The hostage agreement reached by South Korea with the Taliban is a textbook case in bad practices, with unfortunate implications for the United States in Afghanistan.

On July 19 the Taliban took 23 South Korean Christian missionaries hostage. While pressure built on the Seoul government to obtain their release, the Taliban killed two of them to show they were serious, and then released two sick hostages to show they were not total monsters. There was also some pressure on the United States from the South Koreans to assist in obtaining the captives' freedom.

An agreement produced the release Wednesday and Thursday of the remaining hostages. The South Korean government has made important concessions, some of them with broad implications. It has agreed to withdraw the 200 troops it has in Afghanistan by the end of the year. The Korean government says it had already decided to withdraw them, but the linkage has important implications for other countries with troops and other citizens in Afghanistan working in relief, development or other civilian fields.

The South Koreans have promised not to permit any more Christian missionaries to travel to Afghanistan. It is easy to see why Seoul would not like to face this again, but the implications for respect for and safety of religious are not attractive.

Although the South Koreans deny it, the understanding in Afghanistan is that they paid cash to the Taliban for release of the hostages, perhaps millions of dollars. That is very bad practice in hostage negotiations because it, in effect, sets the price for future hostages. The U.S. government doesn't pay ransom for that reason. This could jeopardize the safety of the many civilians of different nationalities working in Afghanistan in humanitarian, business and other fields.

Probably the worst aspect of the affair for the United States is that the South Koreans worked their deal with the Taliban around, and without, the government of Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai. His government's authority was clearly demonstrated to be nonexistent in a significant part of the country. South Korea's direct talks also enhanced the Taliban's prestige. Normally, hostage negotiations are carried out between the government of the country where they are held and the organization holding them. All of that went out the window this time.

Given the political pressures at home, it is understandable that the South Korean government wanted to cut a deal. It has done so and gotten most of its captives back alive. However, in political and hostage-negotiation terms, what they have done is a pure disaster.