The United States and its NATO allies are going to have to re-double their efforts in Afghanistan and elsewhere over the next two years if the alliance is to survive.

Charles Skinner is relocating to Pittsburgh after 27 years as a foreign service officer specializing in U.S.-European relations (charles.b.skinner@gmail.com).

Afghanistan is the first land war and most challenging operation the transatlantic organization has ever undertaken. Unlike during the Cold War, failure would not immediately threaten the security of allied nations, but it would spell the end of NATO as the West's primary military tool for managing crises. It also would signal that Europeans and North Americans cannot manage together a new century in which we face a multiplying number of challenges.

There are plenty of signs that allied leaders have not fully awaken to the danger, and, unfortunately, the recent Riga summit did not lay these concerns to rest:

Allies have been slow to supply the additional troops sought by NATO commanders when NATO moved into southern Afghanistan and ran into trouble against resurgent Taliban forces.

Allied leaders had to be shamed at the summit into lifting restrictions on the use of their forces so they could quickly come to each others' aid.

Some allies have been reluctant to allow NATO to coordinate with other organizations providing development assistance in Afghanistan -- including the European Union, the United Nations and non-government organizations -- even though all agree that Afghanistan cannot be "won" by military force alone.

Many allies also have opposed formal partnerships with the "contact countries" that are fighting or working alongside NATO in Afghanistan -- Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea.

Some allies even have resisted a more ambitious role for NATO in training other countries' military forces -- although NATO obviously would benefit by having more capable forces available to share the burden of peacekeeping operations.

Criticism, to be sure, can be directed at both sides of the Atlantic. The Bush administration, critics point out, did not turn to NATO after 9/11 even though its European allies expressed their willingness to help by invoking NATO's collective defense provisions for the first time. And far from being too ambitious in pressing the agenda outlined above for Riga, the administration has not been ambitious enough. NATO should be at the center of transatlantic consultations and actions on all threats to transatlantic security, from Iran's nuclear ambitions to the crisis in Lebanon.

The chief debilitating factor in transatlantic relations, of course, has been Iraq, both because of the initial differences over taking military action there and the present dilemmas about what to do now.

Against the backdrop of mounting casualties in Iraq, allied publics are unsure about NATO's chances to succeed in Afghanistan. Allied leaders, like Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair and NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, have assured us that Afghanistan remains "winnable."

But while the Bush administration has rebuilt good working relationships with European officials, allied leaders who have opposed the Iraq War and countries where opposition to the war was strongest have found it difficult to increase their commitment to Afghanistan.

Given this politically difficult situation and the compelling case for NATO to succeed, how should the alliance move forward following the Riga summit?

A key step is securing greater European involvement. The United States needs to begin by recognizing -- and publicly acknowledging -- that the Europeans already are more engaged in the quest for world security than anyone might have imagined possible at the end of the Cold War, when Europe appeared inclined to turn in upon itself.

One of the administration's most brilliant moves was supporting the trilateral Franco-British-German initiative on Iran. The jury is still out on this gambit, but the Europeans are deeply committed.

We should tell them we are ready to support their lead elsewhere. They are better placed than we are, for example, to elicit the involvement of key players in the Middle East, Russia and China. France and Italy already have taken the lead in Lebanon. We should intensify our support -- particularly in the current crisis.

We should encourage them to take the lead, perhaps in tandem with the Egyptians and other regional players, in tackling the Israeli-Palestinian impasse, as well. Europeans in recent years have doubted our commitment to the Middle East peace process, which they see as the solution to the region's troubles. They recognize that our support and close cooperation remains essential, especially our assurances of security for the Israelis. Letting them take the lead would remove their doubts and increase their involvement.

At NATO, the United States has traditionally set the agenda. Over time this has discouraged European buy-in. The election of a new French president at the end of April offers an opportunity to re-shape France's military relationship with the alliance and break the impasse in NATO-EU relations.

We should encourage the new French president to develop a plan that would include how NATO could support not only the French-led mission in Lebanon but also an EU-led Middle East peace process. Considering the difficulties we have encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would be helpful to have NATO planning and training for such a mission begin right away.

Germany holds the EU presidency in the first half of 2007, and it could be helpful in launching a constructive process. Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, a former president of the European Commission, could bring a wealth of experience. The United Kingdom, it should go without saying, is best placed to guide us in this effort. Indeed, all our allies have key roles to play.

In the run-up to the Riga summit, administration officials stressed that transatlantic relations today are more about what Europe and America can do together in the rest of the world than about their dealings with each other. Unfortunately, there are problems in the relationship that are keeping all of us from being effective.

The lesson of Bosnia -- and Iraq -- is that we need to stick together. Today's challenges in Afghanistan and elsewhere are so great that we do not have the luxury of wallowing in old and outmoded arguments.