As COVID-19 becomes endemic and annual vaccines roll out, scientists haven’t lost sight of the next wave.
But our fear of new viral waves could help usher them on.
That’s, at least, Donald Burke’s argument.
Burke has been a leading epidemiologist for decades and retired in 2019 as dean of the University of Pittsburgh School of Public Health. Since retirement, he’s had more time to write — and more time to think about what he spent his life’s work on: viruses and their history.
In a recent issue of the journal Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, through Johns Hopkins University Press, Burke looks back at the 1977 Russian flu H1N1 pandemic and its origins, seeing it as an eerie specter that humans are capable of repeating.
Our anxiety to study viruses to stay one step ahead of them could actually lead to an accidental outbreak, a self-fulfilling prophecy, as with the 1977 flu pandemic, says Burke — for which evidence exists was launched after being brought out of extinction for research purposes. The paper serves as a cautionary tale for a future that’s sure to see more infectious diseases.
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“In the heat of things, when fears are at their worst, that’s the worst time for an accident,” he said during a Sept. 6 interview.
He calls the 1977 flu pandemic “a Chernobyl that nobody noticed.”
“This was worse than Chernobyl in terms of lives lost, and yet, mostly at the time, nobody noticed, because the technology wasn't available to really understand it,” he said.

The Russian flu was first reported to have appeared in China in 1977 (its origins are still disputed) and it spread worldwide, killing around 700,000 people. It led to milder illness than some other influenza strains (like the Spanish flu, which killed 50 million people), and it mainly impacted people under the age of 26, leading Burke to conclude it was odd in many ways.
The chief characteristic of it being odd lay in its origins.
Scientists sequenced the strain in 1978 and found its genetic signature looked nearly identical to an H1N1 strain that had gone extinct after causing a pandemic in 1957.
In the world of viruses, this was mysterious.
“Like snowflakes, every newly replicated influenza virus is unique,” said Burke in the paper. Viruses are masters at repeatedly replicating to better fit the hosts they inhabit and become more and more transmissible.
The SARS-CoV-2 virus, which causes COVID-19, followed this same pattern since its birth in 2020: the Omicron subvariant appeared in late 2021 and has prevailed as the dominant strain due to mutations that make it more transmissible compared to previous strains.
Theoretically, if the 1957 H1N1 strain had stuck around in human or animal hosts instead of going extinct, it would have mutated and mutated, changing its signature a little bit at a time.
It was as if it entered a wormhole and popped back up 20 years later without changing. Viruses do this occasionally, but they’re never exact replicas.
Here’s how scientists think it happened: It seemed that a 19-year-old Army recruit was the harbinger of this resurgence, leading to panic, and then to viral experimentation, and then to pandemic.
David Lewis was stationed at Fort Dix, N.J., in 1976. After 13 miles of trekking through the cold for training, Lewis collapsed and died, it was later discovered, from pneumonia caused by H1N1 swine flu virus.
Lewis’ death spooked virologists and then the nation, because the recruits stationed there had not had contact with pigs. With 230 men infected at Fort Dix, and the location’s proximity to major cities, President Gerald Ford announced a mass vaccination campaign against swine flu.
But the outbreak at Fort Dix “appeared to have self-extinguished,” said Burke. In other words, it didn’t lead to a pandemic.
What it did do was encourage scientists to study the extinct H1N1 virus from 1957, out of fear of an impending Spanish flu-like pandemic. The best evidence, said Burke, is that the virus was brought out of a freezer for experiments, starting the 1977 Russian flu pandemic.
Accidental human release of viruses is called “bio-bungling,” and we’re at risk of it today.
“The important point isn’t exactly how the escape of the virus occurred,” he explained. “It’s the notion that in the heat of the moment, people do unwise things. And unwise things can come in many varieties. They can come in terms of doing an experiment that you shouldn’t do, or bringing an old, extinct virus out that you shouldn’t bring out, or doing tests in volunteers.”
Burke is concerned not just about influenza viruses like H1N1 and H5N1 — the bird flu that’s been circulating among cattle recently and has infected a handful of farmers — but also of the resurgence of viruses like measles, mpox and even polio.
Measles has seen 13 new outbreaks in the U.S. this year alone, per the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, including 251 cases and an outbreak in Pennsylvania, and polio has cropped up both in New York and in Gaza, where millions are without basic hygiene tools or clean water.
Burke sounded the alarm about mpox well before the U.S. 2022 outbreak: “I’ve been concerned about mpox for 20 years,” he said.
Paul Duprex, director of the Center for Vaccine Research at Pitt and the center’s Regional Biocontainment Lab, as well as an expert in measles, said Burke’s paper was interesting, and that we should be careful not to invoke an apocalypse mindset on viruses.
“The nuance of how this was triggered is important,” he said. “Think of all of the different ways that could have happened. The article talks about, it could have been from a trial, it could have been from a vaccine production … And it could have actually just come from a natural source. Remember that the viruses are out there ... There’s many, many different ways to think about where that virus came from.”

The lens of an accidental spillover alone loses the nuance of the complex nature of viruses, which have been evolving for millennia to learn to infect hosts and evade immunity, he said.
Burke led the Biocontainment Lab before Duprex, giving them both unique and informed perspectives on what it takes to study dangerous viruses.
“Why I really like what Don has written is because it’s pretty clear he knows the history, and he knows why we have to work with really good, safe biocontainment labs in places where people have all the expertise, so that we can actually be ready to prepare [for future outbreaks],” said Duprex.
To be clear, Burke isn’t calling for the cessation of research on viruses. The work must happen for virologists and public health specialists to effectively prep for the future. But there’s “a really delicate balance,” said Duprex, between being careful and worrying oneself into stagnancy.
“If we invoke the apocalypse for everything, we’re not going to get in cars because they’re dangerous,” said Duprex. “We’re not going to get on planes because they might fall out of the sky. We’re not going to go to do novel therapies for novel diseases, whether or not they’re infectious.”
If scientists hadn’t acted quickly during the COVID-19 pandemic, for one, mRNA vaccines would not have rolled out when they did, said Duprex.
“That’s the tension,” he said. “It’s about knowing the past, knowing what happened, but not being too afraid of the future, about trusting what we have — not blind trust — but trust based on facts.”






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