Shortly after arriving as medical director at Philips four years ago, Hisham Elzayat faced an internal crisis that threatened one of the world’s largest makers of breathing machines.
The longtime heart surgeon had pored over a spate of complaints about the company's best-selling devices, which were filled with an industrial foam capable of breaking down into tiny particles and fumes.
When inhaled, the toxic material could move through the nose and sinus cavity and into the lungs, a stealth intruder that threatened incalculable harm.
After meeting with a top Philips biosafety engineer who also expressed concerns, the 46-year-old doctor said he had seen enough.
In June 2020, he pushed to stop all shipping of the devices from the company's factories near Pittsburgh and pressed to meet with one of the company's most powerful executives to take on what he called an unfolding emergency.
"I have made my safety concerns known," he recalled in an internal complaint.
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But the company turned down his request to halt the deliveries and instead ratcheted up sales of its CPAPs and ventilators during the throes of the pandemic while Philips took in hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue.
Dr. Elzayat’s internal battle to pull the machines off the shelves is detailed in hundreds of pages of company emails, text messages and reports that have been turned over to federal prosecutors as part of a criminal investigation of the leadership of the company, according to sources with direct knowledge of the probe.
The confidential documents, which have been obtained by the Post-Gazette, show for the first time the surgeon was among nearly a dozen Philips engineers and others who pushed the company to warn patients about the dangers of the foam before Philips removed millions of the devices from the market in a recall in June 2021 and to later stop the company from downplaying the risks.

Though Dr. Elzayat stayed on, several employees resigned over the safety threats.
"This is getting uglier every day," he wrote to a testing lab shortly after the recall.
The records show that several Philips scientists raised concerns over the company's efforts to search for test results that they said would be more favorable as hundreds of complaints about the defective machines poured into the company.
Failed safety tests
The Justice Department declined to comment on the probe, but experts interviewed by the Post-Gazette say the internal correspondence could provide key information for investigators in assessing when top leaders learned of the deficiencies and whether they concealed the dangers.
"The government’s focus will be on the executives who had the authority to stop the train," said Ryan Stumphauzer, a former Florida federal prosecutor who once led health care fraud investigations.
The new records show that as far back as 2008 — far earlier than the company has disclosed — the foam in the devices failed safety tests. The material received the lowest possible score for cytotoxicity, the ability of a chemical to destroy cells and increase the risk of organ damage.
The debates over patient protections became so intense that a panel of managers sent a memo to Philips regulatory leaders two months after the recall, questioning what they called the company's "aggression, relentlessness and disdain" for the health warnings raised by the team, the records show.
"The customer and patients are very seldom put first," wrote regulatory specialist Eliza Shearer.
A Post-Gazette and ProPublica investigation last year found that Philips withheld thousands of reports about the foam breaking down in the devices for years, despite a federal law that requires device makers to report the breakdowns in 30 days.
Since the recall, the Food and Drug Administration has received more than 560 reports of deaths associated with the devices, and the Post-Gazette has found at least 5,500 cases of cancer reported to the agency.
Though Philips agreed in April to a consent decree with the FDA to undergo regular inspections and other safety checks, the company announced last month that it would end manufacturing at the two factories near Pittsburgh in 2025 and move those operations to a third-party company outside the state.

Even while Philips was dominating the sleep apnea market, the newly obtained records show the devices repeatedly failed emissions testing for volatile organic compounds including formaldehyde, a known carcinogen, dating to January 2019.
The records also shed new light on differences that took place within Philips over testing methods and whether the company's actions would tip off federal regulators.
When one of the outside labs hired by Philips tried to reduce the formaldehyde readings in the foam in 2021, a senior Philips manager sent a warning to a colleague.
Philips officials "basically want to manipulate the data to make it look favorable," said Bill Moret, a longtime test engineer, who added in a message to another co-worker: "This whole thing is a joke."
In 2019, a confidential report by Philips summarized the test failings — showing alarming levels of formaldehyde released from the foam — and detailed grim concerns about the company's most popular devices.

