After builders of the Petersen Events Center missed the original opening date in October 2001, the state made a risky decision.
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The Petersen Center cost breakdown
Part One:
The Department of General Services, which was overseeing the job, ordered contractors to speed up work in the hope that the new arena at the University of Pittsburgh would be ready for spring 2002 commencement.
The speedup, which included paying overtime and hiring extra workers, contributed to $28.5 million in construction cost overruns on the project. Even contractors who benefited from the extra payments questioned the wisdom of quickening the schedule.
"This is a very ineffective way to construct a project," wrote an official of The Farfield Co., after the electrical contractor was ordered to accelerate its work.
And despite the costly push, the Petersen was not finished by graduation. It would take another six months to correct dangerous conditions and get a permanent occupancy permit.
The construction overruns were a continuation of problems that had characterized the project from the beginning. Before construction began, project cost estimates had escalated from $35 million in the early 1990s to $84 million at groundbreaking in 2000, primarily because of doubling the size of the building and inflation from years of delays.
But the final tab was much higher. By last month, it had reached $119 million, and another $2.3 million in claims are still being contested.
Researchers who have studied public works projects said the cost overruns on the Petersen project seem unusually high. In all, contract amendments, change orders and claims settlements have amounted to a 34-percent surplus.
Judith Long, a Rutgers University public policy professor who recently studied major league sports facilities, said construction cost overruns typically come in at 10 percent to 20 percent.
William Ibbs, a University of California at Berkeley engineering professor who studies project management, put the typical figure even lower, at 5 percent to 8 percent.
"It should be less than double digits," he said, "assuming the project does not have any extraordinary disruptions."
'Fantasy schedule'
Why were the extra expenses so high?
Once construction began, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette has discovered, the state's methods of running the project all but guaranteed high cost overruns.
Pitt initially wanted the arena finished for the start of the fall 2001 basketball season, so the Department of General Services, the state agency in charge of building the arena, adopted a "fast track" approach in which it awarded construction contracts before architectural drawings were finished.
The risk of fast-track scheduling is that the final drawings can differ so greatly from the first ones that contractors have to be paid extra to fix problems. And that's what happened.
"Many critical details have not been totally developed and what is shown concerns me greatly," Pitt staff architect Mark Phillips said of drawings from Apostolou/Rosser, the arena architect. He said before groundbreaking that Pitt would not want to take possession of the building "as detailed."
General Services Deputy Secretary Merle Ryan notified Apostolou/Rosser two months after construction began that drawings contained "missing and conflicting information" and that contractors had complained they were not getting timely answers to questions. Ryan ordered the firm to put an employee at the construction site to assist contractors. The state covered the salary.
The state also had hired 25 "prime contractors" plus a construction manager to coordinate their work. But there were no bonuses or penalties in the manager's contract to encourage the firm to control costs and stay on schedule.
Ryan was the man who decided to go the fast-track route and to name separate prime contractors. He has since left government employment and has declined to comment for this story.
The hidden cost of his choices became obvious once construction began. The job site was clogged with crews competing to work in the same space. Schedules got out of whack. Work was being done out of sequence. Each delay created a ripple effect that put contractors even further behind.
The fall 2001 deadline was a "fantasy schedule," The Farfield Co. told the construction manager. "It is impractical and cannot be met."
"Seventy percent of our contract time is expired, but we have only been able to complete 19 percent of our work," a manager for Cost Co., which handled masonry work, said several months before the deadline.
The big push
Once the 2001 basketball season opener had come and gone, contractors were asked to finish the center in time for the April 2002 graduation ceremony.
So the state set a new target date, Feb. 28, that would give builders plenty of time to get it ready for commencement exercises. To try to reach that goal, the general services department authorized extra payments, and in some cases, paid firms to fix problems that were arguably of their own making.
Pitt Center Partners, the construction manager charged with keeping the project on schedule, was paid an extra $1.2 million for staff and security after the project went over schedule.
