A change in the balance of forces in the politics of Pakistan has led to a new approach to an old problem on the Pakistani side and a problem on the American side.

A confluence of political developments in Pakistan, a large and complex nation of 168 million, has led to a new lineup on the Pakistan government side. In the wake of 9/11, which made Pakistan the ally that Washington could not do without in South Asia in combating al-Qaida and terrorists, its president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, was clearly in charge.

Since then, a combination of events -- Mr. Musharraf's relinquishing his command of the Pakistan army and becoming a civilian president, the return to Pakistan and subsequent assassination of chief opposition figure Benazir Bhutto, and the defeat in parliamentary elections of Mr. Musharraf's party by Pakistan's civilian opposition, which has now formed a coalition government -- has resulted in a new governmental configuration in Islamabad.

The United States played a fairly large role in what occurred. It provided Pakistan $10 billion in aid after 2001, which went primarily to the army. In the name of democratization, it pushed Gen. Musharraf to become a civilian president and Ms. Bhutto to return from exile, to die. The problem is that the Gen. Musharraf-led government was ready to fight the independent and to some degree Islamic extremist elements in the northwest of the country. The new civilian government wants to try to negotiate peace with them. It would state its goal as strengthening Pakistan national unity and reducing national conflict. Pakistanis should not be killing Pakistanis at the behest of Americans, it would say.

On the American side the result has been dissuasion of this approach by the Pakistani government to the northwest frontier dissidents, who may harbor Osama bin Laden. The change in Pakistani government policy has also prompted rumblings from the U.S. Department of Defense about preparing plans for increased U.S. military activity within Pakistan, with the suggestion that some may be going on already.

The first point would be, obviously, did anyone in the Bush administration think about what would happen in Pakistan politics if the Musharraf tree was sawed down in the name of democracy? The second, equally obvious point is that the United States has no business whatsoever carrying out military action inside Pakistan. We already have far more than enough of that in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the idea is to scare the new Pakistani government into prolonging the war against its own people, rather than settling it, that U.S. policy is not only irresponsible but is also guaranteed to enrage the Pakistanis at the intervention into their affairs through threats of military action.

The current U.S. approach, to the degree that it is coordinated at all within the Bush administration, is just crazy.