Missteps cited in Ebenezer church fire that killed two firefighters
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A federal investigation into the fire at Ebenezer Baptist Church that killed two Pittsburgh firefighters and injured 29 others details missteps during the five-alarm blaze, making clear that on-scene commanders should have maintained a "collapse zone" around the church, been more cautious about sending firefighters inside and made sure they were properly equipped.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health report does not assess blame and contains only recommendations about how the fire could have been handled better "to minimize the risk of similar occurrences." But its analysis of the March 13, 2004 fire is more far-reaching than the conclusions of a local inquiry board.
That board's May 1, 2004 report concluded no one was to blame for the firefighters' deaths after the collapse of the church's bell tower, but said that upgrades were needed in equipment and training.
The federal report's recommendations, however, indicate unequivocally that certain well-established firefighting procedures were not followed that day.
Among the 10 recommendations were:
Assess the stability and safety of the structure ... before entering it to extinguish remaining hot spots, especially structures damaged by fire and water. Both deaths and 23 of the injuries occurred while performing such an "overhaul."
Establish and monitor a collapse zone, described as a distance equal to the height of the building plus an additional allowance for falling debris. Several firefighters standing outside the church were injured by debris when the 115-foot-tall, brick-and-stone tower collapsed.
Ensure that the "incident commander," or officer in charge, establishes a command post outside the collapse zone. At Ebenezer, the officer in charge was injured by falling debris, and as a result "command suffered a serious lapse," according to NIOSH.
Train firefighters to recognize conditions that forewarn of a backdraft, an explosion that occurs when an oxygen-starved fire suddenly receives oxygen. Six firefighters were injured when a backdraft occurred about 40 minutes after the fire was reported.
Additionally, the report called on the city to enforce current building and fire codes. Ebenezer Baptist Church, a National Historic Landmark built in 1875, had no fire alarms or sprinkler systems, the same as many other older churches.
NIOSH sent its report to every fire department in the country, standard procedure by the agency. It has no regulatory authority.
"The report identifies the facts that from our judgment were related to the circumstances that led to fatalities," NIOSH spokesman Fred Blosser said. "These appeared to be factors that could lead to fatalities in other situations."
The fire occurred on a Saturday morning as church members were preparing to eat breakfast. A 911 call at 8:45 a.m. reported an electrical fire. Less than an hour later, 70 firefighters and 13 trucks and engines had surrounded the Hill District church at 2701 Wylie Ave.
According to the NIOSH report, firefighters initially fought the blaze in the basement and on the first floor. Their efforts to ventilate the church's first floor were hampered by the thick Plexiglas that covered the building's large stained-glass windows.
About 9:25, crews were in the basement spraying water on the fire when an officer reported the area went "black, totally black, like the fire left," according to the report. "He immediately yelled for everyone to back out. Some firefighters reported hearing a 'big, loud whistle' followed by a bang," the report read.
The backdraft occurred at 9:28 a.m., blowing one officer from the top of the basement stairwell into the street. Others suffered burns. Two firefighters near the church's outer western wall tried to run from the church when they saw "smoke was puffing in and out of the windows," but the force of the backdraft knocked them across Devilliers Street.
More than two hours later, the officer in charge decided to extinguish the remaining pockets of fire in the church. Battalion Chief Charles Brace, 55, entered the vestibule to ensure firefighters did not fall through a hole in the floor. Master Firefighter Richard Stefanakis, 51, was nearby, manning a 13/4-inch hose.
The report continues: "At 1213 hours (approximately 31/2 hours into the incident), the church bell tower collapsed, sending large chunks of stone, brick, heavy wooden timbers and other debris crashing through the vestibule, trapping both victims under the debris."
Chief Brace was not wearing a self-contained breathing apparatus or a personal alert safety system, which emits a loud pulsing shriek to indicate location. Although Mr. Stefanakis was wearing the safety system, there was too much debris to attempt a rescue. Their bodies were not removed until 5 p.m.
The Allegheny County coroner's office said both men died of asphyxiation.
"NIOSH has recommended some things we need to improve," Pittsburgh Fire Chief Michael Huss said yesterday. Chief Huss, the fire chief of Johnstown at the time of the fire, said all 10 of the NIOSH recommendations have either been put into place or are in the process of being implemented.
"We're trying to take these recommendations and learn from them and implement them."
He said the department received a federal grant to train officers in risk management, particularly in decision-making about risk-versus-gain operations.
"Safety is No. 1; that includes our people," Chief Huff said. "If someone's life is in danger, we'll take risks. If there's nothing to be risked, [we have to ask] why are we risking our lives?"
First Published March 22, 2006 12:00 am
