Even if the United States' game plan for Afghanistan, and what passes for government in that country, makes it through next Thursday's elections intact, there is no solid reason for America to continue its nearly 8-year-old war in that country.

The U.S. government has a raft of ambitious plans for Afghanistan, some of them dating back to the initial U.S. invasion in reaction to the 9/11 attacks, which were launched by al-Qaida, then hosted in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. These aspirations include solid, democratic government, reduction or eradication of government corruption, grass-roots and other economic development, a suppression of drug production and trafficking, and the formation and training of credible Afghan security forces to create the circumstances under which the previous goals can be achieved.

Compared to the actual situation on the ground in Afghanistan, many years after the first U.S. intervention, America's goals, developed during the Bush years and largely perpetuated by the administration of President Barack Obama, seem far from achievement. If one were prepared to forget about the mishandling of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during the Bush presidency, including racketeering by U.S. contractors and military undermanning, and simply start now, from square one, the goals still seem unrealistic. They give the impression of having been devised by a visionary, working from a political science model as opposed to from real knowledge of Afghanistan, or any such state in the developing world.

Taking the Afghanistan affair from here, the first barrier to try to get past is the holding of at least vaguely credible presidential elections Aug. 20. It is estimated that the Taliban are active in about half the country. The Taliban are calling for a boycott of the elections. More to the point, they are busily creating conditions of nonsecurity that will make the carrying out of a vote difficult, to say the least. Their latest nerve-rattling act was an attack carried out in Kabul, the capital.

There are some 40 presidential candidates. Among them, the front-runner has to be gauged to be President Hamid Karzai. He was chosen in reasonably fair elections in 2004, gaining 55.4 percent of the vote. Although he looks as though he has done as credible a job as anyone could do as president of such a messed-up country, the Americans and other foreigners are fed up with him. They would probably wholeheartedly like to see him go, except that they don't have an especially attractive candidate to replace him. Besides, any candidate whom the foreigners supported would probably go down to defeat in Afghanistan because he would be seen by Afghans as the candidate of the foreigners.

One leading candidate opposing Mr. Karzai is former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani. Mr. Ghani has hired U.S. Democratic political consultant James Carville to advise him on how to win.

I know it seems preposterous, but the very U.S. presence in Afghanistan would be considered fantastical if it weren't costing so much money and, now, U.S. lives, as Mr. Obama has raised the level of U.S. forces there. In July, 75 U.S. and NATO soldiers were killed in Afghanistan, the highest monthly total since 2001. As of Aug. 11, losses for this month were 27 already.

Mr. Karzai's other credible opponent is Abdullah Abdullah, considered to be the heir of Ahmed Shah Massoud, the leader of Afghanistan's Northern Alliance, the largely Tajik tribal group with which the United States worked in 2001 and 2002 to drive the Taliban out of Kabul.

Afghanistan's politics are a tangled skein of tribal leaders and warlords. The Pashtun are the largest minority, estimated at 40 percent. They have ruled Afghanistan for roughly the past 200 years. President Karzai is Pashtun; so are most of the Taliban. Mr. Karzai's brother is reportedly working to obtain Taliban acquiescence in his re-election. Next are the Tajik, organized in the Northern Alliance. There are the Hazara, a Shiite minority, looked down upon to a certain extent by other Afghans, but who in the past have voted for Mr. Karzai. Other groups, most armed, are the Uzbeks, Turkmen, Ismaili, Sikhs and Hindus, for a grand total of some 50 ethnic groups.

It gets worse. Neighbors Pakistan, India, Russia and Iran as well as Saudi Arabia all have an interest in what happens in Afghanistan and are not hesitant to put money and arms behind their horses in the Afghan race. Afghans are mostly Sunni Muslims but some are Shiite Muslims.

All of that said, for the United States to imagine that with 38,000 troops, perhaps expanded to 60,000, it can impose peace, order and sound government in a country of 30 million, the size of Texas, is imaginative to say the least. Some would say, silly.

Despite his problems it is likely that Mr. Karzai will win the presidential elections, if not in the first round next week, then in the subsequent runoff. His close relationship with the United States may be his biggest disadvantage. His reputation has suffered heavily as he has been held guilty by association for casualties inflicted on Afghans by U.S. troops, manned aircraft and unmanned Predator drones.

The United States doesn't like him for his acquiescence, if not complicity, in drug production and trafficking; this doesn't bother Afghans much at all. Afghans also consider food shortages and other economic misfortunes to be somewhat normal. He has been clever in including different Afghan ethnic elements in a "big tent" administration. He is also considered by Afghans to have been skillful in balancing the various foreign neighbors off against each other, obtaining aid from each.

U.S. metrics in determining future involvement in Afghanistan should be casualties and cost alone. On both scores, it is high time to leave the governance of Afghanistan to the Afghans.

Dan Simpson, a former U.S. ambassador, is a Post-Gazette associate editor (dsimpson@post-gazette.com, 412-263-1976).