An explosive filing in a lawsuit brought by some 9/11 families against the government of Saudi Arabia has seemingly cast a new meaning on all of the deaths that have occurred from that day through the wars that ensued to the veterans’ suicides that have relentlessly continued in their aftermath.
As reported in The Atlantic, the plaintiffs have produced substantial and detailed evidence that two Saudi officials based in Los Angeles, a diplomat and a spy, provided critical financial and logistical support to the first two hijackers who entered America. The filing also shows that these were not the undertakings of isolated rogue actors, but were “carefully coordinated with other Saudi officials” in Washington and Riyadh.
“(I)f our understanding of what transpired on 9/11 turns out to have been flawed, then the costly policies that the United States has pursued for the past quarter century have been rooted in a false premise,” former national security officials Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon write. “The global War on Terror was based on a mistake.”
Yet the limited conclusions that Benjamin and Simon draw from these facts about the nature, extent, and meaning of Saudi complicity in 9/11 demonstrate that fresh evidence will not result in new, comprehensive, and creative thinking when denial is still at work.
The Saudi influence
The prime mistake which determined everything that followed, as they see it, was using false allegations of ties between Baghdad and Al Qaeda as a justification for invading Iraq, when the terrorists in fact had substantial ties to Riyadh.
As none of the evidence even hints that the officials were acting on orders from the Saudi rulers themselves, in their view effectively dealing with jihadist terror was basically a matter of putting pressure on this longtime ally to purge any extremists who held positions in government and the religious establishment.
In reality, the vast historical trajectory that culminated in 9/11 was not going to be rolled back by a bureaucratic reshuffling.
From the time they conquered most of the Arabian peninsula a century ago, the house of Saud had used all of its influence to combat secular, nationalist, and liberal movements across the Muslim world. Leveraging their possession of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina and deploying their vast oil wealth, they diffused their fanatical, ultra-fundamentalist Wahhabi variant of Islam via the numerous mosques, religious schools, and Islamist parties they funded in other countries.
Formally justified as a defense of the faith, their ulterior motive in pursuing a reactionary program that promoted religious hatred was to block modernizing socio-economic transformations that would threaten their absolute power and that of allied feudal elites.
The moment of metastasis for all this subversion came when, in close collaboration with Pakistan, the Saudis took advantage of their role as America’s partners in backing the Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion in the 1980s to pave the way for the imposition of a theocracy there once the communists had been defeated.
With the consent of the Reagan administration, the lion’s share of American-provided weapons and financing was channeled to the most violent extremists by Pakistani intelligence, and religious schools there indoctrinated brutalized Afghan refugees to hate “infidels” in accordance with Wahhabi ideology.
Foreign Islamists, the so-called “Arab Afghans,” were cycled in and out of the warzone to fight and then use their warrior prestige to spread jihadism far and wide – among them Osama bin Laden. After Washington lost interest in Afghanistan with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the twin fundamentalist allies fueled a civil war there that ended with their candidate the Taliban in power and the country a safe haven for terrorists.
Obviously, the impact of all of this on what transpired on 9/11 and the course of human events in general far outweighs the actions of a few officials in the immediate leadup to the attacks. Saudi complicity in 9/11 lies in their determining role as the protagonists of the rise of modern Islamic extremism who bear guilt for creating the milieu from which Al Qaeda emerged, not as fully engaged participants at the highest level in this particular atrocity.
America’s prime mistake
In this broader perspective, the prime mistake America made was not using false allegations of ties between Baghdad and Al Qaeda as a justification for invading Iraq. It was the failure to recognize that trying to win the Cold War by pitting one form of extremism against another had been a tragic error, and that we needed to find very different partners in order to defeat the ideology that inspires jihadist terror.
Instead, Washington strenghened its relations with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, but while we engaged in the non sequitur of invading Iraq, Pakistan went right on supporting the Taliban — despite receiving billions of dollars in military assistance from u. That resulted in the eventual loss of the Afghan war.
Benjamin and Simon frame their piece as a purely historical reckoning, stating that the lawsuit is a good way to “close the books on 9/11,” as in any case “for most Americans, the global War on Terror has become a hazy memory from the time before Donald Trump.”
That is an astonishing assertion to make in the wake of the 10/7 attack on Israel, the agony of Gaza and the Muslim rage it inspires, the restoration of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in to power in Afghanistan, ISIS’s resurgence, the emergence of the Sahel region of Africa as a major terror hub, and the warnings by international security officials that Europe and America are again in the sights of jihadists.
Yet though the terror threat is higher than it has been for many years, they are accurate in implying that the misconceived “war on terror,” which has yielded so little, should indeed become a thing of the past.
If there is any lesson to be learned from the last quarter century, it is that it is not enough to combat malevolent nonstate actors militarily and understand their ties to certain states. We must cultivate and support benevolent nonstate actors that can help us fight extremism by transforming the Muslim world. That means pivoting away from the despots who have been Washington’s chief allies in the region to the very liberal forces that the Saudis long diffused Wahhabism in order to crush: civil society leaders, religious moderates, feminists, and dissident journalists.
To be sure, the Gaza war and President Biden’s staunch yet anxious support for Israel’s prosecution of it has not exactly raised America’s already low standing among such groups. Still, they, and not the autocrats are the only ones who can avoid the agony of the Palestinians producing a new generation of jihadists.
Tragic choices
A just resolution of the Palestinian question combined with a formally announced support for meaningful political and economic reforms in Muslim lands will lower the terror threat emanating from the region in ways that military force and high level diplomacy cannot. And it is a far more dynamic and realistic approach than believing that normalizing relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia and extending a security pact to the latter will somehow stabilize the Middle East, or make its enormous problems just go away.
The Cold War policies which saw America supporting Islamic extremists in order to defeat communism have been justified by some writers under the phrase “tragic realism,” a necessary choice among the least harmful of options which were all bad. Yet the destructive consequences from Kabul to New York over the last thirty years do not bear this assertion out.
Perhaps it is high time we try “tragic idealism” — a determination to re-commit to our basic values in word and deed to atone for our having failed to live up to them in the past.
Vanni Cappelli, a freelance journalist, is the president of the Afghanistan Foreign Press Association.





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