As the situation in Iraq worsens, the debate between the Bush administration and the Democratic majority in Congress has focused increasingly on the narrow question of the continued presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. The question is: Should we stay or should we go?

Simon F. Reich is the director of the Ford Institute for Human Security at the University of Pittsburgh and professor of international affairs in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs (reichs@pitt.edu).

The position of each side is, by now, well rehearsed. They offer different, now-familiar answers as to whether the conflict can be won. The administration, stressing the broader geo-strategic implications of a withdrawal, suggests we need time for its "surge" of troops to take full effect. Democrats in Congress, emphasizing the growing body count in a war that cannot be won in any conventional sense, wants to cut American losses. Both positions are defensible.

Both sides are, however, asking the wrong question. The key question is, "How can the United States save as many lives as possible, yet salvage both its geo-strategic interests and any shred of legitimacy in the current situation?"

The answer is as simple as it is radical: Evacuate Baghdad -- but not Iraq. This is the only way the United States can address a potentially enormous humanitarian crisis, provide a semblance of protection for Iraq's oil fields and contain the prospect of a new conflict emanating from the Kurdish region in the north of the country.

American strategy in Iraq has been a conventional one, used by invading forces from time immemorial: To conquer a country, you first establish control of the capital and then subdue the regions. But since this method of conquest no longer seems possible, the means by which we protect Iraq's people and resources while advancing America's regional interests must change.

First, the humanitarian dimension: More than 2 million refugees have now fled Iraq, mostly for neighboring countries. They are overwhelmingly composed of Iraq's wealthy and well-trained, leaving the poor and relatively immobile behind in the battle zones. When it invaded Iraq, the Bush administration's professed mission was to liberate these people. Now it has a responsibility to protect those who remain.

We need to organize safe havens for those who elect to flee the violence within Iraq. The rest of the Middle East certainly doesn't need more refugee camps, and the alternative is to leave these Iraqis to a fate too terrible to contemplate. We should empty Baghdad of the innocent and let the belligerents fight each other for control of an increasingly worthless asset.

Second, the resource dimension: If we can't save Baghdad, then maybe we can better safeguard the wealth upon which whatever is left of Iraq will be reconstituted. At the moment, oil resources are destroyed or plundered, often to the benefit of both Sunni and Shiite insurgents. We need to safeguard defensible oil fields, pipelines and terminals -- not indefensible cities.

Finally, the broader geo-strategic dimension: The United States will need a military base in what is left of Iraq. This should be located in the Kurdish region, which is by far the safest, most defensible and friendliest environment for American forces in the Middle East outside of Israel. Lodged between Iran, Syria and Turkey, it would provide an invaluable platform for U.S. activities throughout the region.

Locating American forces in the north also would protect the Kurds. In the absence of the Americans, the Kurds almost certainly will commit collective suicide by declaring independence. The result would be a short, bloody conflict by which Turkey, Syria and Iran would carve up the new Kurdistan. Indeed, this might happen even if they don't declare independence but are left vulnerable. So, for very different reasons, the needs of the United States and the Kurds dovetail on this issue.

The main argument against my proposal is that it would ensure the long-term commitment of American forces in Iraq, which would further radicalize the Islamic world by adding substance to jihadist claims that the U.S. goal in the region is domination.

But many of America's overseas bases already are in the region. We would be adding to our regional position by keeping a base in Iraq, not creating one, and the size of the force for such a defensive posture could be much reduced from our present commitment. As for those susceptible to the view that the United States seeks to dominate the Middle East, they were convinced of American imperial designs by our invasion of Iraq in the first place.

The fact is, the decisions of the last four years have left us with an unenviable choice: American withdrawal from Iraq would result in countless further deaths and spur a huge humanitarian crisis. A more limited presence would continue to generate some ill will and some U.S. casualties, but it also might ensure the safety of millions of innocent Iraqis, many of whom, if we are to believe the opinion polls, still look to the U.S. military for protection. Whose views do we care more about, those on the radical fringe or the vast majority of innocent victims?

I would not have drawn up this scenario. It is a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea. But we have a responsibility to protect those innocent Iraqis caught daily in the conflicts between extremists from all sides.

Perhaps America's reputation abroad, as the last superpower with a humanitarian impulse, is in such tatters that it is irredeemable. But committing a smaller force to protect Iraq's people, Iraq's resources and America's strategic vision may be the only way to preserve what may be left of it.