Bob Woodward's new book, "The War Within, A Secret White House History," presents a picture of what purportedly went on inside the Bush administration -- the military and political wrangling and the clash of ambitions -- in the prosecution of the Iraq war from 2006 to May of this year.

It is not clear whether prying up the boards and revealing that rat's nest was what Mr. Woodward had in mind in writing the book. It isn't clear because while he presents an appalling picture, he doesn't draw many judgments about what he recounts.

Mr. Woodward is the quintessential Washington insider, made rich by his books and lecture fees, long past his Watergate crusading days. One might assume that one reason he doesn't present judgments is because he doesn't want to jeopardize his future access to some of these people or their successors. Another possible reason is that he has been in Washington so long that he doesn't even make such judgments anymore.

What it is critical not to forget, however, is the maneuvering and position changes of the generals and admirals and senior political figures involved the waging of a war that has killed more than 4,000 Americans and uncounted thousands of Iraqis and has cost the American taxpayer so far some $583 billion.

The stars of the show are the generals. (We all knew already that the politicians were relatively free of burdens imposed by ethics and morality.) The generals, according to central casting and the oozing rhetoric provided to the American public, are supposed to be powered by a desire to win America's wars and attached to the well-being of the forces under their command.

Put against this image then the picture that Mr. Woodward presents of the top generals in competition with each other for assignments, not obviously because they have a stronger, different picture of how the war should be waged but driven instead by ambition. (It would be nice, thinks one, according to Mr. Woodward, to live in Brussels, but another post is more important in terms of career.)

That might be fine -- all of us think that way to a degree, but the name of the game in Iraq is war, death for our soldiers and important opportunity costs to the homeland.

If one abstracts oneself from whom Mr. Woodward likes or doesn't like, the military figures who played the game with the greatest intensity as the author recounts it included retired Army Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Jack Keane and Multinational Force Iraq Commanding Gen. David H. Petraeus. Mr. Keane shuttled back and forth between different military figures; the White House, including Vice President Dick Cheney and President Bush; and Baghdad, backbiting, trying to advance the careers of some and damage others, and second-guessing different moves in the war. He obviously was one of Mr. Woodward's best sources.

Perhaps the most interesting figure in the book is Gen. Petraeus. He was presented to the American public when he was given command in Iraq as the man with the answers to the mess there. (He took command in 2007; it is still a mess, of course, in spite of the surge.)

Gen. Petraeus reads books about Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, both of whom won wars and were subsequently elected to the presidency. At one point in the book, Mr. Keane flatters Gen. Petraeus shamelessly by saying he is more like the World War II generals -- as in, Eisenhower -- than like the Vietnam generals, who lost.

According to Mr. Woodward, Mr. Keane took some pride in helping to push Adm. William J. Fallon out as head of the Central Command so that Gen. Petraeus could proceed from Iraq to that broader responsibility. He did this through working with Mr. Cheney, among others.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appears in the book as bureaucratically weak, chronically optimistic and inflexible, in spite of her unparalleled access to Mr. Bush. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates comes out as more realistic and more civilized than his predecessor Donald Rumsfeld, but basically in the position of trying to steer an unwieldy sinking ship. Mr. Cheney is presented as vaguely more benign as he approaches the end of his term, sort of Iago before he leaves the stage.

Mr. Bush, "the president," as Mr. Woodward has him referring to himself with disquieting frequency, emerges as a sort of country-music That's My Story and I'm Stickin' To It figure. According to Mr. Woodward he continues to pay little or no attention to new information, particularly if it is not in accord with his preconceived notions.

This book contains more of Mr. Woodward's signature pretensions. He knows -- but can't tell us -- about a new tracking device that has permitted U.S. forces to hunt down and kill lots of bad guys in Iraq. U.S. intelligence is also able to monitor everything that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki says. (That must make for great bedroom and bathroom tapes.)

On the other hand, he seems to have bought the "success of the surge" stuff uncritically. He leaves out of his account of the Sunni Awakening the fact that it involves the United States adding thousands of Sunnis to its payroll, miraculously converting them to "loyalty" to America, freedom and democracy.

Mr. Woodward's insider books are worth reading, just to see what he has scooped up and laid out, a sort of CSI Miami living autopsy of our nation's capital and its "great world figures." The problem is, if these people really are like this they shouldn't be running Wasilla, much less our country, and particularly a war.