Apostolou/Rosser, the architect that had produced late and incomplete drawings, was paid $128,884 for extra staff and $230,374 for extra meetings.
The state also approved $1.4 million in extra payments for more crews and overtime.
Even for an extra $165,000 on its $7.4 million contract, Pat Ionadi Corp. responded in a letter that there was "no possible way" it could meet the new deadline to finish concrete work. Among other things, Ionadi officials said they had not been able to build a set of steps along Terrace Street because other contractors had been in the way, and "even with full acceleration it will still take two months to complete."
Other contractors also complained about inadequate payments and unrealistic schedules.
As the contractors pushed ahead, costly new problems were discovered.
Circuit breakers had to be replaced "to allow elevators to shut down under fire conditions," according to a work order. More exit signs had to be put in. Fire alarms that were "missed on the original drawings" had to be installed.
An episode involving the Pitt Panther logo is a vivid example of a special request colliding with the push to finish the project.
Pitt wanted a six-color mosaic of the logo in the lobby floor, and persuaded the state to buy a special terrazzo called Fritztile.
But the work began during winter, and the Petersen still wasn't enclosed. Workers built a temporary enclosure in the lobby and heated it to 70 degrees so the tile could be installed properly. The floor was uneven, so it was repaired. There was enough dirt in the lobby "to plant a garden," and void the warranty, a Fritz Industries inspector noted, so a cleanup was ordered. An architect thought gray tiles contrasted poorly with the masonry, so he had them replaced with "more aesthetic" gold tiles. Then, on a cold night in March 2002, the sprinklers froze and spilled water, and the Panther logo had to be repaired.
Ultimately, the Fritztile cost at least $115,000 extra.
Open house expenses
Contractors were unable to get their jobs done by Feb. 28, so the state extended the deadline to graduation day, April 28. Despite the extra fees and urgent mandates, the extra two months were not enough.
Pitt moved commencement to Mellon Arena but went ahead with plans for an open house to showcase the Petersen to students, parents and alumni.
The city issued a temporary occupancy permit. Temporary handrails were built and painted in Vegas gold, "to match interior rails." Temporary carpets were installed. An emergency generator was rented. Crews were brought in to monitor safety equipment.
The temporary work for the open house cost more than $122,000.
The open house signified a milestone. Pitt and the state declared that the Petersen was officially open, except for "punch list" items -- the term contractors use for final changes. Coaches and staff began moving into their new offices.
But there was still critical work to be done.
More smoke detectors and sprinklers had to be installed.
Nearly 2,000 rail posts in the new basketball arena had to be reinforced to prevent spectators, as a work order put it, from "falling toward the main court."
A fire inspector found 24 interior stairway doors that were kept locked on the inside because Pitt wanted to control access to the building. But during a fire, the inspector noted, people who used the stairwell would be trapped unless they had a key.
The fire marshal ordered the locks removed immediately. Workers installed an electronic locking system that opens the doors automatically when the fire alarm sounds. That fix alone added $200,000 to the Petersen's price.
By the fall, most of the punch list work was finished and city inspectors were satisfied. On Oct. 28, 2002, one year after the Petersen was supposed to have opened, the city granted a permanent occupancy permit.
Contractors had missed their deadlines by a combined 1,761 days, and that gave the state the right to fine the 12 companies involved up to $2,500 a day. So the general services department levied those fines -- a total of $4.4 million.
But then it dropped the penalties. Several contractors had sued, claiming that the state owed them more money. Some contended that they were not paid enough during the rush to the finish. So, to encourage firms to settle their claims, the state dropped the fines.
What caused the overruns?
In all, during nearly two years of design and another two years of construction, the state racked up $28.5 million in contract amendments, change orders and claims settlements.
To begin with, the state had miscalculated what it would take to design the building and manage the work. The state had agreed to pay two architectural firms and a construction manager $7.4 million. But then it amended their contracts 33 times, bolstering their fees by $4.3 million.
