MELVILLE, W.Va. -- Mine safety officials investigating a fire that killed two men inside the Aracoma Coal Co.'s Alma No. 1 mine believe a crucial section of wall that separates a coal conveyor belt from an air intake was not in place as required at the time of the blaze.

The conveyor belt ignited on the morning of Jan. 19, pouring smoke through the gaps in the wall and into the fresh air passageway that the miners were supposed to use for their escape, obscuring their vision and ultimately leading to the death of two of them.

"It seems like there were some blatant things wrong," said one mine safety official who, along with two others, spoke to the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette on the condition of anonymity. "It's going to turn out that these guys ultimately couldn't escape for that reason -- there were stoppings out that should have been in place."

If they'd been in place, the wall sections would have prevented any exchange of air between the conveyor belt and the fresh air intake, the primary source of air for workers inside the mine. Instead, investigators now believe, smoke flooded into the air intake, which also serves as an escape route, disorienting two of the miners, who became lost and died in the fire.

The two men, Ellery Hatfield, 47 and Don Bragg, 33, died of carbon monoxide poisoning when they became separated from 10 other members of their crew. The others held hands and edged through the air intake amid dense smoke.

Federal and state investigations into the fire are continuing.

The federal Mine Safety and Health Administration last month issued an advisory to its 11 district offices to check for any missing stoppings in other mines. Inspectors were advised that two such walls -- each 18 feet long and 6 feet wide -- were missing in the Alma mine when investigators arrived.

Massey Coal Co., which operates the Aracoma mine, did not return repeated phone calls seeking comment.

According to the MSHA Web site, the Aracoma mine has been cited for 172 violations since the Jan. 19 fire, 115 of them considered "significant and substantial." That compares with 105 violations for all of 2005 and the days leading up to the Jan. 19 fire. Only 54 of those were considered "significant."

Nearly a dozen of the most recent citations referred to violations of federal regulations on ventilation, including adequate barriers between air intake and machinery areas and proper pre-shift safety inspections.

Federal officials say they expect to refer the results of the investigation to the United States attorney in Charleston, W.Va. for possible prosecution for false documentation related to the missing stoppings.

Charles T. Miller, U.S. attorney in West Virginia's southern district, said yesterday that he could not comment on any possible investigations.

Before the fire, the mine was last inspected Jan. 3, a process that is described as "ongoing" on the MSHA Web site. Those reports do not indicate whether federal or state inspectors noticed any missing stoppings.

Investigators have conducted interviews with employees at Aracoma and have asked why the stoppings were not in place.

The pace and relative secrecy of the Aracoma probe has frustrated Freda Hatfield, Ellery Hatfield's wife, who said she was interviewed by state investigators but told nothing about what they have learned.

Under federal rules, the mining company is allowed to have a representative present during the questioning of witnesses, but families of the dead miners are not similarly represented. Federal rules also do not require witnesses to answer questions in private interviews.

"I talked with the people in the state, but they wouldn't tell me nothing," Mrs. Hatfield said. "Every time I asked them a question, they said they couldn't tell me anything. I said, 'Well, what do you want me here for? To watch me cry?' "