Just as the controversy surrounding Boeing’s 737 Max 8 was fading away, a new report about Boeing’s poor judgment shows the need for company executives and Federal Aviation Administration officials to explain themselves.

The Max 8 came under scrutiny after the aircraft was involved in two deadly crashes — the Lion Air Flight 610 crash off the coast of Indonesia on Oct. 29 and the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crash in Ethiopia on March 10. A combined 346 people were killed in the crashes.

While the FAA and Boeing initially insisted that the Max 8 was still a flight-worthy aircraft in the immediate aftermath of the Ethiopian crash, information came to light about Boeing’s Maneuvering Characteristic Augmentation System (MCAS), software that the company had installed on its Max 8 planes without notifying pilots.

The MCAS was meant to resolve an issue created by Boeing’s decision to put larger engines on its 737 planes. The larger engines were added to compete with Airbus’ larger, more-fuel efficient engine design. But because Boeing planes are lower to the ground than Airbus planes, adding larger engines presented an engineering problem.

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The company decided to raise the placement of its engines, placing a significant portion of the engine above the wing. But when the plane was taking off, the nose tended to rise too far up, creating the risk of a stall. To work around this problem, Boeing designed the MCAS, which automatically pushed the nose of the aircraft down when it believed the nose was pointed too far up.

But Boeing, which claimed a two-hour iPad course was sufficient training for operating the Max 8, did not inform pilots about the MCAS.

What’s more, a recent report by CNN found that Boeing did not even test scenarios in which the MCAS malfunctioned. This oversight is significant because once in use, the MCAS malfunctioned repeatedly. Several U.S. pilots complained to the FAA that the Max 8 was unexpectedly nosing down when it should not have been, and flight logs from the doomed Indonesian and Ethiopian flights show that the pilots fought with the MCAS as the software dragged the planes down to the ground.

Boeing was so eager to get its Max 8 plane out to market that it overlooked fundamental flaws with the plane and the training required to fly it. That the FAA seems to have accommodated this behavior, helping to rush the plane through the certification process, only adds to the shock.

Executives and officials from Boeing and the FAA must explain themselves before Congress, the American people and the world. It is a disgrace that the Max 8 was ever allowed to fly and this shameful disregard for safety cost 346 people their lives. We deserve answers as to how this was allowed to happen and we deserve assurances that it will never happen again.