Contractors were paid an extra $18.1 million for change orders, and the architects were paid $500,000 for new drawings for the extra work.
Change orders are inevitable on complex construction jobs. When Pat Ionadi Corp. excavated the Pitt Stadium site, for instance, it encountered an old mine, and the state paid the company $37,697 to shore up the shaft and remove the coal.
Still, planners try to limit change orders because they are expensive. The state can't re-bid the work, so contractors have the leverage to charge a premium. Under Gov. Ed Rendell, a state general services spokesman said, the state wants to limit change orders to 6 percent of basic contracts.
The Petersen's change orders amounted to a 22 percent overage.
And most of that was blamed on the primary architect, Apostolou/Rosser, a joint venture of local firm Apostolou Associates Inc. and Rosser International Inc. of Atlanta.
Pitt Center Partners categorized every change order, and it attributed 60 percent of the extra work to "professional errors and omissions." Contractors were paid $10.8 million to fix architectural mistakes.
Architect Paul Apostolou said the state told him not to discuss the Petersen project, although state officials denied saying that. While declining to discuss details, Apostolou said "we're extremely proud of that project. ... It is without a doubt the finest arena in the country."
Pitt also was responsible for costly changes. The university asked for extra features after the Petersen was designed, and the state approved $4.1 million in changes, including additional outdoor lighting, an elaborate flagpole courtyard near the entrance and other site work that cost $372,911. More food stands and kitchens cost $2.7 million.
Settling claims
In many instances, contractors who were dissatisfied with their compensation sued for more. So far, the state has paid $5.6 million to settle claims with 15 firms.
The largest claims settlement went to the construction manager, Pitt Center Partners, which is particularly ironic, since it was required by the contract to help the state evaluate and resolve claims. The firm's case was settled for $1.2 million. But the details of that settlement and others are unavailable because the state has withheld the case files.
Three more firms have sued for $2.3 million. State officials said they will not discuss pending litigation. One of the cases was filed by arena architect Apostolou/Rosser, but the other claimants have not been identified.
Pitt has a keen interest in the disputes. Although the companies sued the state, because that's who hired them, Pitt is required by its contract with the state to pay any settlements.
Pitt has taken over the defense of the claims, according to the state, and the state has relinquished its contract with Apostolou/Rosser to Pitt, which would allow the university to sue the architect to recover the costs of any claims settlements it feels are the architect's fault.
In the end, the Petersen Events Center cost the Department of General Services $113 million, but there was at least $6 million more spent on the project.
The state had separately allocated $3.5 million for "furnishings, fixtures and equipment." Pitt used that money to buy items ranging from $600 trash cans to a $173,000 portable basketball floor. It purchased $5,200 treadmills, $5,000 cherry credenzas and an $18,000 forklift. It paid $32,000 for a sculpture of the Pitt Panther and $66,000 for eight basketball backstops.
Pitt also controlled a fund of its own that was outside the official project budget.
Pitt paid about $2.1 million for a Daktronics scoreboard and message boards that originally were part of the state's construction budget. Project documents indicate that the university also may have purchased carpets, fluorescent light fixtures, tree grates and telecommunications equipment through this fund.
Pitt has not disclosed exactly what it bought or how much it paid, but state and university documents suggest as much as $5 million in off-budget spending. The actual figure could be significantly higher or lower, and the estimate does not include indirect costs like staff salaries, financing fees and attorney fees.
The Petersen's price tag can be calculated by combining the state general services budget, the furnishings fund, and a conservative $2.1 million estimate for Pitt's private expenditures.
That comes to $119 million, a far cry from the $35 million arena proposed in 1992, and 40 percent more than the estimated cost at groundbreaking four years ago.
It will ultimately be up to Pitt students, employees and visitors -- and the taxpayers who footed 56 percent of the tab -- to decide if the extra costs were worth it.
This story was originally published with images that are no longer available.




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