Daniel Marsula, Post-Gazette Click illustration for larger image.

One of the recommendations from the Iraq Study Group calls for engagement with Iran -- an action that, so far, President Bush has rejected. But the president should recognize that the panel's proposal is not unreasonable -- in fact, there's a notable historical precedent.

One of President Bush's predecessors was also caught in the throes of a distant war greatly unpopular at home. Looking at the complicated region in which Americans were fighting and dying, he focused on its most populous country, one descended from ancient roots and with enormous economic and military influence. It was a country with which the United States had not had diplomatic relations for more than 20 years, since a revolution there had upended a friendly leader and replaced him with one whose politics were anathema to American values. It also was a country whose recognition was viewed by some as tantamount to repudiating the very existence of another nation in the same region with which the United States had a special commercial and military relationship.

The scenario may seem particular to today's headlines. War in Iraq, the evil enemy in Iran, the special relationship with Israel. But, of course, this describes not only the Middle East today, but also Asia in the early 1970s, with its war in Vietnam, a forbidding enemy in Red China and a strong U.S. bond with Taiwan.

J. David Slocum is associate dean in the Graduate School of Arts and Science at New York University. He holds a Ph.D. in American studies and just returned from lecturing about U.S. history at the University of Tehran.

At that time, the White House response was among the boldest in the annals of American foreign policy. Reversing a decades-old position, President Richard Nixon traveled to the capital of the enemy nation. In doing so, he allowed trade to be opened and formally initiated a political process that would culminate in the normalization of full diplomatic relations nearly seven years later.

Mr. Nixon did not await any dramatic gestures from the People's Republic of China before venturing there. Communist since 1949, the PRC already was a nuclear power, having first exploded a bomb in 1964, and it allegedly was providing significant weapons support to the Viet Cong, against whom U.S. forces were fighting. By the early 1970s, the Chinese were themselves engaged in a Cultural Revolution that had closed universities, assailed the emergent political elite and torn apart the fabric of social life. That great upheaval would continue through Mao Zedong's death in 1976. For many, these were dark days.

Historians have made clear how numerous back channel discussions, as well as a shared interest in improving bilateral relations, prepared the way for the president's celebrated trip to Beijing. Despite the sheer force of political will and sense of history at play for Mr. Nixon and his chief adviser, Henry Kissinger, the ground-breaking visit did not immediately establish formal diplomatic ties. The "Shanghai Communique" that concluded the historic summit meeting pledged that the U.S. and Chinese governments would work toward normalized relations. It also allowed them to sidestep the thorniest issue between them -- the status of Taiwan -- while still opening trade. Yet the symbolic significance of the trip can hardly be overstated as a giant step toward the normalization that would occur in 1979.

Many differences exist between the geopolitics of the early 1970s and the present day, between the politics of China then and Iran now, between the wars in Vietnam and Iraq. Some of these, however, also urge consideration of a bold U.S. outreach to Iran.

For example, claims of "Islamic fascism" notwithstanding, no ideological backdrop exists today comparable to communism and the Cold War. Likewise, despite arguments about a coherent Islamic "civilization," the Middle East is as diverse now as China seemed monolithic then.

It is true that going to China did not lead to a successful end to the Vietnamese conflict for Americans. But years later, that region is exceptionally prosperous. When President Bush cited "the long march" of history at an economic summit in Vietnam in November, it was not only the comparison between wars in Southeast Asia and Iraq that was called to mind; it was also the need to examine the seemingly unshakable moral rectitude -- and long-term significance -- of any foreign policy position.

Today, as a dramatic gesture of opening up relations, or at least discussions, with an entire region, where better than Iran?

There are reasons why such an option should not be considered. In fact, many of the core tenets of current U.S. policy follow from an unambiguous perception of Iran: a bellicose regime, already supportive of evildoers around the world, now seeks to develop nuclear weapons and export extremism, so it must be isolated and further sanctioned. Of course, those are also precisely the policies and perceptions that have the United States mired militarily in Iraq, reviled for lack of fair-minded attention to the problems of Palestinians and disparaged for failing to understand the complex politics of the region or specific allegations made about Israel.

The worst that could happen with outreach to Iran, after all, is that efforts at normalizing trade and diplomatic relations could fail. And in that case, evident to all around the world, the failure would not be for lack of principled U.S. action to bridge the divide. Time could indeed be lost as Iran seeks to develop its nuclear technology, but much more could be gained in the court of world -- and even national -- public opinion.

If, as the president says, all options truly remain on the table, shouldn't the White House at least entertain the possibility of such bold action and all it would symbolize around the world? Opening discussions would respond positively to the great hunger for substantive encounters with the United States expressed by so many Iranians. With a population doubled since the 1979 revolution, universities expanding and growing participation in the global economy and culture, many Iranians, especially the young, are making decisions now that will orient their country's future. Both at home and abroad, President Bush regularly indicates his desire to speak directly to people rather than governments or media. Nothing would speak so loudly and affirmatively as a personal visit.

Increasingly, from both sides of the newly aligned political aisle in Washington, there is recognition of the need for a regional solution to the problems in Iraq. As Mr. Nixon achieved by going to China, Mr. Bush could transform the politics in the region, and probably at home, by moving from isolation toward normalization and working with Iran rather than against it. That is, he could go to Tehran.