"The severity of harm is crucial with respect [to children]," the report said.
In an emailed response last week, Philips said that "patient safety and quality are Philips' highest priorities" and that the foam used in the recalled sleep apnea machines has undergone extensive testing from Philips using "five independent, certified testing laboratories and third-party experts" since the June 2021 recall, and that the company and its outside experts have found the material "is not expected to result in appreciable harm to health in patients."
Fighting erupts
Philips would not comment on the records obtained by the Post-Gazette, saying the material is subject to a confidentiality agreement reached in federal court in Pittsburgh, where the company was sued by hundreds of patients who say they were injured by the defective devices.
Philips agreed to pay $1 billion earlier this year to settle the claims, which alleged the company concealed the dangers of the breathing machines while waging aggressive marketing campaigns to sell them.
Despite Philips' claims the devices do not cause harm, the FDA has said the company's tests are not adequate, and the federal agency has continued to maintain that the recall is the most serious, reserved for device defects that can cause injuries or death.
Neither Mr. Moret nor Ms. Shearer, both of whom no longer are with the company, responded to interview requests.
By the time Dr. Elzayat joined the company as a medical director in March 2020, Philips had received more than 475 complaints about foam breaking down in the machines in the prior five years, the newly obtained records show.
A cardiothoracic surgeon and former research fellow at the Emory University School of Medicine, Dr. Elzayat was asked to join a select group within the company known as Project Uno, which was launched years earlier to deal with the problem, he wrote in an internal complaint. After reading the 2019 report and reviewing patient complaints that had been shared with group members, he said he grew alarmed.
Calling the foam a "major risk" to patient safety, Dr. Elzayat wrote that he "escalated the issue to the management level."
By June 23, he took the rare step of pushing to halt shipments of the devices until more tests could be carried out and requested a meeting with John Frank, then vice president and general manager of the sleep and respiratory care unit in Pittsburgh, according to an email. But his request to shut down the deliveries was turned down.
“Every time I suggested or demanded that something gets fixed, the answer was always, ‘Do you know how many devices [are] out there?’” he wrote in the complaint. He said he met briefly with Mr. Frank to talk about safety matters, but no further sessions were held.
Over the next year, Dr. Elzayat and others were locked in a fight with company leaders to press for protections for patients and to determine whether the devices — millions across the country and beyond — should be pulled from the market.
Dr. Elzayat did not respond to repeated interview requests. Mr. Frank, who left the company in 2022, did not respond to requests for an interview. David Ferguson, who took over the top job in 2021 and left the company earlier this year, could not be reached.

'These go in patients'
After long and contentious meetings, Dr. Elzayat and 11 others moved forward in November 2020 to carry out hazardous health evaluations of the DreamStation sleep apnea device and Trilogy ventilators, which could be used by children and pregnant women, the group noted.
By the time the studies were finished in April 2021, the team found the chemicals emitted in the machines presented "unacceptable" risks to patients that could cause "life-threatening" injuries and "permanent impairment." Among the compounds: diethylene glycol, which is used in antifreeze and brake fluid.
In May, Philips medical affairs supervisor Drilon Saliu said that the presence of phenol, a compound that can cause kidney or liver damage with severe exposure, was alarming. "These are not widgets — these go in PATIENTS," he wrote in a Teams chat.
The evaluations and push by team members prompted Philips to launch a recall, the largest of its kind, on June 14, 2021. Up to 15 million devices would be impacted.
Within two months, Philips' shareholders filed a lawsuit in New York alleging the company concealed the dangers from investors while hundreds of lawsuits were filed in federal court in Pittsburgh, accusing the company of selling devices that led to injuries, including cancer and organ failure.
Despite the company's acknowledgment of the risks, Philips embarked on a course that would soon surprise safety engineers and lead to fights within the company.
While multiple tests showed excessive levels of formaldehyde and phenol, Philips turned to at least two other independent labs in 2021 after the recall was launched to get other opinions, prompting scientists within the company to question why Philips was searching for new tests.
One of the labs had found in 2019 that the foam emitted excessive levels of formaldehyde, but had now changed its analysis methods, records and interviews show.
Heated discussions took place when one faction in the company pushed for tests using thresholds that would ensure the readings would be acceptable, records show.

