U.S. Steel did not follow industry standards in rebuilding facilities that were damaged by the fatal August explosion in Clairton, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board said Tuesday.

Although the federal agency is still investigating the blast at Clairton Coke Works that killed two workers and seriously injured five others, it “already has identified potentially unmitigated hazards for workers” and issued two recommendations for U.S. Steel as it rebuilds and relocates its damaged facilities.

They are calling for U.S. Steel to analyze all of its buildings in Clairton to make sure workers are properly protected.

“Even though our investigation into this terrible tragedy is ongoing, the CSB is issuing these initial recommendations to ensure that workers at the Clairton Coke Works facility are not put in harm’s way hereafter,” the board’s chairman, Steve Owens, said in a statement.

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The agency wants U.S. Steel to perform a comprehensive facility siting evaluation, which would inform where the company performs certain processes, how they would be impacted by fire, explosion or toxic hazards and, in the case of existing buildings, how to mitigate the potential consequences of such disasters.

The investigators said they were concerned that such an evaluation wasn’t conducted as U.S. Steel has rebuilt the pipes that carried coke oven gas to batteries 13 and 14, “in almost the same location and layout as it was prior to the explosion.” They concluded that the piping area was “not capable of protecting occupants from explosion hazards.”

A new control room built to replace one damaged in the blast is a pre-fabricated, remote operations unit that was placed about 100 feet from the original setup, across the street from the rows of ovens that turn coal into coke, workers and investigators said.

Building the prefabricated unit on-site allowed U.S. Steel to quickly restart battery 14, one of two that was damaged in August, limiting the facility’s output to other U.S. Steel facilities and companies. Battery 14 came back online in late October. Battery 13 is expected to restart early next year.

But it’s still not clear that the new location is safe, the chemical safety board said.

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In addition to the batteries impacted by the explosion, U.S. Steel has four others that are operating and have buildings with workers near them.

U.S. Steel said in a statement that it continues to cooperate with the active investigation, and that it’s reviewing the recommendations.

“Throughout this process, our unwavering focus remains on prioritizing the well-being of our employees and their families,” the company said.

The agency wants U.S. Steel to adhere to an Occupational Safety and Health Administration standard for facilities that process hazardous chemicals, which the company said doesn’t apply to coke oven gas. U.S. Steel used the same argument to avoid conducting a broader site analysis before, in 2003, according to the Chemical Safety Board.

Still, regulators recommended a full site analysis again this year to ensure workers at four other coke batteries in Clairton are safe.

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“Without a comprehensive facility siting evaluation, it is not clear that workers are being relocated to buildings that are safe from future fires, explosions, or toxic releases,” investigator in charge Drew Sahli said in a statement.

If U.S. Steel had performed the analysis and made changes before the August explosion, the company could have “reduced the severity of this incident by preventing the two fatalities and two of the five serious injuries,” the Chemical Safety Board found.

Preliminary findings from the agency’s investigation, released in September, zeroed in on the process that workers were using to flush debris from a valve located in the transfer area that ended up cracking, which leaked coke oven gas into the facility and caused the explosion. They were using high-pressure water, rather than steam, as the company’s written practices stated. U.S. Steel has since said it changed its procedure for flushing valves.

The recommendations issued on Tuesday don’t deal with the root cause of the explosion but rather its consequences and how to mitigate them.

Companies that operate facilities that process potentially hazardous products are supposed to conduct “process hazard assessments” on their facilities. U.S. Steel did so every five years starting in 1998 and ending in 2018, but not since, the agency found.

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Even when it did so, the company specifically noted that it did not take facility siting — i.e. where those facilities were located — into consideration.

“It is widely known and well understood in the chemical process industry that explosions can damage or destroy occupied buildings, causing or failing to prevent harm to building occupants,” the chemical safety board investigators wrote.

Two U.S. Steel employees, Steven Menefee, 52, and Timothy Quinn, 39, were killed in the explosion.

Five other workers were seriously injured and hospitalized — four U.S. Steel employees and one employee of Veolia Water North America Operating Services.

Six additional workers — five U.S. Steel employees and an employee of MPW Industrial Services, Inc. — were treated for injuries but not hospitalized, according to the Chemical Safety Board.