As the international investigation into two fatal airline crashes continues, the Federal Aviation Administration is looking less like a regulatory agency than a wholly owned subsidiary of The Boeing Co.
Most countries moved quickly to ground Boeing’s 737 Max 8 after it became clear that the March 10 crash of Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 was disconcertingly similar to that of Lion Air Flight 610 about five months earlier off the coast of Indonesia.
Not so the United States. The FAA was still insisting on the Max 8’s airworthiness late March 12 — two days and who knows how many flights after the Ethiopian Airlines crash — then regulators abruptly changed course March 13 and grounded the plane after nearly everyone else had done so.
The FAA’s close relationship with the industry, especially the agency’s employment of many ex-Boeing employees, immediately surfaced as a possible explanation for the agency’s lethargy. But the situation seems to be a lot worse than originally feared.
According to The Seattle Times, federal regulators turned over much of the safety analysis work on the Max 8 to Boeing as the company, in competition with Airbus, pushed the plane to market about two years ago. Boeing’s safety analysis was flawed, the paper reported, partly because it underestimated the power of a flight-control system that might have been responsible for forcing the Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air planes downward.
That isn’t all. The flight-control system on the Max 8 is new, but Boeing didn’t offer pilots special training because the company considered it reasonably similar to that on other 737s. That’s why pilots could qualify to fly the Max 8 merely by taking brief training on an iPad. The Seattle Times noted that Boeing marketed the Max 8 to airlines partly by citing the low training costs.
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Airlines don’t mind skimping. The New York Times reported Thursday that Boeing offered airlines extra safety measures that might have helped pilots on the doomed flights figure out what was happening with the flight control system, but Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air opted not to purchase the upgrades.
After the Lion Air crash, other pilots reported flight-control problems with the Max 8. Some even filed complaints in a federal database. The FAA should have responded with alacrity to those complaints — it’s unclear if it responded at all — and regulators should have leaned hard on Boeing to complete a flight-control system update the company knew was needed after the Lion Air tragedy.
Which leads to more troubling questions:
If U.S. airlines knew their own pilots had concerns with the plane, why did they keep it in service?
If the FAA knew that Boeing was working on a needed software update after the Lion Air disaster, why didn’t it ground the Max 8 fleet until the fix was in place? At the very least, why didn’t the agency immediately recognize the significance of a second disaster involving the plane? The U.S. should have been the first nation to idle the Max 8, not the last.
The Lion Air disaster killed 189, and the Ethiopian Airlines crash killed 157. The FAA’s slipshod regulation put countless other lives at risk. The agency needs a thorough overhaul — one that includes a more neutral relationship with the industry and reclaiming responsibilities foolishly delegated to Boeing.





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