In the 1960s, riots swept through inner cities throughout the United States, most notably in Watts, Detroit and Newark, covered extensively by the media. But the arson wave of the 1970s, as Bench Ansfield points out, was far more destructive in poor communities of color.
In “Born in Flames,” Ansfield, a professor of history at Temple University, provides an eye-opening, myth-busting analysis of this little-known — and still relevant — episode in American urban history.
Focused principally, but not exclusively, on the Bronx, “the arson capital of the world,” Ansfield makes a compelling argument that the essential ingredients stimulating the conflagrations were government-sponsored policies intended to prevent race-based “redlining” and cancellation of coverage by insurance companies that had left inner cities uninsured or underinsured for property damage. These policies unintentionally made burning down buildings more lucrative for the owners.
Many “experts,” Ansfield reveals, blamed the urban riots and the wave of arson on inner city residents. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then an adviser to President Nixon, deemed the fires “a leading indicator of the social pathology” of “ghetto” neighborhoods.
A report commissioned in 1974 by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration claimed they were related to an increase in “spite and vandalism.” Many newspaper stories highlighted “welfare arsonists,” eager to move up on the waitlist for public housing.

Ansfield demonstrates, however, that the vast majority of fires were bought and paid for by landlords. The availability of sub-prime, state-sponsored insurance and the increasing tendency of private companies to follow the “reinsurance” strategy of Lloyds of London — reducing their exposure to losses by increasing their premiums, investing them in stocks and bonds, and ceding a portion of their liabilities to firms around the world — made many inner city buildings “worth more dead than alive.”
When torched, dilapidated, mostly vacant buildings that had been valued at $5,000 by a redlining bank began to bring hundreds of thousands of dollars to landlords. Meanwhile, the assets of the insurance industry tripled from $58.6 billion in 1970 to $197.7 billion in 1980.
Ansfield contrasts the fortunes reaped by the insurance industry with the carnage visited on tenants. Although landlords sometimes gave them advance warning, parents often kept packed suitcases near their beds and told children to sleep with their shoes on. Asphyxiation and burns had enduring health impacts: Non-existent or defective fire escapes could be lethal.
Getting burned out of an apartment and housing insecurity became “central organization principles” of life in the Bronx. Between 1970 and 1980, the borough lost 300,000 residents, about 20% of its population.
Arson rates declined by 1980, Ansfield argues, because residents established grassroots, community organizations to pressure legislators, landlords and lenders to protect their buildings.
That said, Ansfield acknowledges that changes weren’t implemented until the profits were taken out of arson. The non-profit New York Property Insurance Underwriting Association, whose state-mandated coverage of the worst risks played a pivotal role in the arson wave, responded to substantial losses in 1975 by ceasing to insure substantially unoccupied or vacant properties, beefing up investigations of fires, and developing better underwriting and claims strategies.
In 1977, the Bronx DA declared war on arson, New York City’s mayor established an Arson Task Force, which enabled coordinated action across the entire municipal bureaucracy, and the state legislature allowed unpaid property taxes to be deducted from insurance settlements.
To protect themselves from growing public criticism that followed the notorious “blackout” in New York City, private insurers began cooperating with fire marshals, police, and prosecutors.
As a result, in the 1980s, the Bronx began one of the largest rebuilding programs in the history of American cities.
Nonetheless, Ansfield reminds us, millions of Americans, especially poor people and people of color, continue to struggle with a shortage of affordable housing. And, as the Great Recession of 2008 demonstrated, the lessons of subprime mortgage lending and global financialization have not been learned.
Glenn C. Altschuler is The Thomas and Dorothy Litwin Emeritus Professor of American Studies at Cornell University.





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