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Forum: The dogs of peace Mercenaries have a bad rap, says Doug Brooks, but in their new incarnation as Private Military Companies they could play a constructive role in the post-Cold War world - and spare the United States some costly interventions Sunday, March 07, 1999
Mercenaries have earned an appalling reputation for past exploits in the developing world, especially Africa. Their sordid ventures, both real and fictional, fill novels and movies. In the 1960s they often fought on the side of repressive regimes and dictators, and even today they are found serving insurgent groups dedicated to toppling fledgling democracies.
In January of this year Eastern European mercenaries were reported to be employed by rebels attempting to overthrow the elected government in Sierra Leone - rebels whose trademark atrocity is severing the hands of civilians, including infants. Sometimes known as the "dogs of war," mercenaries long have been the target of United Nations efforts to outlaw them.
On the other hand, had they been allowed, mercenaries would have saved most of the 800,000 innocent people who died during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda - a task that the United States understandably but tragically declined.
The post-Cold War world has not been as peaceful as hoped in 1989. While the danger of a global war has faded, "little" wars continue to plague the world. As the last superpower, the United States is now in the uncomfortable position of literally deciding which conflicts are worth ending with military intervention and which will be ignored.
All too often military interventions are essential to avert humanitarian catastrophes, but they are also inherently dangerous. Forty-three Americans died during our humanitarian intervention in Somalia between 1992-1994. Thousands of U.S. service personnel continue to be at risk in the former Yugoslavia - and even more are likely to be deployed to Kosovo.
Intervention is also expensive, with the Somalia operation costing the international community well over $2 billion . Whatever the critical need for intervention it is too often outweighed by the military, financial and political risks involved..
"Private Military Companies" (PMCs) are ready and willing to replace American troops as an emergency reaction force. Lacking the layered bureaucracy of the United Nations and the restrictive "exit strategies" required by U.S.-led interventions, PMCs can be activated on short notice to intervene in conflicts that are escalating to the point of humanitarian catastrophe.
Furthermore, they can be used to provide longer-term security and peacekeeping duties while nations are rebuilt and political systems are constructed in an effort to provide a permanent solution to the problem. PMCs can do all this without risking American service personnel and at a fraction of the cost of a typical U.S. military intervention.
Mercenaries have been around in various forms since before recorded history. Private military companies are a post-Cold War incarnation that differs substantially from the past. "Mercenary" is a misleading description for PMCs. These companies are a unique child born of Cold War demobilizations and economic globalization.
Unlike mercenaries of recent decades, PMCs maintain corporate structures, codes of conduct, and are careful to operate within the scope of international law. PMCs, generally utilize highly trained former soldiers from a number of the West's most elite military units. Post-Cold War military reductions have created a pool of highly skilled military personnel to draw from. In addition, PMC declarations that they will only side with "legitimate governments" have held true. Although they are occasionally denounced as mercenaries, PMCs share few of the negative characteristics of the old "dogs of war".
The best know PMC was Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African company that employed both black and white soldiers who had previously served in elite units. The Angolan government employed EO in 1993-94 when it played a key role in forcing the UNITA rebels to accept a U.N.-brokered peace, ending a decades old conflict. Later it was hired by the small African nation of Sierra Leone that was on the verge of collapse in the face of some particularly ruthless guerrillas
In a matter of months EO, working closely with local militias, had forced the guerrillas into a full retreat and eventually created sufficiently stable conditions to allow internationally supervised elections. The whole operation is estimated to have cost Sierra Leone around $20 million, a remarkably small price for peace
One of the most common complaints about EO is that both in Angola and Sierra Leone war resumed after EO left. However in both cases EO had planned to provide security once the conflict had ended, but was asked to depart in part due to international pressure. EO closed its operations on Jan. 1 of this year, a victim of new South African legislation restricting its activities and problems finding new contracts in the face of international disapproval of "mercenaries".
Despite the disappearance of EO, there are other PMCs that could be contracted to carry out military interventions on behalf of the United States or the U.N. One example is Sandline International. Sandline is a British company that worked with the West African peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, to help restore Sierra Leone's elected government to power after a military coup. There are many other companies that are less prominent but are already involved in security operations in the developing world protecting industrial sites and mines..
PMCs have proven to be as professional, disciplined and, by most accounts, humane as Western armies. Col. Tim Spicer, a founder of Sandline, said, "We would like to conduct ourselves in the way most people would expect a First World army to conduct itself." They have demonstrated a capability to intervene rapidly and effectively in remote regions and states in crisis.
This flexibility and speed is essential for effective humanitarian interventions. EO earned high marks from the population of Sierra Leone, who were both relieved to be free of the brutal rebels and delighted that order had been restored. There were remarkably few complaints about EO's operations and tactics by international aid organizations working in the country. Unlike U.S. or U.N. interventions, PMCs act as "force multipliers", complimenting national militaries - not replacing them. PMCs use surprisingly small numbers of high-quality personnel - less than 300 were used in Sierra Leone - and thus are better able to limit unnecessary casualties and control the behavior of their employees.
Hiring PMCs would be a great deal more cost-effective than U.N. or U.S. led interventions. PMCs have to compete against other private companies and thus by nature must be lean. They are not burdened by bureaucracies, arcane rules or red tape and therefore have greater flexibility than national militaries.
There are nevertheless a number of obstacles to using PMCs. The biggest hurdle is that they are still lumped with mercenaries as "undesirable" by the international community. For the United States to use PMCs would legitimize the companies and thereby create a great deal of diplomatic friction. The U.N. still maintains an office whose sole purpose is to eliminate mercenaries - Secretary General Kofi Annan has stated that there is no "distinction between respectable mercenaries and non-respectable mercenaries." Ironically efforts to outlaw the respectable PMCs are having the effect of increasing the numbers of freelance mercenaries who ignore such laws in any case.
Perhaps a more serious problem is accountability. The reluctance of the international community to legitimize private militaries means that the whole industry is essentially unregulated.If a PMC hired by the United States didcommit atrocities, what could the United States do besides cancel the contract? Bringing criminal charges would be difficult since most of the personnel are not likely to be Americans. A rigorous system of safeguards would be needed to ensure that the PMC doidn't become a detriment to U.S. interests.
For millions of citizens in Third World countries suffering from endless warfare, PMCs offer hope for an end to the carnage. For Americans fearful of seeing body bags returning from obscure, distant wars, PMCs offer a conscience-salving alternative to sending American soldiers. Unfortunately, for 800,000 Rwandans it is already too late.
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