"It was obvious he was trying to pass the device by any method that would work," wrote Philips engineer James Horne after a company supervisor in August 2021 pushed for more positive results.
'Babies are using our products'
That same month, the sleep and respiratory regulatory managers sent a 10-page memo to a company leadership team providing the complaints of at least a dozen employees, including some who resigned over the safety of the breathing machines and other devices.
Many of the workers claimed the business interests of Phillips were taking precedence over the health of patients, records show.
In the case of Holly Cotter, a regulatory engineer who resigned from Philips in July 2021 and was considered "a key contributor" to Project Uno, "she was very upset about how long it took the business [interests] to react to the seriousness of the health issue that arose from the project designs," the memo said.
"Holly said the ultimate reason she quit is that she felt that the business did not care for the end users and that babies are using our products."

Ms. Shearer, the compliance specialist, said she was upset over what she called the company's push for growth over protections. "I have witnessed the prioritization of more — more revenue, more market share, more cost savings — to the detriment of our customers and more specifically patients' safety and well being," she wrote.
Disputes erupted within the company over the science itself — the methods of testing the chemicals released from material in machines that are strapped to peoples' mouths and noses for hours at a time.
At one point, a manager from a lab hired by Philips said his group was able to "bring the formaldehyde levels down" in the foam by coming up with an average reading from test scores taken throughout the day, a method that masked the risks.
But the manager warned in an email that "this particular data set would raise some flags in the regulatory review.”
By October 2021, Philips had hired a consultant who said the phenol found in the foam was not as harmful as previously determined, citing a 2010 Canadian study that set a higher threshold for risk, according to emails.
In response, Dr. Elzayat sent an email to the Pittsburgh leadership team and pointed out that the consultant failed to take into account a subsequent Canadian study that came out two months later that rejected the earlier assessment, saying the thresholds did pose critical risks.
He later said in an internal complaint the Philips managers never responded to his message, and that he was already being shut out of meetings and assigned to a new supervisor. "I had been alienated and neutralized," he wrote.
Just six months after announcing the recall, company engineers exchanged emails saying the company — after turning to two additional labs — was getting test results that showed the foam was not as dangerous as previously reported, records show.
On Dec. 23, Philips released a statement that the company had used "certified testing laboratories" and third-party experts to show the foam would not likely cause long-term harm and that previous findings relied on a "limited data set and toxicological risk assessment."
At the same time, complaints were bombarding Philips — thousands since the recall — from patients and others who reported black particles, tar, dust and other debris in devices that were only supposed to deliver clean air, records show.
Some of the patients said they were hospitalized for vomiting, fainting, kidney failure and a host of respiratory illnesses.

By the end of 2021, scientists expressed concerns that patients waiting for new devices during the recall would continue to use their old machines in light of the company's claims the foam no longer posed severe risks.
One of the labs hired by Philips in Pennsylvania refused to change its results in 2021 that showed multiple failings for chemical compounds.
Among the lab's biggest concerns, records show, is that while individual chemicals in the foam can pass and fail according to various recognized thresholds, the foam ultimately tested positive for genotoxicity — the ability of a chemical to cause cells to mutate, a process that can lead to cancer.
"No one wants to own the foam is bad," Matthew Heidecker, a lab executive, emailed a Philips engineer.
More safety issues
Emails show the lab took its tests and other evaluations in 2021 to Shayne Gad, a nationally recognized expert on toxicology and former president of the American College of Toxicology.
In one of his evaluations, Mr. Gad, who has written numerous scholarly papers on medical device safety, said the phenol emitted from the foam was genotoxic, one of the most serious failings.
In addition to Mr. Gad, the FDA stepped forward and challenged the company's findings in 2022, saying the tests by Philips to recast the risks were not adequate.
The FDA found that "the recalled devices present an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public health," the report said.
Philips said it would continue to perform tests on the machines while it embarked on a plan to replace the problem foam with a new silicone material in the replacement devices.
But that material, too, raised safety concerns among Philips' scientists.
Tests by independent labs hired by Philips found the new foam used by the company — material fitted in the millions of replacement machines — was also emitting hazardous chemicals, including formaldehyde.
One of the devices was the DreamStation 2, a newly released sleep apnea machine that was promoted as one of the company’s primary replacements. The FDA noted in a report that the machine failed emissions testing because it produced “compounds of concern” and that pediatric patients who use the devices could be especially vulnerable.
"This is all so sad," wrote Katie Feurer, a Philips engineer, in a Teams message to Mr. Saliu, the head of medical affairs, in September 2021. "I wish it were different."
Mr. Saliu, who is no longer with the company, said Philips was not been transparent with his team about the tests on the new foam. "This behavior must stop," he wrote to Ms. Feurer. "Patients count on Philips with their health and well being and the foam MUST be safe — quality must be ensured, period. Patient safety is what matters above ALL other things."
Ms. Feurer responded: "I am with you 1000000%," and later added in the same exchange: "I find it very strange that there are 10 devices sent to three different test houses [labs] — this is not normal and look like fishing for results that we like."
Mr. Saliu responded: "Yes, exactly and that is NOT normal."

