Sam Bank­man-Fried was a cham­pion of Ef­fec­tive Al­tru­ism, a vaunted ap­proach to pub­lic pol­icy and per­sonal con­duct that judges peo­ple and their choices by ask­ing if they add to the sum of hu­man hap­pi­ness.

The move­ment’s lead­ers are surely em­bar­rassed by their as­so­ci­a­tion with a man on trial for de­fraud­ing in­ves­tors of bil­lions of dol­lars. They might ar­gue that he just talked up Ef­fec­tive Al­tru­ism to mar­ket his prod­ucts more ef­fec­tively or that he was just an ut­terly in­com­pe­tent man­ager. In ei­ther case, he has noth­ing to do with Ef­fec­tive Al­tru­ism, cor­rectly un­der­stood.

I dis­agree.

Could he do it?

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From a moral-philo­soph­i­cal point of view, what’s in­ter­est­ing is not whether Bank­man-Fried was act­ing in good faith or man­aged the com­pany well. What’s in­ter­est­ing is whether as an Ef­fec­tive Al­tru­ist, he could le­git­i­mately do what he is ac­cused of do­ing and still be do­ing the right thing so long as he used the pro­ceeds to ad­vance hu­man hap­pi­ness.

The move­ment’s an­swer to this ques­tion seems to be: No, cheat­ing peo­ple is ob­vi­ously wrong. Most sane peo­ple would agree. The prob­lem with this an­swer is that it shows Ef­fec­tive Al­tru­ism to be some­thing of an in­tel­lec­tual scam.

Ef­fec­tive Al­tru­ism is a form of util­i­tar­i­an­ism. Util­i­tar­i­ans judge acts by com­par­ing their ef­fects on the global sum of hap­pi­ness, and the mor­ally right course is the one you ex­pect to achieve the most hap­pi­ness. Other moral con­sid­er­ations — like ob­li­ga­tions to be hon­est, to be just, to be loyal, to re­spect prop­erty rights — count only to the ex­tent that they help in cal­cu­lat­ing hap­pi­ness.

Ef­fec­tive Al­tru­ists are there­fore obliged to say: Yes, steal­ing to give to the poor might be good. The poor would prob­a­bly gain more in hap­pi­ness than the not-poor would lose. It de­pends on the num­bers.

Ordinary lower-case effective altruism is concerned with bang for the buck and making a difference. No doubt, the more discipline and rigor its practitioners can bring to their task, the better. And it's true, by the way, that the diligent use of plain old cost-benefit analysis might usefully reorder global development priorities.

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But Up­per-case Ef­fec­tive Al­tru­ism is a whole other thing. It deems or­di­nary ways of do­ing good timid and un­prin­ci­pled. To care more than we do about the world’s poor­est peo­ple isn’t enough, for ex­am­ple. Hap­pi­ness is hap­pi­ness, so we should care as much about the hap­pi­ness of dis­tant strang­ers as we do about that of peo­ple close to us.

Nar­row­ing fo­cus

It calls on peo­ple to nar­row their fo­cus. Wil­liam MacAskill, an Ox­ford Univer­sity phi­los­o­pher and one of the move­ment’s in­tel­lec­tual lead­ers, is said to have ad­vised Bank­man-Fried while the lat­ter was a ju­nior at MIT, “Earn to give.” Vol­un­teer­ing in a soup kitchen is all very well, but get­ting rich and then giv­ing ev­ery­thing away to the world’s poor­est is more ef­fec­tive and there­fore mor­ally su­pe­rior.

Perhaps the novice also wondered: “Why not live well at the same time? Set against the good I'll be doing, the cost isn't even a rounding error.”

MacAskill’s lat­est gloss on Ef­fec­tive Al­tru­ism — so-called Longter­m­ism — vastly ex­pands these de­mands by ar­gu­ing that the hap­pi­ness of hu­mans 100 years from now, or 1,000 years from now, is as valu­able as the same amount of hap­pi­ness to­day. Fail­ing to give due weight to the hap­pi­ness of gen­er­a­tions un­imag­in­ably re­mote in time is a kind of moral blind­ness.

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You can see why Ef­fec­tive Al­tru­ism also ap­peals to peo­ple with per­son­al­ity dis­or­ders. It blends the in­trac­ta­ble com­plex­ity of these cal­cu­la­tions with what most might see as so­cio­pathic sim­pli­fi­ca­tion. Com­put­able eth­ics strips out all un­help­ful moral cri­te­ria, that is, moral judg­ment as most peo­ple un­der­stand it.

Ac­cord­ing to hard-core util­i­tar­i­ans, em­pa­thy is a prob­lem, be­cause it makes the in­ter­ests of fam­ily, friends, neigh­bors and fel­low cit­i­zens seem more press­ing than those of strang­ers, for­eign­ers and peo­ple who might or might not be born mil­len­nia from now. One day, with suf­fi­cient fund­ing and ade­quate com­put­ing power, rea­son will over­come this moral id­i­ocy.

Who knows. Per­haps it will. And granted, in the mean­time, Ef­fec­tive Al­tru­ism might do real good merely as a fad, by per­suad­ing peo­ple to think more about what we owe oth­ers. Even so, the move­ment is in­tel­lec­tu­ally dis­hon­est, be­cause it pre­tends to be two con­tra­dic­tory things.

First, it’s a fear­less as­sault on pre­vail­ing eth­i­cal com­pla­cency, dar­ing to chal­lenge em­bed­ded moral in­tu­itions, in­fer­ring strange-seem­ing edicts through sheer force of rea­son. Second, un­der pres­sure, it flips to or­di­nary eth­i­cal con­duct, just ex­e­cuted more care­fully. In other words, it’s both a star­tling philo­soph­i­cal break­through and mostly busi­ness as usual.

Flip what you say

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If you head a think tank that seeks at­ten­tion and cash, say that you’re shift­ing par­a­digms. When one of your as­so­ci­ates is caught rob­bing banks to sup­port fu­ture re­search on in­ter-plan­e­tary mi­gra­tion, talk about com­mon sense.

The move­ment was al­ready strug­gling with this im­pos­ture be­fore the FTX scan­dal broke. In Sep­tem­ber 2022, MacAskill told an in­ter­viewer he was an­noyed by the way peo­ple he talked to al­ways wanted to push his ar­gu­ments to their log­i­cal con­clu­sion. Ap­par­ently, that’s too much to ask of a moral phi­los­o­pher.

Clive Crook is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist and member of the editorial board. His previous article was “Should we trust Trump or his accusers, or neither?”.