EAST PALESTINE, Ohio — Federal regulators sent a letter to Norfolk Southern and other major railroads in September to warn against skirting train inspection rules through using a system known as “ghost tracks,” according to testimony Friday on the final day of safety hearings into February’s derailment in East Palestine.
Jason Cox, a representative for the Brotherhood of Railroad Carmen, testified that rather than having inspections carried out by the specialists his union represents, Norfolk Southern now relies more heavily on train crews to do them. He said the result was that the first car to derail in East Palestine had not undergone a thorough inspection from the point it was turned over to Norfolk Southern in Madison, Ill.
“There are qualified mechanical inspectors at all these points, and they were not allowed to inspect this car at any of those locations,” Mr. Cox said.
Had they inspected it, Mr. Cox said, the faulty bearing that caused the train to come off the tracks might have been caught sooner. He held up a gauge that an inspector would have used.
The letter and Mr. Cox’s testimony were part of a running theme Friday at the hearing, held by the National Transportation Safety Board in the East Palestine High School gym. Union leaders said they repeatedly warned that Norfolk Southern, along with other railroads, were stretching resources increasingly thin in the name of efficiency, putting safety at risk.
The board released thousands of pages of records Thursday and is gathering testimony from witnesses to build its understanding of how the derailment happened and how emergency crews responded in the aftermath.
In a letter included among the records, Federal Railroad Administrator Amit Bose wrote to Norfolk Southern to say officials were concerned about changes in how railroads were carrying out inspections. Mr. Bose said the agency had evidence that railroads were not properly checking trains into terminals — being kept instead on “ghost tracks” — meaning they could avoid being inspected by dedicated carmen and would instead be checked by other workers.
“The repeated performance of inspections, by employees or contractors who do not possess the same specialized training and experience as maintenance-of-equipment employees, raises concerns about the adequacy of the inspections and the potential impact on the safety of the equipment across the national rail network,” Mr. Bose wrote.
Mr. Cox said Friday that railroad employees asked managers about the letter and were told it wasn’t a directive and didn’t compel Norfolk Southern to take action. Jared Hopewell, a Norfolk Southern executive who testified Friday, said he didn’t know how the railroad had responded to the letter.
But Mike Rush, a top safety official at the Association of American Railroads, questioned whether an inspector would have noticed anything was wrong with the bearing.
“The bearings are sealed components,” he said. “I’m not saying a carman can never detect an issue with a bearing, but that’s not typically going to be the case.”
The derailment has focused attention on safety practices in the railroad industry. In addition to launching an in-depth investigation of the East Palestine derailment, the NTSB is also reviewing Norfolk Southern’s safety culture — an additional layer of scrutiny begun after the death of a conductor in Cleveland.
Industry leaders argue that safety remains a priority. Mr. Rush said federal data shows that major railroads had their second-best accident rate ever in 2022.
“The railroad industry’s recent safety record is excellent,” he said. “This record was built through years of work and investment in employee training, infrastructure and technologies such as wayside detectors. The railroads have driven risk down across every facet of railroad operation.”
The train in East Palestine came off the tracks after a bearing on one of its 149 cars overheated and failed. Much of Friday’s testimony focused on efforts by Norfolk Southern to detect overheating bearings before they lead to a derailment.
Trackside devices known as hot bearing detectors are designed to scan a passing train and alert crews to danger. There is a network of about 6,000 installed across North America.
As the train that eventually derailed was headed toward the Ohio community, it passed two detectors. The second recorded an elevated temperature in the bearing that ultimately failed, but it was not high enough to alert the crew. A third detector sent an emergency warning, but the engineer did not have enough time to safely stop.
The second detector did send an alert to Norfolk Southern’s advanced train control safety desk in Atlanta, but an analyst on duty did not immediately see it because he was juggling three alerts from other trains. Even if he had, Mr. Hopewell said, it was not serious enough to require him to take action.
But a manager on the safety desk told NTSB investigators the job had become more demanding over the years and that he had “consistently requested more manpower,” according to a summary report the federal agency released Thursday. Norfolk Southern told investigators it had begun training additional analysts in May.
While the data is available to the safety desk, Christopher Hand, an official with the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen, said railroads are reluctant to share detailed data from the trackside safety detectors with train crews.
“Airline pilots are well-informed about any issues in flight and do not rely solely on alerts from a central office,” he said. “Train crews should be afforded the same level of awareness.”
The first day of hearings examined the response by emergency crews in the aftermath of the derailment. Keith Drabick, the East Palestine fire chief, testified he was given 13 minutes to make the critical call about whether to vent and burn cars carrying hazardous vinyl chloride.
The railroad and its contractors were convinced that a chemical reaction with the potential to create an explosion was taking place inside the tanks. But documents and testimony Thursday showed that Oxy Vinyls, the company shipping the chemicals, concluded no such reaction was happening, calling into question the decision to use the vent-and-burn procedure.





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