 1999 through 2007.

"We demonstrated it within Nokia and said this is what we needed," he said. "We tried to convince middle and upper management. But there was no way."

After leaving Nokia in 2007, Mr. Hakkarainen wrote a book that chronicled Nokia's successes called "Behind the Screen," which was published in April 2009. He said he was still upbeat about his former employer but thought it had lost its creative momentum and would take at least a couple years to respond to the Apple iPhone.

In the year through June, Apple sold $21 billion worth of iPhones and iPhone applications. That is almost two-thirds as much as the €27.9 billion, or $36.3 billion, Nokia generated in handset sales in 2009.

Apple, whose rising market capitalization has just made it the second most valuable company in the world, behind Exxon Mobil, delivers consistently higher profit margins.

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"Nokia in a sense is a victim of its own success," said Jyrki Ali-Yrkko, an economist at the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. "It stayed with its playbook too long and didn't change with the times. Now it's time to make changes."

Nokia, a company that began as a paper mill in southwest Finland in 1865, went on to make cables, rubber boots and paper before starting to make wireless phones in the 1980s.

As of June, Nokia controlled 40.3 percent of the worldwide market for mobile phones, down from 40.7 percent a year earlier, according to Strategy Analytics, a research firm.

The company's presence has slipped mostly in the United States, where the public has latched onto smartphones. Its U.S. share slipped to 8.1 percent in April from 9.1 percent a year earlier, according to the research company ComScore.

The company is a source of national pride in Finland, and its stumblings have been front-page news in a country that recently dipped back into recession. Nokia, by far the largest private employer in Finland, accounts for 1.6 percent of gross domestic product and more than 10 percent of exports.

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Nokia declined to respond to the specific criticisms expressed by the three former employees. Ms. Suominen, the spokeswoman who is a senior vice president for communications, played down the roles the former managers interviewed for this article had filled at the company, saying that they had been "managers with individual roles or leaders of small teams."

Ms. Suominen said the company had a portfolio of 11,000 patent families and that its engineers filed 1,000 new patents each year. A recent internal survey showed Nokia employees in general believed the work environment was conducive to engagement and innovation, she said.

"We are of course a much bigger company than we used to be," said Ms. Suominen, who has been at Nokia for 25 years. "I am sure there are things we could have done better and innovations we missed. But that happens to all companies. We have been very successful with some other innovations."

In the past two years, Nokia's researchers have developed Chinese character recognition for the Chinese market, an SMS-based social networking service in India and software that creates panoramic photos from a series of images, said Henry Tirri, the head of Nokia Research Center, the company's long-term research unit, which employs about 600 people at 12 sites around the world.

Nokia's competitors do not have similar phone products, Mr. Tirri said.

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Still, none of those technologies has changed the game in the way the iPhone revolutionized the market.

"Anybody who knows me knows I like to remove bureaucracy when I can, " said Mr. Tirri, a native of Finland who is now based in Palo Alto, California. "We have made a real effort to transform and open the research channels just since I arrived at the company in 2004."

With the naming of Mr. Elop as chief executive, analysts are expecting major changes. Three days after his appointment, a senior Finnish board member, Anssi Vanjoki, the executive vice president and general manager for mobile solutions, announced his resignation.

In the past five years, Nokia has actively built a more international research staff, but the company's character remains decidedly Finnish. Mr. Elop inherits an executive board with seven Finns, one Venezuelan and a Chicago native, Mary T. McDowell, who heads the company's nonsmartphone business from the United States.

Despite its shortcomings, Nokia is on track this year to sell more than 70 million smartphones, more than twice as many as Apple, which sold 33 million iPhones in the year through June 26. Smartphones will make up 16 percent of the 475 million mobile phones Nokia plans to produce this year, or about four of every 10 handsets sold.

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"Nokia has a huge advantage through its size and established networks," said Carolina Milanesi, an analyst at the research firm Gartner in London. "Once Nokia can develop a popular new feature, they will be in a position to get it onto millions of devices in a short time."

Since the late 1990s, the company has successfully defended its market lead from Samsung, R.I.M., Apple, LG, Google and others. But the economics of the industry are changing, and the biggest profits are coming from the most advanced devices.

Nokia announced last week that it would have to delay shipment of its long-awaited N8 touch-screen phone, citing software glitches.

Nokia's background as a maker of hardware -- in the past, top managers at Nokia typically came from the network equipment side of the business -- has made it ill-suited to grapple with the shift in the industry's focus from communications hardware to software-based services, Mr. Risku said.

"The business changed from signal technology to design and what people want from services, content, and games," he said. "They didn't have the knowledge and ability to deal with those things."

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Much of Nokia's modern corporate culture and organization was put in place by Jorma Ollila, the Nokia chairman who served as chief executive from 1992 through 2006, and his successor, Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo.

Within that structure, proposals were screened by a matrix of interlocking management committees, often with competing agendas, which had the power to block ideas under consensual decision-making rules, according to Mr. Hakkarainen, one of the former Nokia managers.

Mr. Hakkarainen said proposed innovations were often rejected because they were perceived as having too small a payoff.

But "successful innovations often begin small and become very big." he said. "It was a straitjacket on innovation."

In 2003, Nokia did introduce the industry's first touch-screen device, the 3108. Kai Nyman, formerly chief architect for Nokia's enterprise domain strategy, said the problem with the early touch-screen devices was that the Symbian operating system could not deliver a smooth interface.

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"Symbian was the weak link in the chain," said Mr. Nyman, who worked at Nokia for 26 years until last year.

"There were plenty of years to make Symbian better. We could have rewritten the whole code several times over," he said. "We had the resources and the people. But we didn't do it."