Political leaders don’t initiate wars with the expectation that they will be protracted contests of attrition. Short wars are of course rational, as a fait accompli pre-empts any response by a slow-mobilizing U.S. alliance. However, if the lightning attack fails, the leader risks becoming a victim of regime change by the extent of the re-organization he needs to impose on their citizens and industry to strengthen his country.
Short wars become long wars and long wars risk the loss of allies and the provocation into being of new adversaries.
Dangerous balance
The economic and energy balance between the U.S. and its allies versus the China-Russia axis and its allies, is close to even, and therefore likely to produce a protracted attrition war, punctuated by the use of nuclear weapons as one side begins to lose.
2024 World Bank data shows that China accounts for 31.6% of the world’s manufacturing capacity, as compared with 15.9% for the U.S., and 22% for major U.S. allies in the top ten (Japan, Germany, India, South Korea, Italy, Mexico, and France).
Both South Korea and Indonesia manufacture more than Russia (2.7% and 1.81% versus 1.8%), and Mexico out-produces France (1.7%Ca to 1.6%). Brazil has a larger manufacturing base than the U.K., Turkey more than Spain, and Iran more than Sweden.
Although China produced far more cars (27 million) than the U.S. (10m), a better surrogate for armored vehicle output is 2022 commercial vehicle manufacturing: U.S. (8.3m), China (3.2m), Morocco (2.9m), Thailand (1.3m) Japan (1.3m), and India (1m).
The U.S. and its NATO allies still account for over 95% of total global aircraft production by valuation, which is a good proxy for technical sophistication. However, by gross tonnage of merchant vessels in 2023, China accounts for 33M, South Korea by 18m, Japan by 10m, and the rest of world by just 4m, which is worrying. The U.S. ranks just ahead of Iran and behind Indonesia, Turkey, Netherlands, and Russia.
Most unsettling is that the U.S. ($5.9bn) ranks behind China ($27.1bn) in value of machine tools, even including all of its major state allies (Italy, Germany, Japan, South Korea and India, worth $21.2bn).
In 1938, the German author Sternberg saw the shortcomings of Hitler’s war plan, espoused in his 1925 “Mein Kampf,” for a “blitzkrieg” invasion of Russia. He was remarkably accurate in his predictions that despite the prevalence of armored warfare, attrition by industrial capacity that would determine victory.
But he made a mistake about its effects. His aversion to Nazism and his consequent isolation from German sentiment, meant that his predictions of a revolt against Hitler among the soldiers, workers, farmers, middle and factory-owning classes, was not only false, but failed to appreciate the resilience of the Nazi state, and the modern state in general.
How will a long war end?
This is a serious issue for those seeking victory in Ukraine by the overthrow by coup of Russian President Vladimir Putin, or avoiding war over Taiwan by threatening to conjure the same coup threat against the Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.
Predicting how protracted wars end, like the Russo-Ukraine War, or whether China could seize Taiwan and survive the ensuing naval blockade, what damage North Korea could inflict on its neighbor, and how Iran could seize and if it can then be expelled from the Straits of Hormuz, is a very complex technical issue best handled by fine-grained wargaming.
The implications of the short war illusion is that deterrence by the democracies must always be primed for a demonstration of its capability and credibility. Allegations of long-term planning by Putin and Xi are really just a jumble of short and episodic domestic political maneuvers to stay in power, and Western deterrence must be visible enough to be incorporated into those calculations.
The democracies must not pattern the traditional Western complacent practice of allowing the enemy to conduct a surprise attack in order to mobilize its domestic population, like the 1940 Fall of France or the 1941 strike on Pearl Harbor. It must prepare itself.
During the Cold War, NATO was faced with the dreaded choice of triggering a tactical nuclear war either at the commencement of hostilities along the East German border before most of NATO’s divisions were overrun, or in a last-ditch desperate defense on the Rhine, and it was this uncertainty that held the USSR at bay.
Capability and deterrence
Currently, given China’s overwhelming manufacturing capability, which may be sustained by Russia’s energy supplies in the event of a U.S. naval blockade of China’s Middle Eastern oil, requires that NATO must also demonstrate that it has a plan for a protracted years-long conflict.
Nuclear deterrence must also be robust enough in the event that imminent failure leads to considerations of a desperate nuclear attack by the Kremlin or Beijing. One important strategy, given the increasing shift of manufacturing to the developing world, is to cultivate allies by the difficult mission of creating new liberal democracies.
Julian Spencer-Churchill is associate professor of international relations at Concordia University and author of “Militarization and War” and of “Strategic Nuclear Sharing.”





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