In a recent statement, Philips said the material had been "extensively tested by multiple, independent certified laboratories in accordance with the applicable regulatory standards, and no safety issues have been identified."
“The repaired and new replacement devices with the silicone sound abatement foam are safe,” the company said in a 2023 response to the Post-Gazette.
Internally, the company's tests drew criticism from several scientists. In one case, Dr. Sujata Bhatia, a bioengineer and physician, said she was alarmed after she reviewed some of the test results of the silicone in 2022.
"This is not a typo. The volatile organic compound is 6.25 times the threshold for safe exposure," she texted an independent lab. Ms. Feurer, Mr. Saliu, and Dr. Bhatia did not respond to interview requests.
In its own statement to the Post-Gazette, the FDA said more tests are needed on the foam before determining if the devices pose “risks to patients,” and that people should continue to use the machines in lieu of going without a device as the tests continue.
Prosecutors bear down
Medical experts interviewed by the Post-Gazette say the internal fights over the foams and the complaints filed by employees underscore just how serious the differences were between factions of the company while millions of people were still using the machines.
"The whole regulatory process [fell] apart," said Kushal Kadakia, a public health researcher at Harvard Medical School who has written about the recall.
Beyond the staff members who pushed for reforms, Mr. Kadakia said the FDA should have stepped in sooner to ensure the safety concerns were addressed. The agency did not take any action until the recall in 2021. "Why is this happening to medical devices as opposed to drugs?" he said. "Because there is so little [regulation] of medical devices."
The FDA said that it responded as soon as it learned of the dangers, nearly two months before the machines were removed from the market. But the Post-Gazette and ProPublica found that the agency received hundreds of complaints about the devices starting in 2011 about the foam breaking down in the chambers. Some reports singled out "contamination," a red flag that experts say should have prompted an inquiry.
"Where was the oversight?" said Dr. Rita Redberg, a cardiologist at the University of California San Francisco who researches medical device safety. "There were reports from the company to the FDA about problems with the devices dating back to 2011.”
John Cogan Jr., a former attorney for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, said prosecutors in the federal probe will more than likely scrutinize the role of company leaders in the crisis and the decisions they made when faced with the hundreds of complaints that came into Philips before the recall.
"They are going to look at the individuals," said Mr. Cogan, a University of Connecticut law professor and an expert in health care law. "It's high profile. It's a lot of money. The damage is severe."
He said he was alarmed by the records that now show "there were a significant number of people pushing back in the company" for stronger safety measures. "And then the company goes out to look for new data. You have to imagine how that looks to a jury."
Dr. Elzayat said that he was ultimately stripped of his duties as medical director after he refused to sign an updated health evaluation in late 2021 that said the foam was no longer unsafe, records show. "I have been excluded from all meetings and communications," he wrote in 2022.
Others have left the company, including Mr. Horne, who did not respond to interview requests.
Mr. Kadakia said the emergence of the records provides a rare glimpse into the role of employees who challenged their own company during a health crisis. "It's an example of people who were willing to resign their own jobs. In medicine, the first rule is to do no harm. To me, they abided by that rule."
Now, it's up to federal investigators to examine the roles of people in the company who were making key decisions and to see "if they were intentionally holding back information," he said. "It's really a story about transparency — who had access to information and when."
For company scientists pressing for patient protections, the dangers of the foam were known for years. "What's there is literally there," wrote Mr. Moret in a text to an outside lab just months before the recall. "And no matter what you do, it's not going to go away."
Michael D. Sallah: msallah@post-gazette.com; @mikesallah7
Michael Korsh; mkorsh@post-gazette.com; @michael_korsh





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