Imagine a scenario in which a computer virus combined with malignant malware is deployed to reach every system in the nation: stripping hard drives of valuable data, denying even basic log-in access and bringing commerce and productivity to a halt.

Now picture a hacker breaching the systems that control a city's water supply, gaining access to purifying chemicals that could become poisonous if mixed the wrong way.

Think that sounds scary? What's truly frightening is that the first tale is a strongly plausible work of fiction, but the second is the actual account of a company that provides water service to homes throughout Southern California.

As the nation honors lives lost during the terrorist attacks of 9/11, as well as those sacrificed during the decade of warfare that followed, it is also celebrating the fact that the country has avoided equally devastating attacks since that cataclysmic day.

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But while government agencies have thwarted numerous plots, increased their intelligence sharing and captured or killed the highest level organizers of the attacks, security expert Mark Russinovich said there hadn't been nearly enough done to protect the nation's critical infrastructure from the possibility of a cyberattack.

"Unfortunately, not enough of the Obama administration staff believe cybersecurity is important to the national agenda," he said.

One key issue, he said, is that many public utilities are, in fact, run by private entities not bound to the cybersecurity standards the government imposes upon its agencies.

And while many private companies are budgeting millions of dollars toward cybersecurity efforts (including the Southern California water supplier, which used a hired hacker to discover the flaws in its system), there's no way to know if each individual water, electricity, Internet or financial provider is doing enough.

Mr. Russinovich, a Microsoft technical fellow, said a system similar to one used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which has agencies submit regular reports on how they are meeting security policies, should be applied to all agencies that provide critical infrastructure.

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Given what he called an "anti-regulatory" environment in the current Congress, he isn't optimistic the country will see the reforms anytime soon. The Department of Homeland Security has formed private/public partnerships with agencies that own or operate critical infrastructure assets, but Mr. Russinovich doesn't believe that that's enough to do the job.

"We're at a place, when it comes to critical infrastructure, it's worth having that [system] applied to everything, not just nuclear plants," he said.

Another factor holding up progress is a matter of responsibility. The Department of Homeland Security is tasked with protecting the nation's critical infrastructure, but overlapping duties that could fall under the auspices of the Department of Defense or the National Security Agency lead to confusion over departmental jurisdiction and funding.

"When there's ambiguity when you've got this kind of threat we are facing, that's going to cause some problems," said Mr. Russinovich.

According to the Council on Foreign Relations paper "Confronting the Cyber Threat," the lack of cohesion extends to the Pentagon's U.S. Cyber Command system, which fully protects defense networks but doesn't work beyond the military's "dot mil" domain.

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The Department of Homeland Security, with help from the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team, secures "dot gov" Internet addresses but wasn't until recently receiving technical assistance from the National Security Agency in the way that the Pentagon did. Last September, Homeland Security and the Pentagon signed a cybersecurity pact that formalizes cooperation between the two departments, the NSA and the military's Cyber Command unit.

The most prevalent security problem is also the one that could be most easily solved, said Mr. Russinovich. Simple vigilance regarding password protection, data encryption and software updates will go a long way toward protecting even the highest levels of government and private agencies.

The Southern California water company's hired hacker was able to access its system because employees were logging in through unprotected personal computers.

Mr. Russinovich called the Transportation Security Administration's use of a single wireless password on multiple machines a prime example of how government and private sector agents at the highest levels are ignoring cybersecurity best practices, to everyone's peril.

As an example of what can be done by hackers, he pointed to the June 2010 Stuxnet virus attack, which targeted the system used to refine nuclear material in Iran. The attack destroyed the plant's centrifuges while making conditions appear to be normal to those monitoring its activities. Although speculation centers on the United States and Israel, there has been no confirmation of who launched the attack.

Considering the sophistication of that attack, as well as the fact the United States already had declared the right to respond to cyberwarfare attacks with traditional weapons, securing America's cyberinfrastructure could be considered a matter of life and death.