What is going on in Iran and how does America’s foreign policy position play into it?
For the past week, demonstrations have been taking place all over the country, not just in Tehran, the capital. In the past day or two, the Iranian government has mounted counterdemonstrations in the streets of some cities. So far some 21 protesters have died, almost certainly killed by security forces, and the death of one police officer has been reported. Hundreds have been arrested.
On the United States’ side, the government position is, roughly, that America supports the aspirations of the people, a position stated in rawer form by President Donald Trump in tweets, including the caution that the U.S. is watching, without suggesting what might be done in different contingencies.
The root of the demonstrations is that the living circumstances of most of the 80 million Iranians are somewhat miserable. Inflation is high. Unemployment, especially among the large proportion of young people, is high. Corruption is also high and favors those who have been ruling since the revolution that replaced the shah with a conservative religious class and its supporters. The explosion in the streets occurred when President Hassan Rouhani leaked next year’s budget, which revealed that a large proportion of resources was being devoted to nongovernmental religious and security bodies in Iranian society.
The price of oil, upon which the Iranian economy still predominantly rests, is not strong. The 2015 deal that had Iran shelving its nuclear arms program in return for a removal of economic sanctions by the other parties — China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States — has not provided the economy as large a boost as its people and Mr. Rouhani had hoped for.
The first question thus becomes: Is this the end of the now 38-year-old religious regime, or is the economic root cause of the disorder repairable? We would have to guess the latter, given that, in spite of the innate conservatism of the ayatollahs’ regime, it is capable of being agile in the face of adversity that threatens its survival. Second, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s regime has ample means of responding to the threat to it by force at hand, and, particularly given the economic motivation behind its desire to stay in power, will not hesitate to use the Revolutionary Guards and other forces to maintain its position.
It also has at hand, thanks in part to Mr. Trump’s tweets, the U.S. travel ban against Iranians and the retained sanctions. These are means of deflecting blame for the current unfortunate circumstances — both the economic misery and the unrest in the streets — from the government to “Iran’s enemies,” including Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United States, against all of whom the ayatollahs can cite grievances. Mr. Rouhani, who sometimes makes Mr. Khamenei uncomfortable, is likely to take the fall, including for having concluded the 2015 nuclear agreement.
If Mr. Trump tries to tear up the nuclear agreement at this point, it is likely to strengthen the ayatollahs’ government as well as enrage the other signatories. The best U.S. posture at this time, with a lot of trouble in the air in Iran, is a low profile.




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