A de­cade ago, the Houthis were a rag­tag group of fight­ers based in the north of Yemen that most peo­ple hadn’t even heard of. To­day, the movement-turned-de facto gov­ern­ment in Yemen is caus­ing so much trou­ble in the Red Sea that some of the world’s larg­est ship­ping com­pa­nies are no lon­ger sail­ing through its wa­ters.

Since the Is­rael-Ha­mas war erupted Oct. 7, the Houthis have taken pot­shots against ci­vil­ian ves­sels in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait choke­point head­ing into the Red Sea. At­tack drones and bal­lis­tic mis­siles have been launched from Houthi-con­trolled ar­eas along Yemen’s coast­line, some of which have caused mi­nor dam­age.

Mil­i­tary op­tions

U.S. war­ships in the area have re­sponded to mul­ti­ple dis­tress calls. On Dec. 16, the USS Car­ney shot down 14 one-way drones in what has been the most sig­nifi­cant armed en­gage­ment in those wa­ters to date.

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In­sur­ance for ships car­ry­ing ev­ery­thing from oil to ag­ri­cul­tural prod­ucts are now at sky-high rates. BP, the en­ergy con­glom­er­ate, is no lon­ger us­ing the Red Sea. More than 100 con­tainer ships that would or­di­nar­ily sail through the Red Sea to­ward the Suez Canal have taken the lon­ger jour­ney around Africa.

Amer­i­can of­fi­cials have weighed mil­i­tary op­tions. U.S. strikes on the Houthis would run the risk of the Is­rael-Ha­mas war spread­ing to the re­gion’s other fault lines. Saudi Arabia has ad­vised U.S. re­straint over con­cern that its own set of peace talks with the group would col­lapse oth­er­wise.

The U.S., how­ever, can’t be seen to do noth­ing. The ad­min­is­tra­tion there­fore has or­ga­nized a mul­ti­na­tional task force to pre­serve free­dom of nav­i­ga­tion. The Pen­ta­gon’s chief spokes­man de­scribed the task force as sim­i­lar to a “high­way pa­trol,” re­spon­si­ble with as­sist­ing ves­sels if re­quested.

These are very gen­eral com­ments, and there are more ques­tions than an­swers about how the mar­i­time task force will ac­tu­ally work. The en­tire proj­ect feels like a hap­haz­ard en­ter­prise. As­sum­ing the rules of en­gage­ment have been agreed upon, they re­main mys­te­ri­ous to the pub­lic. Pre­sum­ably, the task force is strictly a de­fen­sive mis­sion.

De­fense or of­fense?

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What that means in prac­tice, though, is to be de­ter­mined. Does this mean the U.S., U.K., France, Italy, Spain and the rest of the co­a­li­tion will stick with neu­tral­iz­ing Houthi drones and mis­siles, akin to es­tab­lish­ing an ad hoc air de­fense sys­tem off Yemeni wa­ters? What hap­pens if a mis­sile or drone man­ages to cause se­vere dam­age to a ship? Would such a sce­nario prompt the U.S. and its part­ners to re­turn fire? Is the co­a­li­tion pre­pared for Houthi re­tal­i­a­tion?

It wouldn’t be a sur­prise if the co­a­li­tion were still work­ing through the an­swers to these ques­tions.

Its mem­ber­ship has also come un­der for scru­tiny — for good rea­son. Out­side of Bahrain, the states most af­fected by trade flows through the Red Sea have cho­sen to stay away.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emir­ates aren’t par­tic­i­pat­ing, the for­mer be­cause it doesn’t want to do any­thing the Houthis could mis­con­strue as an ag­gres­sion. (The two re­main locked in peace talks over the civil war in Yemen.) Egypt, which ad­min­is­ters the Suez Canal and re­ceived more than $9 bil­lion in tran­sit rev­e­nue this year, isn’t a part of the ef­fort ei­ther.

China sources most of its oil from the Mid­dle East and yet has stayed on the side­lines de­spite U.S. at­tempts to ca­jole Bei­jing into tak­ing a greater share of the re­spon­si­bil­ity for en­forc­ing free­dom of nav­i­ga­tion in the re­gion’s wa­ters. China is in no mood to grant the U.S. any fa­vors when it sees U.S. pol­icy as overtly hos­tile to its in­ter­ests.

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Of course, all of this is com­ing at a time when com­bat be­tween Is­raeli and Ha­mas forces con­tin­ues, with no sign the fight­ing is about to ta­per off. While truce talks have gained mo­men­tum, they are de­signed to cre­ate the con­di­tions for more pris­oner and hos­tage re­leases, not to nec­es­sar­ily end the con­flict.

The Houthis’ de­mand

The Houthis claim that at­tacks on ships in the Red Sea will per­sist un­til one of two things hap­pens: Is­rael stops bomb­ing Gaza, or the in­ter­na­tional com­mu­nity finds a way to send far more hu­man­i­tar­ian aid into the en­clave. At the time of writ­ing, the United Na­tions Se­cu­rity Coun­cil is in the clos­ing stages of ne­go­ti­a­tions that would es­tab­lish a mon­i­tor­ing mech­a­nism in the area to en­sure aid gets to where it needs to go.

Whether or not the Houthis’ po­si­tion is gen­u­ine is dif­fi­cult to say. But if it is gen­u­ine, the Biden ad­min­is­tra­tion has even more of an in­cen­tive to push Is­rael into wind­ing down op­er­a­tions in Gaza.

At best, the U.S.-led mar­i­time co­a­li­tion is a place­holder be­tween now and when the Is­rael-Ha­mas war ends. At worst, it will in­sti­gate a whole new set of prob­lems that Wash­ing­ton and its part­ners will be forced to con­tend with.

Daniel DePe­tris is a fel­low at De­fense Pri­or­i­ties and a for­eign af­fairs col­um­nist for the Chi­cago Tri­bune.